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BOUNDARY CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By ROBERT L. SOLOMON*

I. Western Boundary Concepts and Practices

TERRITORY is important to people; the manner in which it is divided up is often critical. The European approach to territorial problems developed mainly in response to European historical experience; the traditional literature in the fields of geography and history makes scant reference to non-Western boundary concepts and practices. European and Southeast Asian approaches to territorial issues differ significantly. In the aggregate, the differences are imposing, if somewhat abstract; in detail, the continuing disparities in outlook and administrative practice are of considerable relevance to current policy decisions.

This analysis will attempt to develop models of Western and Southeast Asian experience by reference to historical example. The intent is to demonstrate the influence of the local environment on the development and interaction of two rather distinct ways of thinking about boundaries, territory, and sovereignty.

Some of the principal common assumptions of modern Western boundary concepts may be summarized as follows.

It is necessary and desirable for every state to have boundaries that can be represented by lines drawn on maps. Except for inaccessible or unimportant remote areas, these boundaries should be suitably demarcated on the corresponding terrain. Boundaries should be codified in treaties and sanctioned by law. Where boundaries do not exist, or old ones no longer apply, they should be drawn (just as, when no maps exist, or present maps are poor, new maps should be drawn). Thus, one statement on the function of boundaries between modern states: "The character of the modern state necessitates the establishment of clear-cut limits of its area of authority and organization. For all its multifarious activities . . . its territory must be clearly bounded, not by frontier areas, but by unmistakable lines. Such lines are inter-state boundaries. Without them, the present system of states might well be reduced

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to a chaotic condition, since it would be impossible to know where the sovereignty of one state ended and that of another began."[1]

A frontier, as opposed to a boundary line, is regarded as a zone of less contact and hence of less definition, and it is expected that all frontiers will, sooner or later, be resolved into boundaries. Boundaries must be drawn so as to include all of the territory of the sovereign state. The purpose of a boundary is ". . . to mark in no unmistakable manner the limit of the territory in which the state exercises its sovereign power with all the trappings which that exercise carries with it."[2]

"A state without territory is not possible."[3]

"On one and the same territory there can exist one full sovereign state only."[4]

"In the ideology of modern international politics all states are sovereign and every piece of the earth's surface must . . . be the rightful legal possession of one and only one such state."[5]

A state is thus defined *territorially*, and state sovereignty resides within the totality of the national territory.

COLONIAL PRACTICES

What we have referred to as "Western concepts" are illustrated in the political and administrative practices of the European colonial powers in their ventures into Asian territory.

When they arrived in Southeast Asia, the Europeans were confronted with an extremely dynamic—and therefore precarious—situation. Historical movements of lowland peoples, under way for centuries, were continuing, and these movements exerted pressure on uplanders as well.[6] Lowland states were engaged in what seemed to be perennial warfare. The Vietnamese were expanding[7] to the south at the expense of the Lao. The Thais increased the pressure on both Lao and Khmer (Cambodian) realms with their own ventures to the east.

The local powers were constantly embroiled in disputes over succession and other quarrels. Long before the Europeans arrived, Thai-

[1] A. E. Moodie, *Geography Behind Politics* (London 1961), 73.

[2] *Ibid.*, 81. (Moodie is a geographer.)

[3] L. Oppenheim, in H. Lauterpacht, ed., *International Law*, 8th edn. (New York 1955), 451.

[4] *Ibid.*, 452.

[5] E. R. Leach, "The Frontiers of Burma," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, III (October 1960), 49. (Leach is an anthropologist. This view is not his own, but his interpretation of "European myth.")

[6] For a discussion of the relations between lowlands and upland peoples, see below, p. 9.

[7] For a stimulating interpretation and further references, see M. G. Cotter, "Toward a Social History of the Vietnamese Southward Movement," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, IX (March 1968), 12-24.

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land and Vietnam had repeatedly intervened in the internal affairs of their weaker neighbors, seizing opportunities provided by contested succession in the strife-torn Laotian and Cambodian kingdoms.[8]

Because of the conflicts between the older peoples—such as the Pyus, Mons, Khmers, and Chams—and the newer immigrants—the Burmans, Thais, and Vietnamese—"the shape of mainland Southeast Asian boundaries had not yet become stabilized"[9] when the colonial powers arrived.

Not only were there no stable, delimited, or demarcated boundaries, but even the concept of a boundary line was alien to the Southeast Asian experience. Within the region, the functional equivalent of borders consisted of zones of contact and intermittent positional warfare, within which the limits of extension of the "sovereignty" of each kingdom or principality were determined by a power-relation that was always subject to change.[10]

The legal and cartographic instruments of border definition were also absent,[11] as was a tradition of nationalism that attached anything more than bargaining value to remote territory, whose inhabitants hardly identified themselves with the lowland centers. Though the essence of sovereignty was of great importance, the territorial aspect of sovereignty was in fact negotiable.

The original European interlopers in Asia, from the Portuguese to the Dutch, English, French, and Spanish, wished primarily to develop trade. Since it was more difficult to control than to conquer new territory, and cost-conscious colonial powers had limited resources (especially of manpower), the acquisition of territory was, at first, of only secondary interest.

This interest eventually became a steadily growing one, for economic and security reasons. The Dutch, for example, found island trading to be insufficiently profitable unless a monopoly could be enforced by political and military means. The Portuguese, confronted with similar problems, were originally content to control only selected strategic out-

[8] For fascinating accounts, see *The Dynastic Chronicles, Bangkok Era: The Fourth Reign*, translated by C. K. Flood, I and II (Tokyo 1966).

[9] Alastair Lamb, *Asian Frontiers* (New York 1968), 39.

[10] Thus the British historian Harvey could write of a "bedlam of snarling Shan states" that, to the European eye, were "wriggling like worms."

[11] The following entry occurs in *The Dynastic Chronicles*, 368: "It was contemplated by the King that the Mekong River separated the territory of Siam from those of Cambodia and Vietnam. Now France had been surveying and marking maps of the river area, and France was the only country that was doing this. It seemed unwise for the Siamese not to do the same. The King therefore commanded [a nobleman] to seek out and hire an Englishman who had experience in map-making. [The nobleman] *hired a Mr. D. . . . .*"

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posts that would have allowed them to dominate island trade through pre-eminence on the seas. For over a century, the British in India "managed to limit their Indian possessions to the minimum area which they felt was called for as a base for their commercial operations." However, "once in possession of one Indian province, the British were faced with the problem of the security of that province's frontier with districts not under their control. Frontier crises led to trans-frontier campaigns and the extension of the Frontier."[12] And, "once firmly established in India, the British felt obliged to assume control over confused or hostile border areas such as Burma, which were incapable of withstanding the mobilized power of the subcontinent."[13]

The economic incentive for expansion in quest of stable and profitable resources was matched by a territorial drive spurred on by competition among the colonial powers. The gradual British conquest of Burma, which lasted three-quarters of a century, and the somewhat more precipitate French expansion in Indochina brought these two major powers into a progressively more dangerous confrontation in the nineteenth century. The competing colonizers rushed toward each other's frontiers in their efforts to secure their own possessions and deny other prizes to their traditional rivals: "As indigenous power throughout Southeast Asia appeared in process of swift disintegration, the resulting surge of both British and French influence throughout the area gave promise of the development of a dangerous adjacency of borders in the near future."[14]

However, once these converging forces reached a certain critical distance from each other, the movement slowed and then reached a stalemate as diplomatic efforts were made to forestall any outbreak of hostilities. Although the British and French were both driven in their territorial ambitions at least partly by a sense of competition,[15] this competition tended to be self-limiting: while expanding, both empires strove to avoid direct contact, either through buffers or through the expedient of agreed borders. The imperial powers wished to avoid disastrous armed conflict with each other, and had enough experience

[12] Lamb, *Asian Frontiers*, 55.

[13] J. F. Cady, *Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development* (New York 1964), 380.

[14] Claire Hirshfield, "The Struggle for the Mekong Banks, 1892-1896," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, IX (March 1968), 25-27. This account makes extensive use of private papers that have only recently become available. See also Charles Crosthwaite, *The Pacification of Upper Burma* (London 1912).

[15] It is often written that the French indulged a "sentimental" desire to "reach the Mekong," which they originally hoped would provide them with a trade route to China. See J. L. Christian, "Anglo-French Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Its Historical Geography and Diplomatic Climate," *The Geographical Review*, XXXI (April 1941), 272-82, and Hirshfield.

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with misunderstandings and minor skirmishes to appreciate the real dangers of imperial confrontation. Restraint was an important element of the colonial boundary system. In colonial Southeast Asia, Thailand was the principal beneficiary of mutual caution on the part of the French and British. As Jean Gottman has written in a general context, "A boundary is not simply maintained in place because the political forces of the two 'compartments' which it separates reach an equilibrium in opposition to each other. Such a theory would assume that there is always opposition between one side and the other of a boundary, that the policy of every state worthy of the name tends toward territorial aggrandizement."[16]

Boundary lines are neither uniform nor homogeneous; they are not "political isobars."[17] A boundary is not only relational—a "momentary and transitory" expression of the power and interest of two adjacent polities—it may also be a factor for stability.[18] Agreement on the definition of borders can be an expression of mutual interest in avoiding conflict and, over time, a stable border can become an important element of the status quo.

Political and economic factors led the colonial powers to enlarge their dominions and then to strive for definition and codification of the limits of their sovereignty. Many of the colonial boundaries bore a superficial resemblance to the broad outlines of earlier indigenous states, though this was "the outcome not of any particular desire to preserve the older units, but . . . rather [a result of] the controlling influence exerted in this area of extremely accidented relief by the great riverine and sea routes, which had likewise moulded the earlier patterns."[19]

In spite of this apparent resemblance, a new and alien concept of boundaries had been introduced. Europeans brought artillery, treaties, and maps to Southeast Asia, and felt that they had introduced order and stability to the region. But the colonial administrative pattern in the hinterlands stayed roughly as it had been in precolonial days; there was little additional economic or governmental penetration of the interior fringe areas. The colonizers had arrived not overland but from the seas, and their presence was confined for the most part to lowland coastal areas; "except for a few important mining areas inland, the

[16] Jean Gottman, *La Politique des états et leur géographie* (Paris 1952), 139.
[17] A term misused by Jacques Ancel, in *La Géographie des frontières* (Paris 1938).
[18] See E. Fischer, "On Boundaries," *World Politics*, I (January 1949), 196-222.
[19] C. A. Fischer, "Southeast Asia: The Balkans of the Orient?" *Geography*, XXVII (November 1962), 355.

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coastal fringe was everywhere the principal scene of Western economic activity."[20]

In some remote areas, where reasonably suitable "natural" frontiers existed, the required level of boundary definition was not as great as in other places where there was immediate danger of costly confrontation with a rival. Thus, the British could afford to be vague in their attitude toward the frontier regions on the southern fringe of the Himalayas, which were not the object of colonial competition, but they had to reach a better defined, more stable equilibrium with the advancing French at the Mekong River. Still, the artificiality of even those boundaries that were agreed on in fairly specific terms is underscored by the fact that there was as little systematic administrative penetration and development in the remote upland interior of clearly defined colonial possessions as there was, relatively speaking, in the inaccessible Himalayan borderlands. The upland peoples who inhabited the remote areas where most borders were drawn remained isolated and were still left to their own ways. To this day, the legal status of many of these peoples remains undefined.

In spite of the absence of change in the local pattern of life, border areas had taken on a new identity, in the form of a definite legal and cartographic status. Linear boundaries were for the first time established in principle and given juridical and cartographic expression in Southeast Asia. The Europeans endowed former frontier zones with the status of linear boundaries, with only the slightest regard for the human and political geography of these areas. Still, marginal frontier zones, formerly areas of contact and interchange in theory as well as in fact, remained in fact what they no longer were in theory. As a result, "there is hardly a single international boundary in the whole of Southeast Asia which would not have called for 'rectification' by the Versailles treaty makers."[21]

Ill- or well-defined, the imperial frontier system was in the last resort maintained by imperial power. As long as the validity of colonial boundaries was insured by force, boundary disputes were not of great importance. In fact, a vital function of the colonial boundary system was to separate the respective colonial spheres, to avoid abrasive contact between the competing powers. Boundaries were drawn where buffers could not be found. It mattered little that the boundaries thus agreed upon had scant relation to the local way of life, as colonial boundaries were shaped mainly by the needs of the colonial powers.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Ibid.*, 366.

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In defining political-administrative boundaries, the colonial powers dealt with both internal and external divisions. Since internal boundaries were of less importance in the context of great power competition, they were drawn somewhat more haphazardly, causing problems for the successor states that later had to deal with them on a sovereign basis. For example, in India, "the border which the British settled upon between Sind and Kutch was tolerable so long as both regions lay within the same larger political unit. As an international boundary it was quite unsuitable."[22] Similarly, the boundaries running between Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia have been the object of disputes more difficult of settlement in their new capacity as international boundaries than they had been as internal colonial boundaries.[23]

In sum, the colonial powers both ignored local factors and introduced extraneous political considerations and alien concepts in the determination of colonial boundaries in Asia. The saving grace of the colonial boundary system was that, while it provided border security (protection against invasion or large-scale territorial encroachment), it never attempted to provide border control. Colonial boundaries never constituted a major obstacle to migrating or wandering peoples and did not significantly interfere with the normal pattern of human traffic in the traditional frontier zones.

As long as the colonial powers were on the scene to lend authoritative enforcement to their international boundaries and internal administrative divisions, these arrangements were neither unreasonable nor particularly damaging in their effects on local society. Movement of peoples continued across boundaries; administrative penetration was not radically or obtrusively increased.

Moreover, the imperial system had certain advantages for the colonial wards. Warfare ceased in an area that had hitherto been the scene of almost constant fighting. Though governmental presence did not become overbearing in remote areas where traditional migrations continued, a modicum of security from invasion was provided: one Vietnamese sage wrote that "when a mountain is inhabited by a strong tiger, the others will not dare to come disturb it any longer." J. T. McAlister, Jr. has written that, "ironically, through their adaptation of Vietnamese ambitions and traditional relationships, the French created in Southeast Asia a colonial empire that was a fulfillment of long-standing goals of Vietnamese expansionism. No longer was there any need

[22] Alastair Lamb, *Crisis in Kashmir, 1947 to 1966* (London 1966), 51.
[23] For a discussion of related problems, see below, p. 22.

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for an equilibrium. The power of France was equal to imperial dreams even greater than those of the Vietnamese."[24]

However, Vietnamese expansionist ambitions were neither totally nor permanently satisfied by the administrative arrangements that the French established in Indochina. Though French power was great, and, relatively speaking, acted to the advantage of the Vietnamese as against Laos and Cambodia, this power also restrained the Vietnamese from the kind of perpetual dominance over large portions of Lao and Cambodian territory that they might otherwise have eventually achieved.

Ironically, although the French satisfied the Vietnamese, they may also have kept alive the competing hopes for security of the weak Khmer and Lao states, in relation to both the Vietnamese and the Thais. When the French intervened in 1893, Laos, as has been the case for most of its history, was not a unified state. And as a result of Vietnamese expansion from the seventeenth century on, "the Khmers were pushed out of their villages into Cambodia or into marginal lands near the sea. Perhaps only French protection saved them from extinction or assimilation."[25]

II. The Southeast Asian Setting

All peoples divide up the space they inhabit in some distinct and customary fashion.[26] In spite of the existence of international legal and diplomatic standards, which have in some respects influenced political behavior in the region,[27] it is as wrong today as it was in the heyday of imperialism to assume that Western concepts invariably have the same meaning for Southeast Asians as they do for statesmen in the West.

Colonial boundaries in Southeast Asia were the product of interaction between forces exerted by the local environment and those influences introduced by the Europeans. Enduring differences in boundary concepts and practices are explained in part by peculiarities of the environmental setting and historical experience of Southeast Asia. Generally mountainous, the area is characterized by narrow north-south river valleys and few plains capable of supporting a dense population.

[24] J. T. McAlister, Jr., "The Possibilities for Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *World Politics*, XIX (January 1967), 265.

[25] Cotter, 18. See also Louis Malleret, "La Minorité Cambodgienne de Cochinchine." *Bulletin de la société des études Indochinoises*, XXI (1946), 26-33.

[26] This is a largely unexplored question of interest equally to the anthropologist and the geographer. For some interesting examples, see S. B. Jones, "Boundary Concepts in the Setting of Place and Time," *Annals*, Association of American Geographers, IL (September 1959), 241-55.

[27] For a discussion of this influence, see below, pp. 19ff.

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This results in an unbalanced geographic dispersal of peoples, with few centers of relatively great population density. This pattern of settlement has not only prevented regional political unification, but has also made access to and centralized administration of remote areas of unified countries difficult and sporadic.

The region is one of great, though sometimes exaggerated, ethnic complexity.[28] The basic ethnic division is usually referred to as that between "lowland" and "upland," or "valley" and "hill," peoples. Upland areas have been inhabited by groups of hill tribes or hill peasants in all periods of Southeast Asian history; ancient texts contain many references to them. With their unfamiliar ways, they were regarded as "wild tribes," beasts, or slaves by their lowland neighbors, even though during some periods they may have enjoyed equal levels of civilization. Some tribes still cherish oral traditions of their formerly dominant culture.

Along with these cultural differences, there has long been a pattern of interaction or "interpenetration"[29] between these groups of peoples. Each has profoundly influenced the religious practices of the other—lowland animism and upland "great-tradition" religions bear witness to this ongoing transfer. Some upland tribes were pushed into the hills by the influx and expansion of powerful valley and plains cultivators, and others have both influenced and been absorbed by lowland civilizations. The "wild tribes" have from time immemorial served as mercenaries and irregular fighters, and have trafficked in opium and other contraband. In spite of the fragmentation of the region, these contacts have always been present, and are becoming more intense as communications improve and incentives multiply. The government of the Republic of Vietnam has increased its efforts to win the loyalty of its highland peoples, and the Royal Thai government has responded to the same challenge through the Hill Tribe Division of the Ministry of Interior, as well as by creating the Border Patrol Police.

Many of the pressures on Southeast Asian boundaries stem from questions of ethnic identification and relations of central governments to minority populations. In the past, "tribal groups, discontented with their lot under a particular government, could easily shift countries by

[28] Areas of greatest ethnic complexity are for the most part concentrated in limited regions; for this reason, standard ethnolinguistic maps may appear somewhat misleading. Peter Kunstadter has written of Southeast Asia as "a series of patchworks of language, race, ethnic identification, religion and distribution of cultural traits . . . the patches on the quilts are larger in the valley-coast-delta plains areas. . . . The patches are smaller in the folds and creases of the more remote or isolated refuge areas of tribal groups," *Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities and Nations* (Princeton 1967), 13.

[29] See the seminal article by Edmund Leach, 49-73.

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crossing over an undefined or uncontrolled border without becoming a matter of concern to their new hosts."[30]

In Southeast Asia, the broad outlines of these "uncontrolled borders" were established in colonial times, in an era when geographers still debated the merits of "natural" versus artificial boundaries. Aside from administrative convenience, it was felt that terrain features such as mountains and rivers exercised a natural separating function that was readily transferable to the political sphere. For example, "for the lowlanders, once established in the valleys, the mountains have proved to be effective barriers to large-scale movements of population except . . . when the area has been under the pressure of warfare."[31] The key phrase in this passage is "for the lowlanders." Upland peoples have not felt equally constrained by these geographical barriers. As the British geographer Kirk has pointed out, "To mountain peoples mountains do not necessarily constitute barriers. This is a concept of lowlanders."[32]

Similar problems arise from the extensive use of rivers, streams, and canals as boundaries between Southeast Asian nations. On a small-scale map, a watercourse may appear to be an ideal natural boundary. Drainage is easier to represent on a map than is relief, which requires more complex cartographic techniques and is often more difficult to interpret from map sources. However, "except in the case of a few great rivers, a watercourse rarely constitutes a serious obstacle even for primitive man. On the contrary, it provides him with a double line of communication in its waters and along its valley floor, the valley floor itself forming a natural anthropogeographical environment."[33]

In the Southeast Asian geographical context, middle and lower river courses generally flow through lowland areas that support relatively dense population concentrations on the basis of irrigated agriculture. In such areas as the Mekong delta of South Vietnam, watercourses provide mobility and facilitate contact rather than separating distinct communities. The people who share a river or stream, living on opposite banks, nominally of different nationalities, often have more in common with each other than they do with their highland compatriots. To them, the presence of a legal border means very little, even if, as their pattern of life remains the same, they suddenly discover they are "smuggling" instead of trading.

[30] Kunstadter, 29.

[31] *Ibid.*, 9.

[32] William Kirk, "The Inner Asian Frontiers of India," *Transactions*, Institute of British Geographers, xxxi (December 1962), 156.

[33] Y. M. Goblet, *Political Geography and the World Map* (London 1955), 164. This statement applies to cultural, as opposed to military, considerations.

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The primary function of any national boundary is to separate or divide the respective areas of political jurisdiction of two different polities. Thus, "boundaries of state territory are the imaginary lines on the surface of the earth which separate the territory of one state from that of another, or from unappropriated territory, or from the open sea."[34] Although these definitions are straightforward, boundary functions are complicated by many other factors. Boundaries serve both political and territorial functions. All boundary distinctions are artificial in the sense that they are man-made. A boundary that, politically, separates the territory of one state from that of another does not physically separate the two boundary states. Every boundary is an imaginary line and, regardless of the nature of the terrain in the vicinity of the line, its appropriateness and effectiveness depend upon the broad environmental context and its evolution over time. Most boundaries are, in the long run, subjected to pressures that may stretch, move, or breach the original line of division, while other pressures, on both sides, work in the direction of stability and enforcement. Other boundaries, or portions of them, may be extremely stable over time, either because they are in remote areas unaffected by human factors, or because they are in built-up areas where boundary functions have become routinized and virtually taken for granted. In such cases, the existence of a stable boundary may itself exert a stabilizing political influence.

The Southeast Asian environment has not generally enhanced boundary stability. The physical features chosen for boundary lines did not originally exert a true separating function. Rivers and streams encourage active relations between peoples, and mountain ranges do not constitute genuine obstacles unless they are supported by active administration and a sense of identification with the central government that adds to rather than detracts from the validity of the boundary. In an era marked by insurgency and infiltration across national borders, it would be unrealistic to expect Southeast Asian governments to attain complete control of population movements in frontier areas, which would require uniform acceptance of Western boundary concepts in addition to achievement of administrative capabilities unprecedented in the region. In fact, Southeast Asians have developed their own concepts and practices with regard to boundaries, territory, and sovereignty, and their present performance should be considered in relation to the standards that have evolved within the region.

[34] Oppenheim, 531.

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TERRITORIAL DIPLOMACY

Territorial diplomacy has been a consistent feature of inter-"state" relations in Southeast Asia from the earliest times to the present. The basic tenet of this strategy is that if expansion (when relatively strong) is alternated with territorial concession (when weak), in the long run losses should be minimized and intermediate bargaining advantages maximized. Even today, it is considered more important to use marginal territory for diplomatic purposes (that is, to acquire and then expend it) than merely to maintain control, especially since, in isolated areas, military conquest is more easily achieved than administrative control.

Properly applied, this policy confines destructive fighting to the enemy's lands, frontier marches, or buffer areas.[35] As long as the Thais, for example, were able to expand into non-Thai territory, subsequent losses of the same territory were tolerable because they did not involve Siam proper.

In spite of strenuous diplomatic maneuverings, Thailand was forced to surrender large tracts of territory. However, the result of this surrender of formerly Thai territory was not only to forestall or prevent futher territorial encroachments by the colonial powers, but also to increase border security in frontier regions that had previously been difficult to control and susceptible to local rebellions, border skirmishes, and invasion. Although Thailand, in contrast to the other nations in Southeast Asia, remained independent, it was nevertheless obliged to accept colonial dictation as to the location of its boundaries.[36]

Astute practice of territorial diplomacy was instrumental in allowing Siam to retain its independence while its neighbors were succumbing to colonial rule. Beset by both British and French colonial designs, King Mongkut stated in 1864 that "since we are now being constantly abused by the French because we will not allow ourselves to be placed under their domination like the Cambodians, it is for us to decide . . . whether to swim upriver to make friends with the crocodile or to swim out to sea and hang on to the whale."[37]

He then enunciated a policy that was to stand Siam in good stead for a century: "It is sufficient for us to keep ourselves within our house

[35] In one classic case, "Lan Chang and Ayutthaya . . . shared a common interest in maintaining the Khorat plateau as a wide border area between their two kingdoms. In wars between the Lao and the Siamese kingdoms, the Khorat plateau, by virtue of its intermediate location, formed a major battleground." C. V. Keyes, *Isan: Regionalism in Northeast Thailand* (Ithaca 1967), 7.

[36] See Hirshfield and Lamb, *Asian Frontiers.*

[37] A. L. Moffat, *Mongkut, The King of Siam* (Ithaca 1961), 124.

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and home; it may be necessary for us to forego some of our former power and influence."[38]

The Thais were recognized by their Southeast Asian neighbors as the most successful practitioners of this policy. One Vietnamese scholar wrote:

> The Siamese were able to preserve their independence. They are not obliged to defend their frontiers nor are they compelled to protect their interests. . . .
>
> If we are now willing to part with some of our territory . . . then we shall lose our entire country. . . . Therefore our best strategy now would consist in cutting off a portion of our territory on the frontier area and giving it to the French. Then they will defend these frontier regions for us. In exchange for an eternal peace favorable to the entire population, we shall merely lose a small portion of our country.[39]

With the passage of time, Thailand's stock of marginal territory has been exhausted. This valuable resource, and the manner in which it was meted out by Thai statesmen, played an important role in protecting Thailand's independence, while partly satisfying expansionist colonial ambitions. Between 1850 and 1909, Thailand lost about 90,000 square miles of territory, most of it in Cambodia and the Malay states, to the French and British. During World War II, Thailand, with Japanese cooperation, reasserted old claims and occupied parts of western Cambodia and the northern Malay states; when the war ended in defeat for Japan, Thailand again surrendered non-Thai territory to comply with the victors' demands. Since World War II, the loss of buffer territory has made Thailand a more vulnerable country; as Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman has stated, "We here in Thailand have no place to retreat to. No place to withdraw to. So we will make our first stand here—and our last."[40] In spite of ethnic problems in North and Northeast Thailand, those areas, unlike the Cambodian provinces that were annexed in wartime, are no longer considered dispensable by the Thai government.

Territorial diplomacy in fact depended upon, and was reinforced in theory by, a vivid sense of "center" as opposed to "periphery."[41] In

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] Truong Buu Lam, *Patterns of Vietnamese Response to Foreign Intervention: 1858-1900*, Monograph Series No. 11, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University (New Haven 1967), 90-91, citing *Memorials on Reforms* (*1866-1868*) by Nguyen Troung To.

[40] C. V. J. Murphy, "Thailand's Fight to the Finish," *Fortune*, LXXII (October 1965), 122-27.

[41] For example, Leach states that Nanchao "should not be thought of as a state with

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practice, the "periphery" could represent the area either of another country, of a vassal, or of a remote or mountainous region of the kingdom itself. For expanding "valley" civilizations, the terrain of transvalley hills was forbidding, and the hill peoples, even when conquered, were extremely difficult to control. Kautilya warned that "the king shall avoid taking possession of any country which is liable to the inroads of enemies and wild tribes and which is harassed by frequent visitations of famine and pestilence."[42]

The pattern of center and periphery conforms to the concentric cosmological world conception of Hindu mythology, with the throne as the center of the kingdom, and with the capital and the outlying provinces, vassalages, and neighboring realms represented as a series of concentric rings. Thus, a ready-made schedule of priorities was available to the statesmen of the kingdom.

Although it usually became necessary in the long run to yield conquered lands, the possession of alien territory did offer an interim advantage: it provided geographical insulation and diplomatic insurance. If the stock of disposable alien territory was exhausted, a vassalage could be yielded in time of duress. And if it came to the worst, peripheral territory could be given up in order to insure the maintenance of sovereignty in the kingdom's center. Thus,

> When a powerless king finds himself attacked by a powerful king, . . . he should submissively sue for peace on the condition of offering treasure, army, himself or his territory.[43]

> When by ceding a part of the territory, the rest of the kingdom with its subjects are kept safe, it is termed "ceded," and is of advantage to one who is desirous of destroying thieves and other wicked persons infesting the ceded part.[44]

Although frontiers were not usually well defined, problems of effective control did create a kind of frontier-sensitivity; with each country trying to maximize its territorial advantage, expansion and contraction were the only alternatives. In Kautilyan diplomacy, peace was war by other means. In this unstable international framework, the

borders but as a capital city with a wide and variable sphere of influence. The inhabitants of Nanchao had no specific identification with the state, there was no Nanchao nation which would be dispersed by the elimination of Nanchao as a separate entity." Leach, 56.

[42] Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, translated by R. Shamasastry, 8th ed. (Mysore 1951), 54. The *Arthashastra* of Kautilya, which dates from ca. 321-296 B.C., is an Indian classic of great vitality, written 2000 years before Machiavelli's *The Prince*, with which it is often compared.

[43] *Ibid.*, 268.

[44] *Ibid.*, 335.

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more a country was forced to contract, the more pressing would be its need for subsequent expansion if a long-run equilibrium was to be maintained.

The moving frontier was a means of gauging and aligning the international equilibrium. Sovereignty was not defined in a rigorous territorial sense. Marginal territorial concessions were not viewed as fatal to the kingdom. As long as the essence of sovereignty—the nuclear kingdom—was unimpaired, such concessions were a legitimate instrument of policy.

Even in peaceful times, order and surveillance were not easily maintained in remote areas. The capacity to administer remote areas, often peopled by wandering tribes, would not have permitted a strict territorial definition of sovereignty. Ethnically speaking, in Southeast Asia most of "the political entities in question had interpenetrating political systems, they were not separate countries inhabited by distinct populations."[45] Even within the broadly defined territorial limits of the state, the authority of the central government was not everywhere taken for granted, and similar conditions still apply in many areas of the subcontinent.

III. The Relevance of History

In theory, sovereignty was just as important to the most short-lived Southeast Asian principality as it was to the nations of Europe. The crucial difference was in content; in Southeast Asia, the preservation of sovereignty was less dependent upon the maintenance of absolute territorial integrity as defined by existing borders. The Vietnamese experience provides a ready example. While one eminent historian refers to "the continuous Vietnamese awareness of an insistence upon the territorial identity and integrity of the Vietnamese homeland,"[46] and another affirms that unlike other countries in Southeast Asia, "Vietnam during the nineteenth century, and earlier, was already a nation. The Vietnamese people possessed a definite territory, spoke one language, shared common traditions, and were born of a single historical experience,"[47] it is questionable how "definite" the presumed territorial identity and integrity really was. Politically, Vietnam was not truly unified, and ethnically there was, and still is, interpenetration rather than integration. Vietnamese emperors spoke grandly of "the mountains and rivers," but they did not rely on maps, treaties, and legalisms,

[45] Leach, *Comparative Studies*, 50.
[46] H. Benda, in the Preface to Truong Buu Lam, iv.
[47] Truong Buu Lam, 31.

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and the territorial aspect of their sovereignty was never clearly defined until French mapmakers and boundary commissions devoted themselves to that task. In a more contemporary case, prior to the change of government in March, 1970, Cambodia had stated its willingness to abandon all outstanding territorial claims against its neighbors in exchange for unilateral declarations expressing recognition of Cambodia within its present borders. Attainment of security was regarded as more important than the pursuit of minor claims to territory.

Most Southeast Asian countries owe their present boundary alignments to colonial action. The only conclusive way to settle boundary disputes is to determine accurately the whereabouts and nature of boundaries that were drawn during the colonial period, no matter how inappropriate some of these boundaries may have been. Even where local boundaries have a long history, their accurate definition has depended upon the techniques of surveying and cartography that Europe brought to Asia.

Colonial boundaries represented an alien superimposition on a dynamic indigenous civilization. These alien institutions survived, on the one hand because they were backed by force, and on the other hand because the rules of the game they established applied more to competing imperial powers than to the peoples whose lives they would have affected had they been enforced more strictly.

Colonial maps, treaties, and boundaries were adequate for Western needs, in that they resulted in territorial definition while avoiding costly colonial wars, but they were not particularly relevant to the local environment. The boundary system "kept the lid on," but after the departure of the colonialists, border disputes re-emerged between most of the contiguous countries in mainland Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless, the European impact altered the terms in which these issues were subsequently dealt with. Disputes now tend to be debated in legalistic terms, often with both parties relying on colonial maps, treaties, and administrative acts, and with the international forums of the United Nations, the World Court, and the press as the scene of their pronouncements; the successor states rarely resort to armed confrontation in conflicts over territory, their bellicose threats notwithstanding.

Although Southeast Asian leaders have generally adopted the form and style of their Western mentors and counterparts in dealing with foreign policy issues, it should by no means be assumed that they have thereby conclusively parted with traditional views and practices. It is sometimes easier to rely on verbal exchanges in the international arena than it is to sustain effective military and administrative control in re-

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mote areas. It was just as difficult for colonial administrators and advisors to extend effective central control to far-flung provinces as it had always been for the local rulers. This situation was in part the result of pre-colonial conditions and in part the result of colonial administrative techniques. The colonialists concentrated on hardening the perimeter, neglecting, as both their predecessors and successors have done, to build out to the fringe on a sound administrative basis.

The colonial legacy of Southeast Asian leaders was thus an ambiguous one. They inherited a boundary system that, in its broad outlines, was satisfactory enough as a territorial basis for modern nationhood. Yet their nations were not integrated ethnically, and they lacked the administrative apparatus either to enforce their borders or to build out to them. Military and police powers were not adequate, nor were they designed for operations in remote areas. Colonial administration did not re-structure bureaucratic incentives in a way that might have overcome the hardship and loss of status that service in the remote interior had entailed since the earliest days of the Southeast Asian court societies. This administrative heritage, which makes service in far-flung regions punitive or undesirable, is another example of the cumulative impact of past experience. Communications and technology are improving, if unevenly, but time-honored bureaucratic incentives are slow to change; often, entirely new administrative structures must be created to perform new functions, and novel financial arrangements have to be made. The inhabitants of remote areas had meanwhile become accustomed to being left alone, which in many cases they valued as non-interference, rather than being disappointed because of government "neglect." In short, the incentives, capabilities, and local environment all worked against the establishment of effective machinery for border control or strong government penetration in remote areas.

The outcome was a double standard in territorial policy. The Europeans insisted on definition, but they did not build up, and thus did not pass on, an effective legal or administrative apparatus that could have given practical meaning to the boundary system after colonial power had been withdrawn. These conditions have not changed significantly since the end of the colonial era. The United States has provided encouragement and assistance to its allies, Thailand and South Vietnam, in the development of improved border-control facilities, but the administrative picture is still much the same as it has always been. Old attitudes are protected, or insulated, by the new standards that permit propaganda and diplomacy to substitute, at least partly, for greater administrative penetration and more effective enforcement. Alliance

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policies, as in Thailand and Vietnam, have resulted in improved capabilities, but it is noteworthy that incentives have changed little. Foreign assistance, by providing a substitute for local effort, may even undermine incentives while raising capabilities.

Differences in boundary policy between Western and Southeast Asian nations are partly offset, and partly obscured, by the mixture of modern (international) and traditional (parochial) standards found in contemporary Southeast Asian statecraft. Past precedents of trading territory for national survival have not been forgotten. In modern terms, this practice has been translated into the tacit toleration of unauthorized use or occupation of parts of the territory of one nation by foreign forces or tribal migrants from another. Because so much importance has been attached to the formal aspect of sovereignty, these incursions take place on a *de facto* basis, and the official line either condemns or does not acknowledge a condition that the central government is powerless to contest. The Royal Laotian government is unable to deny use of its territory to either the Pathet Lao insurgents or the units of the North Vietnamese Army in transit to South Vietnam. Tribal refugees from the fighting in Laos have filtered across the border into Thailand. Cambodian officials have been powerless to prevent infiltration or occupation of Cambodian territory by Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army personnel.

It should be emphasized that boundary or territorial policy is composed of a set of interrelated, but not necessarily consistent elements, ranging from the detail of local administrative practices to the complexities of diplomatic debate. The following section undertakes an analysis of the varied components of boundary policy. Identification of these elements should lead to better understanding of the disparate pressures that shape policy at different levels, and may be of use in pinpointing those policy areas where foreign advice and assistance can most effectively be brought to bear.

IV. A Political Framework for Territorial Issues

In most of the developed world, boundaries are well defined, their jurisdictional rules are well observed, and political disputes no longer center on territorial issues (with the possible exception of disputes over territorial waters). Several factors contribute to these conditions:

a) Spectacular changes in military technology, particularly in nuclear weaponry and delivery systems, seem to have made political boundaries meaningless in case of war.

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b) In the developed West, the advanced evolution of state functions up to and at national boundaries has allowed the respective states' administrative "reach" or penetration to give full meaning to the concept of the boundary as the limit of sovereignty. Modern states are able to take their boundaries for granted because state power can, at least potentially, be applied as effectively in outlying areas as in the central regions.

c) With the spread of populations and administrative control, ambiguous frontiers were gradually subject to greater definition, and this development has resulted in precise maps that accurately portray definitive international boundaries.

In the developing world, however, boundary functions are still the object of acute interest, and what we may refer to as "boundary policy" is a legitimate area of national concern, involving a complex set of issues.

In terms of national policy, the significance of an international boundary is limited neither geographically nor politically to the immediate area in which the boundary line is emplaced. Boundary functions, and thus boundary policy, are related to several political levels, each of which involves diverse policy considerations:

a) *International* policy, affecting states other than those that share a specific boundary, often comes into play in boundary disputes. Declaratory policies and policies of action may be directed toward various international forums (the United Nations, the World Court, International Commission of Jurists, and certain regional organizations) or toward other countries, particularly allies, that are indirectly concerned. At the international level, there may be a whole set of policies with differing targets and objectives.

b) *Boundary-state* policies affect two or more states sharing the boundary in question, and may also vary; if a state shares borders with more than one other country, its policies regarding these borders may be the same, or different, and may be fixed either independently or in a manner that reflects the relation of policies and events affecting one boundary to outcomes at other boundaries.

c) *Domestic* considerations often influence boundary policy, in a manner that reflects the relative importance of various political groups as well as the transitory national priorities that relate domestic and international policy. Pronouncements for mass consumption may differ from the deliberations of the political elite

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(and its factions). Domestic minority policy frequently relates to boundary policy, particularly if there is a sizeable minority from (or identified with) an adjacent state. Similarly, if there is an emigrant (or other culturally related) group residing across the boundary, domestic options may be constrained.

d) *Local* policy affects areas in the immediate vicinity of, or along the lines of access to, the border, and local issues sometimes place considerable strain on policies set at other levels.

e) Within the larger political framework, qualities of the boundary and its local environment exert an influence on the nature and effectiveness of policy. These factors include:
   (i) accessibility of the border area (from each side);
   (ii) clarity (extent of delineation/demarcation) and appropriateness (relation to physical and human geography of the area) of the boundary;
   (iii) original purpose of the boundary (internal or international);
   (iv) evolution of state functions on each side of the boundary;
   (v) evolution of the local environment, especially patterns of settlement and mobility, on each side; has the populace adapted to the boundary in a way that tends to reinforce or to break down the separating function of the boundary?

f) Consistency, control, and coordination among the various policy levels are key factors in analyzing any boundary dispute. Many questions arise in this respect:
   (i) Consistency: Are international policies directed at different targets consistent with each other, or do they at least reflect a pattern that is designed to achieve a single purpose? Are international policies consistent with positions taken toward various boundary-states? Are there differences in relations with different boundary-states, or is there a uniform outlook on territorial issues? To what extent do these relations reflect the requirements of domestic politics? What possible precedents are created, and what outside interests are potentially affected by boundary policies?
   (ii) Control: What extent of control does the central government exercise over the application of state functions at the boundary or in remote areas in general? Are special problems created by minorities, refugees, dissidents, or groups such as smugglers and gunrunners?
   (iii) Coordination: How is policy influenced or constrained by the administrative apparatus available for the implementa-

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tion of policy at different levels? What bureaucratic structures are involved, and what are their capabilities? Do bureaucratic incentives influence the implementation of policy? Are there any special governmental instrumentalities involved? Is there conflict or competition among the services and agencies involved in dealing with border problems? What is the status of communications facilities, both vertically and horizontally?

Within the various dimensions of boundary policy, different attitudes or practices may occur. At each level, the options of one country toward another might be represented by six categories:[48]

nonconcern
cooperation
incursion
excursion
mutual hostility
irregular/unregulated uncontrolled movement

To illustrate the application of various boundary policy options at different levels, let us consider the following examples:

POLICIES OF COUNTRY A TOWARD COUNTRY B

Policy Level	Policy Option
international	nonconcern
boundary-state	cooperation
domestic	
elite	cooperation
mass	excursion (i.e., hostile propaganda)
minority (internal)	excursion (i.e., persecution)
local	excursion (clandestine exfiltration), uncontrolled migratory movement

In this example, there is no overt expression of international policy by either side, though there is cooperation between the two states sharing the boundary. The political elite of country A voices friendly sentiments toward its neighbor B, but, for its own reasons, it carries on a

[48] These terms are self-explanatory except for "incursion" and "excursion," which signify some form of aggression by one side or the other, short of mutual hostility or open war. Thus, for country A, excursion might stand for verbal abuse in an international forum, a propaganda campaign in the domestic press, or exfiltration of irregular or conventional military units; from the point of view of country B, the policies of country A would be regarded as incursions.

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campaign of vilification in the national press, for mass consumption, and it uses the minority population from the adjacent country as its scapegoat. Meanwhile, events at the local level are inconsistent with, or beyond the control of, expressed national policy. There is clandestine exfiltration across the boundary, blending in with uncontrolled migratory movement, which is itself the result of inadequate exercise of state functions at the border. In the case of country A, we might well ask, how do these contradictory elements add up, or how should we evaluate the "real" policy of country A toward country B? But before going on to this interesting question, let us consider one more example, that of countries Y and Z:

POLICIES OF COUNTRY Y TOWARD COUNTRY Z

Policy Level	Policy Option
international	mutual hostility
boundary-state	nonconcern (inaction)
domestic	
elite	mutual hostility
mass	nonconcern
local	cooperation

In this case, the representatives of the two countries berate each other with resounding invective in the United Nations, there is acrimonious litigation at The Hague, and relations are severely strained by a complicated legal dispute concerning jurisdiction over ten square miles of unproductive land astride a disputed boundary. However, the battle is waged in the international arena, and the governments of the two states express no practical concern with the problem in their day-to-day administration. The political elites of both countries are hostile to the claims of their rivals, but public opinion is not aroused by what seems to be a rather remote quarrel. Furthermore, the population in the vicinity of the border, which has never been clearly demarcated, is oblivious to the issue, and the related peoples on both sides of the disputed border continue to cooperate with each other as they have always done.

Both Country A and Country Y exhibit inconsistency in the options they have chosen at different levels of boundary policy. It is difficult to add up the contradictory elements and arrive at a judgment as to what either country's "real" policy is. Country Y appears to be in a state of hostility with its neighbor, at least if we listen to the charges it makes

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in the international arena, but this policy does not reach down to the local level, where cooperation continues. Country A, on the other hand, has a congenial official line, but it apparently tolerates use of its soil as a base for guerrilla incursions into its neighbor's territory.

These examples show that boundary policy is a complicated set of interrelated but not necessarily consistent elements, each of which must be analyzed in its proper context. In some cases, it would be wrong to regard specific *elements* of boundary policy as representative of national policy in general. In analyzing any boundary dispute, all factors in the broad political framework should be considered.

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INEQUALITY AND INSURGENCY IN VIETNAM

A Re-analysis

By JEFFERY M. PAIGE

ALTHOUGH the Department of State continues to attribute the war in Vietnam to "aggression from the North,"[1] there has always been a suspicion among more enlightened public officials and most academic critics of the war that economic discontent rooted in the inequitable tenure arrangements of the Vietnamese countryside might have some connection with the vigorous opposition of the Viet Cong to numerous Saigon governments. Thus it is surprising to learn that, on the contrary, support for the Saigon regime is most pronounced in provinces in which few peasants farm their own land, large estates were formerly owned by French or Vietnamese landlords, tenancy is widespread, and the distribution of land is unequal.[2] This finding is particularly striking since it is contrary to data from the rest of Southeast Asia. In Burma, for example *dacoity* and other forms of social disorder were most frequent in the deltaic area of lower Burma,[3] a region of extensive tenancy, unstable tenure, massive agricultural debt, and large-scale absentee ownership by Indian financial houses. In Thailand most social tension is concentrated in the northeast, a region of poor soil and shifting subsistence agriculture, and in the Menam delta immediately adjacent to Bangkok, where absentee holdings are farmed by tenants.[4] Most commercial agricultural land in Thailand is cultivated by owner-proprietors and it is this fact that explains much of the country's political stability. In the Philippines the Hukbalahap movement was concentrated in central Luzon,[5] again a region of extensive tenancy.

South Vietnam appears to be an exception to the general instability of tenant areas on the basis of Mitchell's statistical analysis. A combination of a superficial understanding of Vietnamese geography, agriculture, and social organization, and an over-optimistic use of regression analysis has made it possible for Mitchell to reverse the actual relation

[1] U.S. Department of State, "A Threat to Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam" (Washington 1961).

[2] Edward J. Mitchell, "Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam," *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 421-38.

[3] J. S. Furnival, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (New York 1956), 137-38.

[4] E. H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York 1961), 244.

[5] *Ibid.*, 214.

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between tenure and insurgency. Specifically, the principal errors seem to be:

1. Misinterpreting the relation between land tenure and political instability in both the French and English Revolutions.
2. Combining radically different forms of agricultural organizations, including plantations, commercial tenant farms, and subsistence smallholdings, into overall indices of inequality or tenancy.
3. Using as an index of insurgency the strength of Republic of Vietnam control in 1965, a period of large-scale guerrilla warfare with extensive foreign participation on both sides.

Mitchell attempts to interpret his surprising statistical relation between tenancy and insurgency by drawing general parallels with agrarian conditions in both the English and French Revolutions. In all three cases political docility on the part of peasants is said to depend on personal and legal ties to the lord in a traditional tenure system. In addition, the landlord controls the peasant by manipulating credit and calling in the militia when he observes signs of incipient political deviance. Poor peasants, those in high tenancy areas, and those subject to absentee landlords are supposed to have been particularly docile in both the English and French Revolutions. Actually, the relations among land tenure, size of holding, landlord-peasant relations, rural poverty, and revolution are considerably more complicated than Mitchell suggests, and England and France are contrasting cases in some respects. In England, peasant disorders and support for the party of Parliament were concentrated in the south and west, particularly in areas close to London. This region was also an area of large holdings, extensive tenancy, few small owner-operated farms, and relative affluence, at least among farm tenants. In the more remote northern areas, where traditional English feudal arrangements based on domain lands and fragmented, widely dispersed tenant holdings persisted, the peasants remained loyal to the Crown.[6] These two distinct patterns of land-use developed out of the gradually increasing production of wool for urban and international markets. The growth of markets and the possibility of profits converted many of the wealthier peasants and feudal seigneurs into commercial farmers. Since sheep-raising is most efficiently conducted on fairly large holdings, the highest profits were to be had by

[6] For a summary of tenure arrangements in the English Revolution see Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston 1966), 3-39; or R. H. Tawney, *The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century* (London 1912), *passim.*

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consolidating small peasant holdings and bringing the commons and waste into production wherever possible. The growth of commercial farming created the conditions for the extensive enclosure movements of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. In areas of extensive commercial agriculture the poorer peasants were forced off the land entirely and the remaining large tenant farmers were considerably more prosperous than either the peasants they evicted or the small-holders in traditional areas of northern England. If a statistical analysis similar to Mitchell's were applied to seventeenth-century England it would show that in the areas of greatest Royalist control there was little tenancy, holdings were small and scattered, and absentee interests controlled little of the land. The relation between land-tenure arrangements and revolutionary activity in seventeenth-century England appears to have been precisely the opposite of Mitchell's findings for Vietnam.

The relation between forms of tenure and revolution in France seems to support Mitchell's line of argument, but the apparent similarity to the findings for Vietnam is largely coincidental. In France the most important commercial farm product was, of course, the wine grape, and the gradual extension of the market into subsistence areas followed a somewhat different pattern than it did in England. Wine-grape cultivation is labor-intensive and enjoys no appreciable economies of scale. Thus, small-holders were effective economic competitors and could use traditional peasant holdings for commercial production. Commercial agriculture was conducted largely by small peasant owner-proprietors rather than by prosperous tenants on large estates, as was the case in England.[7] In areas where wine production was extensive there were many small holdings, nobles were neither numerous nor wealthy, and many aristocrats lived on the land, managing their own estates. In the west, particularly in the Vendée,[8] where neither grapes nor marketable grains were produced, there were no commercial pressures to change the traditional feudal order, and consequently the agricultural system consisted of large estates owned by absentee nobles, fragmented peasant small-holdings, and large numbers of tenants and sharecroppers working the domain lands. The peasants of the Vendée were notably resistant to the French Revolution and participated in a massive counter-revolutionary insurrection against the newly installed Revolutionary regime. The monarchial loyalties of the Vendée, then, seem to lend

[7] Moore, 46-48; T. F. Marburg, "Land Tenure and the Development of Western Society," in W. Froelich, ed., *Land Tenure, Industrialization, and Social Stability* (Milwaukee, 1961).

[8] Charles Tilly, *The Vendée* (New York 1967).

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support to Mitchell's analysis of Vietnam. In both cases areas resistant to revolutionary activity were characterized by tenancy, large estates, and absentee landlords.

The French and English Revolutions seem to present contrasting evidence on the relation between tenure and insurgency. Actually they do not. Although the exact form of commercial tenure arrangements can have a substantial effect on political activity,[9] the most important variable in both the English and French Revolutions was the penetration of the market into formerly subsistence areas. Market penetration can lead to the consolidation of small landholdings into large estates worked by tenants, as it did in England, or to small owner-operated plots, as it did in France. In either case, the more commercial the agriculture the greater the likelihood of radical political activity. This is the principal argument of Tilly's *The Vendée*,[10] which Mitchell cites as a basis for his own theorizing.

The expansion of commercial markets radically alters the social conditions of peasant existence, and it is these changes that create the preconditions for revolution. The most important change is the increased dependence of the peasant on national and international price fluctuations and a consequent increase in the general instability of agricultural income. Though agriculture is always a risky business, the normal risks of drought, frost, and storm are vastly increased by the possibility of surplus and falling prices. As he becomes increasingly involved in commercial agriculture, the peasant will very likely become dependent on a single cash crop and will be less capable of insulating himself from market fluctuations by varied crops. He will become more dependent on manufactured goods for both consumption and farm work and on urban sources of capital and credit. The market is likely to bring the peasant into contact with urban bourgeois interests, to undermine the feudal system of noneconomic personal exchange, to develop a rational calculative orientation toward costs and contributions of peasant and lord, to expose the peasant to political and social trends originating in cities, to increase interest in roads and other internal improvements affecting the flow of agricultural commodities, and to increase the possibilities of extensive agricultural indebtedness. All of these changes create an increased likelihood that the peasant will be drawn into na-

[9] For an analysis of commercial tenure forms and their possible effects on political activity see Arthur Stinchcombe, "Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (Sept. 1961), 165-76.

[10] Actually, Tilly calls the process "urbanization," but his use of the terms refers more directly to the extension of the market than it does to the growth of population aggregates.

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tional political disputes that were formerly of little concern to him. The extension of the market and the resulting political mobilization of the peasant are the fundamental forces behind the attacks on the *ancien régime* in both England and France. As we shall see, they are also the most important variables in understanding Communist insurgency and other movements of the discontented in South Vietnam.

Even though the theoretical implications Mitchell draws from earlier revolutions are questionable, he might have found some valid empirical relationships in his data had he paid more attention to the actual form of agricultural organization in Vietnam. Instead, his summary statistics disguise several radically different systems of agriculture. Traditional Vietnamese rice cultivation[11] was organized around the village as the basic productive and land-controlling unit. Control of the village was exercised by a council of village elders who would redistribute community land every three years in response to changing population patterns and family needs. Much of the land was held by small owner-proprietors, and the proportion in communal hands varied from approximately 25 percent in Tonkin to 2 percent in Cochin China.[12] Large land-holdings existed in theory only, as a result of large bequests by the Emperor in return for service in the Imperial bureaucracy or army, and reverted to the emperor on the death of the beneficiary. Although former mandarins were occasionally able to maintain control of large holdings for several generations, particularly in the Mekong delta region far from the centers of Imperial power, private proprietary interests were never as important politically as they were in the feudal systems of the West or Japan. This form of agricultural organization developed first in the Tonkin delta and spread gradually southward over central and south Vietnam. Communal tenure persisted under colonial rule in Tonkin and Annam, but nearly vanished in Cochin China, where it had only recently been established at the time of the French conquest. In South Vietnam today many of the northern coastal lowlands from approximately Mui Deui to the 17th parallel are regions of intensive rice cultivation, strong village organization, and traditional tenure arrangements.[13] Although river deltas provide occasional stretches of extremely fertile soil, much of the land is poorer than that in the Mekong delta, and agriculture is still largely at a subsistence level.

Conditions in Cochin China were vastly different under colonial rule,

[11] R. W. Lindholm, "An Economic Development Oriented Land Reform Program for Vietnam," in Froelich, 180-91, or Jacoby, 158.

[12] Yves Henry, *Economie Agricole de l'Indochine* (Hanoi 1932), 213.

[13] H. H. Smith and others, *Area Handbook for Vietnam* (Washington 1967), 16.

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and these differences persist in contemporary South Vietnam. This was the only region directly administered by the French, and most of the large land concessions were granted in this area.[14] Almost all commercial rice production for export is concentrated in the Mekong delta, and it is here that proprietary interests are strongest, tenancy most widespread, and land ownership by absentee interests most important. Though rice production occupies almost the entire rural population in what was formerly Cochin China, there are sizable rubber plantations along the southern plateau of the Annamite range north of Saigon. These vast estates are owned principally by large French companies such as Michelin and the famous Société des Terres Rouges.[15] Although employing only a small percentage of the Vietnamese population (55,000 Vietnamese worked on plantations in 1960[16]), these estates show up in startling ways in the statistics on the ownership and distribution of land reported by Mitchell.[17] Thus we find that Phuoc Tuy province has the most unequal distribution of land of any province of Vietnam in 1960. It is totally unreasonable to lump this province, with 26 percent of its cultivated acreage in huge rubber estates, with provinces like An Giang that are almost totally devoted to rice production. Similarly, Long Khan, which has the lowest percentage of owner-operated land in Vietnam, has no rice acreage whatsoever and employs its meager resources of arable land almost entirely in rubber production. There are, in fact, six provinces (Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Long Khan, Phuoc Tuy, and Tay Ninh)[18] that have sizable areas in rubber, all of which appear as areas of widespread tenancy and highly unequal land distribution in Mitchell's statistics. The distribution of rubber plantations explains the otherwise puzzling fact that these six provinces, despite their large estates, have little land subject to transfer under Diem's land-reform ordinance.[19] Only rice lands were included in the land-reform program.

In addition to these primary agricultural activities, a substantial number of Vietnamese in infertile coastal regions supplement their meager agricultural production by fishing. This is particularly true in the arid littoral from Vung Tau, in Phuoc Tuy province, to Mui Dieu, in Khan Hoa province. In this region rice acreage is very low, and many of the villages are clustered in coves or sheltered bays rather than being spread

[14] See Henry, Table on p. 227.
[15] See data on plantation size, production, and corporate ownership in United States Operations Mission to Vietnam, *Annual Statistical Bulletin*, v (1961), 76-77.
[16] U.S.O.M., 9.
[17] Mitchell, 431.
[18] U.S.O.M., 76.
[19] Mitchell, 431.

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out across the rice fields as is usually the case in the rest of Vietnam.[20]

All four of these different forms of agricultural organization are combined in Mitchell's indices, with rather confusing results. Does a very unequal distribution of land represent a) huge rice holdings in an area of extensive commercial rice production and tenancy, b) a combination of subsistence rice production and rubber plantations, or c) an occasional large rice estate in the midst of many small and poor farms owned by farmer fishermen? Surely any reasonable analysis of revolution should concern itself with the form of agricultural organization as well as with aggregate statistics on tenancy or inequality. When such an analysis is carried out for Vietnam the results are the opposite of those reported by Mitchell.

Table I presents summary data on the 26 provinces studied by Mitchell, grouped regionally according to economic geography. Four more or less homogeneous regions can be distinguished—the dispersed river

TABLE I. LAND TENURE AND LAND USE BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION

	COASTAL LOWLANDS NORTH	COASTAL LOWLANDS SOUTH	PLATEAU SOUTH	DELTA
Number of provinces	6	3	5	12
Colonial administration	Annam	Annam	Cochin China	Cochin China
Mean rice area (thousands of hectares)	72	23	20	139
Mean rubber area (thousands of hectares)	0	0	8	0
Mean ratio; ha. rice land/capita	.12	.11	.10	.29
Rice-exporting provinces as a percent of all provinces	0	0	20	91
Mean percent communal land	41	38	—	3
Mean percent owner-operated land	56	44	41	36
Mean coefficient of variation in size of holding	1.11	1.94	1.86	1.48
Mean percent Vietnamese land subject to transfer	0.0	0.7	2.2	19.9
Mean percent French land subject to transfer	0.3	8.8	0.8	14.6
Mean percent of all land subject to transfer	0.3	9.5	3.0	34.5

deltas of the northern coastal zone, the arid southern coastal zone, the grey- and red-soil region of the southern plateau of the Annamite range,

[20] Smith and others, 16.

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and the Mekong delta.[21] The sparsely populated provinces of the central highlands have been excluded, as they were in Mitchell's analysis. The data on rice and rubber acreage, and rice acreage per capita were computed from 1960 statistics compiled by the Agency for International Development.[22] The information on provinces exporting rice and on the percentage of communal land were both obtained from Henry's[23] summary of the 1929 French colonial cadastration. Although there may have been some changes, particularly in the percent of communal land since 1929, Mitchell[24] indicates that this survey compares well with contemporary estimates of land holdings. Provincial boundaries, particularly in the delta, have changed since 1929, so that frequently the summary statistics for a province represent only a rough approximation to the area included in 1960. In all cases computations have been based on 1960 provincial boundaries.

The last five indices were all computed directly from data presented in Mitchell's original article. The coefficient of variation of the distribution of land-holdings by size is simply the standard deviation of the distribution of land-holdings divided by the mean. A large score indicates an inequitable distribution. Land subject to transfer refers to rice estates over 100 hectares in size, which are subject to redistribution under Diem's land-reform measures.

The four regions differ dramatically in the patterns of land-use revealed by these summary statistics. Rice production is most important in the delta and the northern coastal lowlands, with the mean acreage per province for the delta exceeding that for the lowlands by a ratio of about two to one. Neither the southern lowlands nor the plateau has any substantial rice acreage. All the rubber acreage, on the other hand, is concentrated in the southern plateau region. The data on rice exports, rice area per capita, communal land, the various indices of ownership, and the size of holdings clearly differentiate the different agricultural systems. The northern coastal region is characterized by a scarcity of agricultural land compared to the principal rice-producing areas of the delta. Both the absence of rice exports and the substantial amount of communal land indicate that the subsistence agricultural pattern of

[21] Northern coastal zone: Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, and Phu Yen provinces. Southern coastal zone: Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan. Southern plateau: Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, Long Khan, Phouc Tuy. Delta: An Giang, An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Dinh Tuong, Kien Giang, Kien Hoa, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, Long An, Phong Dinh, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long.

[22] U.S.O.M., for rice area, 71; rubber, 76; population, 5.

[23] Henry for export figures, 332-33; communal land 144-45 (Annam), 154-81 (Cochin China).

[24] Mitchell, 427.

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Imperial Vietnam persists in this region. Since commercial agriculture is unlikely, wealthy French and Vietnamese did not invest here, and there are almost no estates large enough to be included in the land-reform program. A traditional Vietnamese agricultural pattern means that land is equally distributed (coefficient of variation = 1.11) and a large percentage of cultivators own their own land. The commercial rice-producing areas in the delta present a very different pattern. There is a relative abundance of rice land per capita, although the data on exports suggest that much of the rice is not consumed in the area. Tenancy and land inequality are appreciably greater here than along the northern coast, and the great majority of large French and Vietnamese estates are concentrated in this region. Thus, the northern coast and the delta represent extreme points on a continuum ranging from traditional subsistence agriculture to large-scale commercial production. Market penetration, with its politicizing effects, is considerably more advanced in the delta than it is along the northern coast. The substantial social and psychological changes produced by these different systems have long been noted in Vietnam. Gourou, for example, contrasts the peasants of Cochin China with those in the Tonkin delta, where traditional Vietnamese agriculture, similar to that in the northern coastal zone, is practiced. "The inhabitant of Cochin China has much less of the peasant mentality than the inhabitant of Tonkin. The Tonkin peasant [is] strongly attached to his land, dreams of increasing it patch by patch, as a result of whatever savings he can realize. . . . The Cochin-Chinese, living in a region of large estates, is not attached to the soil to the same degree, he is less stable, perhaps less of a worker, more inclined to gamble, more apt to indulge in speculations which are astonishing in their audacity and variety."[25] The principal reasons for this difference in orientation were the widespread tenancy and large estates that developed in the commercial agriculture of the delta and led to unstable tenure and widespread agricultural indebtedness. The delta peasant also had more free time: Gourou estimates that a hectare of rice land in Tonkin or Annam required 200 man days of labor per year (400 if it were double-cropped) but a hectare in Cochin China required only 50 to 80 man days of labor per year.[26]

Since 85 percent of the population of South Vietnam lives in the delta or the northern coastal zone, the contrast between these two regions is the principal determinant of the political orientations of most of the

[25] Pierre Gourou, *L'Utilisation du Sol en Indochine Française*, trans. S. Guest and others (New York 1941), 331-32.
[26] Gourou, 297, 261-362.

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population. The other two regions are included principally to indicate the errors that Mitchell introduces by lumping them all together. The large rubber estates of the southern plateau region give an extremely high coefficient of variation (1.86) and a low percentage of owner-operated land, but these figures simply indicate a mixed system of rice tenancy, and rubber plantations. The small group of plantation workers have proved to be a politically volatile group in colonial Vietnam, but their interests are likely to be rather different from the land-hunger of tenant rice-farmers. The southern coastal zone presents a more confused picture. There is clearly little land in rice-production, and, as in the northern coastal zone, the ratio of population to arable land is high and there is a large amount of communal land. On the other hand, there are obviously a number of very large estates formerly owned by French *colons*, a situation more similar to that in the delta. Thus, the region has a mixed agricultural system, with both traditional Vietnamese subsistence agriculture and a few large commercial holdings existing in the same general area. The inclusion of these two different systems in the summary statistics for the three provinces in this region produces high coefficients of variation in size of holdings but not a similarly high level of tenancy. The inequality of both the rubber region and the arid coastal zone is more apparent than real. The summary statistics simply reflect mixed agricultural technologies.

The final difficulty with Mitchell's article is its use of control by the government of Vietnam in late 1965 as a measure of insurgency. By this time the war had escalated to large-unit actions involving substantial numbers of North Vietnamese and American troops. Tactical considerations, such as the availability of sanctuaries, length of supply lines, and terrain accessibility should be the principal determinants of the pattern of GVN control. Demographic and social characteristics, including tenure forms, would not necessarily be related to this pattern of control since it is entirely possible that the locus of military conflict is far removed from sources of political support. As the data in Table II indicate, the index of GVN control in 1965 is not at all related to the distribution of earlier patterns of widespread social discontent. It is clear from casual inspection of this table that, though GVN control is distinctly lower only in the northern lowlands, almost all social movements have been concentrated in the Mekong delta proper. In the period between the consolidation of French administrative and colonial power after the defeat of the last major primary resistance movement in 1917 and the outbreak of World War II, there were two major millennial religious movements promising liberation from the French, and

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TABLE II. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL CONTROL BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION

	COASTAL LOWLANDS NORTH	COASTAL LOWLANDS SOUTH	PLATEAU SOUTH	DELTA
Mean percent Cao Dai control (area)	0	0	17	1
Mean percent Hoa Hao control (area)	0	0	0	32
Percent of all provinces affected by agrarian unrest, 1930-31	17	0	0	75
Percent of all provinces affected by agrarian unrest, 1940	0	0	0	75
Mean number of assassinations per province	.3	0	.8	7.7
Mean GVN control 1965	12	50	30	36

two violent agrarian uprisings. The earliest religious movement was that of the Cao Dai, which began in 1919 as a movement among wealthy merchants, small land owners, and Vietnamese civil servants. The syncretic doctrine of the Cao Dai included Moses, Christ, Buddha, and Victor Hugo among its prophets. Its elaborate administrative structure, which frequently performed quasi-governmental functions, was modeled on the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. The church's wealth enabled it to support an elaborate social welfare program and an extensive temple-building program, including a monumental structure at the church's See in Tay Ninh. In the chaos following the Japanese withdrawal the Cao Dai became effective administrators of a number of areas in Cochin China, and this control became quite pronounced after the French defeat in 1954. The area controlled by the Cao Dai in 1955, as estimated by Bernard Fall,[27] divided by the total area of each province is the basis for the mean figures presented in Table II. The physical area provides little indication of the actual number of adherents and, in fact, probably underestimates the number in the delta proper. Nevertheless, it is a useful indicator of the ability to deploy political and military resources in an area, and consequently may indicate regions in which the church's institutional structure is strongest. It is clear that the Cao Dai's control is confined almost entirely to the rubber areas north of Saigon. A more detailed comparison of Fall's patterns of Cao Dai control with concentrations of small rubber planta-

[27] Bernard Fall, "The Political-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam," *Pacific Affairs*, XXVIII (September 1955), 235-53.

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tions on a map presented by Henry[28] indicates that Cao Dai control is particularly likely in such areas and is weaker in areas of large corporate-owned plantations. Since, as Robequain[29] reports, many earlier small plantations north of Saigon were established by members of the tiny Vietnamese middle class, particularly civil servants, it would be reasonable to argue that the basic source of Cao Dai wealth and power is found among these planters. If this is indeed the case it would explain the Cao Dai's prosperity and its limited appeal to the poor peasants of the Mekong delta or the coastal lowlands. Although the Cao Dai is a movement of radical religious change, it is predominantly middle-class in its appeal and unlikely to evolve into a widespread Communist movement.

The Hoa Hao, also studied by Fall, presents a contrast in many ways to the Cao Dai. A militant variant of Buddhism, this religion did not find its prophet until 1939, and clearly directed its ideology to the poor peasant overwhelmed by debts and taxes. Huyen Phu So, the sect's prophet, urged simplified inexpensive religious ritual, including the elimination of elaborate pagodas and funerary rites. This sect had considerable appeal to the tenants and farm laborers of the delta, particularly in the region of vast estates called the Mein-Tay, or new west, in the southern and western delta. The Hoa Hao and the Viet Minh were often in direct competition for the allegiance of these poor peasants. Immediately after World War II the Hoa Hao formed an alliance with the Viet Minh, but later broke with the Communists and came to terms with the Saigon government. Nevertheless, the success of the Hoa Hao is an indication of the delta peasant's receptiveness to movements promising millennial solutions to the problems of rural poverty and debt.

There were two major agrarian revolts in what is now South Vietnam after the consolidation of French rule, both involving more or less explicit Communist ideology or organization. The first of these occurred in 1930-1931 in response to the falling rice and rubber prices and an extensive drought in Annam. The landlords and mandarins were executed, land was confiscated, and, at least in Nghe An province, local soviets were established. The revolts were promptly and violently suppressed by the French. The distribution of disorder by province summarized in Table II was determined by comparing descriptions of the disorders in four secondary sources.[30] If a province or a locale within a

[28] Henry, map facing 550.

[29] Charles Robequain, *The Economic Development of French Indo-China* (New York 1944), 203.

[30] Joseph Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled* (London 1967), Jean Chesnaux, *The Vietnamese Nation: Contribution to a History* (Sydney 1966), P. Devillers, *His-*

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given province was mentioned as a site of disorder, that province was considered to have been included in the revolt. It is clear that the disorder was concentrated in the delta, with only one of the northern provinces (Quang Ngai) affected.

The 1940 revolt was even more directly influenced by Communist ideology than that in 1930-1931. It was during the 1940 revolt that the flag of what is now North Vietnam was raised at Cau Lanh in the delta. The revolt began in the Plaine des Joncs in the western delta and spread south and west until it included most of the Trans-Bassac (the region south of the southern branch of the Mekong). None of the northern provinces was affected.

The beginnings of the Viet Cong insurgency follow the pattern of the 1930-1931 and 1940 revolts and the Hoa Hao movement. Fall[31] determined the distribution of assassinations of local officials and representatives of the central government during the period 1955-1957 from published newspaper reports in Saigon. It is clear that only in the delta does any substantial number of assassinations take place. The delta, a region of commercial rice production, large rice estates, extensive tenancy, and inequitable holdings, is the most prone to revolutionary social movements, both political and religious. None of the other regions shows this propensity for social instability. The traditional subsistence rice area of the northern coastal zone, with its low levels of tenancy and fairly equitable land distribution, has both retained its allegiance to Buddhism and been remarkably free of political violence. This is, of course, the reverse of Mitchell's conclusions.

The data on military control in 1965 reveal only one strong relationship. The northern coastal zone, mountainous and close to North Vietnam, is almost totally in the hands of the Viet Cong. The owner-operated small-holdings of this region and its high rate of Viet Cong control are probably responsible for Mitchell's reported statistical association between ownership and insurgency. In fact, however, this region has never initiated widespread revolutionary movements and was not extensively involved in the beginnings of the current insurgency. As was the case in both France and England, traditional subsistence areas remain loyal to traditional authority, and regions of extensive market penetration are likely to lead the revolution. In all three cases the fundamental explanatory principle is market penetration

toire du Viet Nam de 1940 à 1952 (Paris 1952), Lê Thánh Khôi, *Le Vietnam: Histoire et Civilisation* (Paris 1955).

[31] Bernard Fall, "South Vietnam's Internal Problems," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXI (September 1958), 241-60.

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rather than inequity or estate-size. Thus Mitchell's analysis is based on questionable history, vague theory, and inaccurate observation. To his credit, he published the data on which his conclusions were based, considerably simplifying the job of rebuttal.

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THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM

A Redefinition of Unity

By KENNETH JOWITT

UNDOUBTEDLY David Floyd is correct in his statement that "by far the most important and original of the sections [within the Romanian Workers' Party April, 1964, Statement] for the communist world as a whole was the one dealing with political relations between the communist countries, though it was the statement on Comecon which attracted most attention at the time."[1] Among the major points the Romanians made in this Statement was that the formal basis of relations enunciated by Khrushchev in 1955 was to become the real basis of relations among socialist nations. Relations were to be based on "the principles of national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, mutual advantage, comradely assistance, noninterference in internal affairs, observance of territorial integrity, [and] the principles of socialist internationalism."[2] The Romanians spelled this out in underscored print and followed it with the statement that "the strict observance of the basic principles of the new type relations among the socialist countries is the primary prerequisite of the unity and cohesion of these countries and of the world socialist system performing its decisive role in the development of mankind."[3]

Two other major points were contained in the Statement's section on the "World Socialist System," and were reiterated at the June Conference of Communist Parties held in Moscow (1969). One familiar point was that "in the nature of the socialist system there are no objective causes for contradictions between the national and international tasks of the socialist countries," but that "on the other hand, no specific and individual interests can be presented as general interests, as objective requirements of the development of the socialist system."[4] The second point was that "it is up to every Marxist-Leninist party, it is a sovereign right of each socialist state, to elaborate, choose, or change the forms and methods of socialist construction."[5] In the light of the division within the Communist world and the traditional character of

[1] David Floyd, *Rumania: Russia's Dissident Ally* (New York 1965), 113.
[2] "Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the International Communist and Working Class Movement (April 1964)," in William E. Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-1965* (Cambridge, Mass. 1967), 284.
[3] *Ibid.*, 287. [4] *Ibid.*, 286. [5] *Ibid.*

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its organization, the position the Romanian party adopted in its Statement contained important potential implications for the future character of the world Communist movement.

We are primarily concerned with the political elaboration and ideological synthesis that the Romanian elite effected between 1965 and 1969 regarding its position within the bloc and its definition of the ideal character of the world Communist movement. In order to deal with these concerns we shall discuss the following topics: (1) the "consensual" legacy and orientation that has dominated conceptions of bloc-unity, (2) the Romanian party's acceptance of a new conception of and position on bloc-unity, (3) the factors involved in this Romanian initiative, (4) the consequences of such initiative for conflict resolution within the bloc, (5) a consideration of several elements that have reinforced a traditional (i.e., "consensual") definition of bloc unity among certain ruling parties, and (6) a consideration of the Romanian party's relation to the world Communist movement.

Consensual Legacy and Orientation

For more than forty years before the Romanian Statement of April, 1964, the character of interparty relations within the Communist world had a very specific content. Such relations can be described by various terms. Brzezinski has called them "integral relations"; in organizational terms these relations were what one theorist calls "pooled interdependence."[6] Both of these characterizations are accurate, but perhaps the concept most applicable is "consensual relations." Under Soviet hegemony relations among Communist parties were characterized by the demand for internal agreement about shared perspectives and a common set of norms as well as values; there was a demand for agreement on the content of behavior and for the abolition of differences.[7] Thus, the 1957 Moscow Declaration stated that "the exchange of opinions revealed *identity* of views of the parties on *all* the questions examined at the meeting and *unanimity* in their assessment of the international situation."[8] Such a consensual relationship was defined as the prerequisite of each unit's sovereignty: "The solidarity and close unity of the socialist countries constitute a reliable guarantee of the sovereignty and independence of each."[9] In his report at the Eighth Party Congress

[6] James Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York 1967), 54, 55, 61, 64.
[7] Irving Louis Horowitz, "Consensus, Conflict, and Cooperation: A Sociological Inventory," *Social Forces*, XLI (December 1962), 187.
[8] "The 1957 Moscow Declaration (Text)," in G. F. Hudson and others, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York 1961), 47 (italics added).
[9] *Ibid.*, 51.

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(formerly the Third) in June, 1960, Gheorghiu-Dej echoed this definition of unity, and in August, 1961, he stated that "between the RWP and the CPSU there have always been the closest fraternal relations and that complete understanding and unity of views have prevailed, never overshadowed by anything, on all fundamental problems."[10]

It could be pointed out that in 1961, conflict between the RWP and CPSU had escalated[11] and that Gheorghiu-Dej's comment was actually an esoteric statement of conflict over "less than fundamental" problems. Such an analysis is warranted; however, we must realize that the traditional formulation was still perceived as the only possible and legitimate one, and the Romanians as well as the Soviets still adhered to the consensual tradition.

Perhaps the single most revealing index of the Romanian party's attitude towards interparty consensual relations is the Party's position on the Comintern. In May of 1961, on the fortieth anniversary of the Romanian Party, Gheorghiu-Dej was quite explicit in stating that "it was only thanks to the political assistance given by the Executive Committee of the Communist International that the factional struggles could be put to an end, and the unity of the [Romanian] Party's ranks could be re-established."[12] The redefinition of unity within the Communist world was to place quite a different value on the Comintern's activity. Ceauşescu demonstrated this quite forcefully (see page 41) in the speech he delivered on the forty-fifth anniversary of the Party, May 7, 1966, which revealed his resolve to act on the implications of the April, 1964, Statement, to maintain his regime's initiative, to elaborate a defense of its sovereignty, and to attempt actively to shape its environment. His major goal was and is a redefinition of interparty relations on a cooperative rather than consensual base.

From Consensual to Cooperative Relations: "Adam Smith" vs. the Monolith

In attempting to redefine the nature of interparty relations, Ceauşescu was involving himself and his regime in a momentous task. The thrust of his attempt was to establish the legitimacy of cooperative interparty relations. According to Horowitz, from whom we are borrowing the concepts "consensual" and "cooperative," cooperative relations

[10] Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, *Articles and Speeches*, 94 and 204.

[11] See Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania 1945-1965* (forthcoming Berkeley 1971), Part III.

[12] Gheorghiu-Dej, in *Articles and Speeches*, 169.

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"make no demand on role uniformity but only upon procedural rules. Cooperation concerns the settlement of problems in terms which make possible the continuation of differences and even fundamental disagreements."[13] Although Ceauşescu has never used the term "cooperative," his political orientation, aspirations, and demands in the area of interparty relations are accurately expressed by this concept. Thus a major argument presented by the Romanian party prior to, during, and after the June, 1969, Moscow meeting of Communist parties has been that "under no circumstances must these differences [within the bloc] have an effect on relations among socialist states. . . ."[14]

We suggested earlier that a party's position toward the Comintern may provide an index of its attitude toward "consensual" relations and as an example referred to a statement made by Gheorghiu-Dej in 1961. Five years later, Ceauşescu had occasion to refer to the Comintern. In discussing the original decision to become a member of the Comintern, Ceauşescu was careful to point out that certain Romanian delegates "expressing their adhesion to the Leninist principles regarding the Party of a new type . . . raised a series of objections to the assessment made by the Comintern of the situation in Romania. . . . They also objected to interference of the Comintern in establishing the composition of the leading bodies of the CP of Romania."[15]

According to Ceauşescu, at the Congress that ratified the decision to create a Communist party, other delegates expressed "reserves as to the obligatory nature of the decisions taken by the Communist International for the component parties."[16] And although in his 1961 speech Gheorghiu-Dej thanked the Comintern for assisting the Party in ridding itself of factions at its Fifth Congress in 1931, Ceauşescu credited the Romanian party itself with the accomplishment. The changed attitude toward the Comintern reflected not only a new perspective on the kind of unity currently appropriate among Communist parties but also on the type of unity necessary for the effective institutionalization and political success of these parties within their respective countries. Basic to this new perspective has been the Romanian elite's redefinition of the Soviet Union's place and role in the world Communist movement, a formulation made quite explicit in an article that appeared in the

[13] Horowitz, 187.
[14] Ceauşescu, *Scinteia*, June 10, 1969.
[15] Nicolae Ceauşescu, *The Romanian Communist Party—Continuer of the Romanian People's Revolutionary and Democratic Struggle, of the Traditions of the Working Class and Socialist Movement in Romania* (Bucharest, May 6, 1966), 28.
[16] *Ibid.*, 29.

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theoretical journal, *Lupta de Clasă* in April, 1968. Since the statement made in this article is highly significant, we shall quote it at length:

> In the period between the two world wars, when the Soviet Union was the only socialist state, [when] the holy duty of the international working class, of all progressive forces in the entire world, was the defense of the U.S.S.R. . . . the idea that the fundamental criterion of internationalism is the position taken toward the Soviet Union was broadly accepted. In our days, when socialism has become a world system . . . when in the world . . . [there] takes place anti-imperialist movements for national and social liberty, for democracy and social progress, the criterion of internationalism has broadened, has gained a richer content, corresponding to the great world-wide revolutionary process, extremely varied in its mode of manifestation, [a fact] which characterizes our epoch of man's transition to socialism. Essential in affirming socialist internationalism today is the fight for assuring unity of all socialist countries of all Communist and workers parties, and of all anti-imperialist forces . . . of solidarity with all who fight for independence.[17]

The Romanian elite's point was that the effective as opposed to formal recognition of diversity demanded a new conception of unity and a new set of decision premises[18] and policies for each bloc member—particularly the Soviet Union. The Romanians did not originate this particular idea. However, it was significant in the elaboration of a specifically Romanian position within the bloc. Its political import for the world Communist movement was that for the first time such a position was forcefully expressed by a ruling party whose credentials as a bloc member, while attenuated, were still more acceptable than those of Yugoslavia, China, or the PCI. The Romanians made it quite clear that no one center or number of centers was (or is) appropriate within the world movement, given the great diversity that characterized the different national settings within which each Leninist party had to operate. With such a wide range of diversity, centers could contribute only in the form of political errors—presumably to an even greater extent today than in the "Comintern past." The argument of diversity provided a point of departure both for the Romanian elite's critique of

[17] Ion Şerbănescu, "Internaţionalismul proletar si lumea contemporană" [Proletarian Internationalism and the Contemporary World], 30 (italics added).

[18] For a discussion of decision premises see the excellent volume by Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York 1964), 57-59.

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the main pattern of relations among Communist parties for the past forty years, and for the Romanian's alternative pattern. Ceauşescu formulated the essence of the latter in his speech at the Ninth Party Congress in July, 1965, when he remarked, "The development and flourishing of each socialist nation, of each socialist state, equal in rights, sovereign and independent, is an essential requirement upon which depend the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries, the growth of their influence upon mankind's advance towards socialism and communism."[19]

Such a formulation was critical in that it completely reversed the conditions of unity. Previously the strength of all—which implied the domination of the Soviet Union—had been the condition of the strength of each; now just the opposite was argued. Communist unity, bloc- and world-wide, was now defined as being dependent primarily on the strength and unity of each national constituent.[20] The Romanian redefinition of unity has replaced the notion of a monolithic unity with a concept that is highly reminscent of Adam Smith's "invisible hand." According to the Romanians, in the resolution of major domestic problems and in international efforts the contributions of *each* Leninist party will result in a unity far more stable and genuine than anything that has gone under the heading of unity in the past. Under Ceauşescu, the Romanian elite has explicitly opted for a "branch" approach to international unity whereby each Leninist party "independently establishes its political line, tactics, and strategy in such a way as creatively to apply the general truths of Marxism-Leninism in terms of the concrete conditions in which it acts."[21] In either true Lindblomian or Adam Smith fashion the consequence is the good not only of the "individual" but also of the "collectivity." Thus, "the way in which communist

[19] Nicolae Ceauşescu, "Raportul Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român Cu Privire La Activitatea Partidului în Perioada Dintre Congresul Al VIII-Lea Şi Congresul Al IX-Lea Al P.C.R." [Report of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party on the Activity of the Party in the Period Between the Eighth Congress and the Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party] in Nicolae Ceauşescu, *România Pe Drumul Desăvîrşirii Construcţiei Socialiste*, I (Bucureşti 1968), 62.

[20] This position was included in the statement issued at the close of the Moscow meeting of Communist Parties in June, 1969; see "Sarcinile Luptei Împotriva Imperialismului în Etapa Actuală Şi Unitatea De Acţiune A Partidelor Comuniste Şi Muncitoreşti, A Tuturor Forţelor Antiimperialiste [The Tasks in the Struggle Against Imperialism in the Present Stage and the Unity of Action of the Communist and Workers Parties, of All Anti-imperialist Forces]," *Scînteia*, June 19, 1969. However, inclusion of this position does not signify that the Soviets accept this argument but rather that it is the price they were willing to pay to have the Romanians attend and sign.

[21] "Întăriea Unităţii Mişcării Comuniste Şi Muncitoreşti—Îndatorire Supremă" [The Strengthening of the Unity of the Communist and Workers Movement—The Highest Duty] *Scînteia*, February 28, 1967.

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parties in socialist countries resolve the problems [associated with] the construction of the new order, [and] mobilize the resources and creative forces of the nation . . . has a distinct importance not only for the respective country, but also for the growth of the forces of socialism and communism."[22]

If, as Crozier has suggested, "in the long run power will tend to be closely related to the kind of uncertainty upon which depends the life of the organization,"[23] then it seems quite clear that the Romanian elite led by Ceauşescu has attempted to define one locus of that uncertainty by national diversity and to argue that only local Leninist parties are capable of dealing with it effectively, thereby legitimating and adding to the power and autonomy of each national party. However, the RCP's redefinition of unity has *not* depended on or originated primarily from the argument that diversity requires greater local power.[24]

The Question of Causation

The major factor behind the Romanian elite's redefinition of bloc unity has been its belief in and assertion of the Romanian party's "political maturity." By maturity it seems the Romanians mean much the same thing as do political scientists when they speak of party institutionalization. The Statement of April, 1964, expressed the opinion that, "in their historical development, the socialist countries have become stronger economically, politically, and socially, the Communist and workers parties of these countries have matured, and their capacity of solving various problems pertaining to construction at home and the international relations of their countries has grown."[25] This position was elaborated in an authoritative article that appeared in *Scînteia* February 28, 1967. Here it was stated that "The force of the Communist movement finds expression in the growth of the level of maturity of the communist parties, in their organizational and political-ideological consolidation, in their capacity to elaborate their own political line, and successfully to conduct a revolutionary struggle on the basis of applying the general truths of marxism-leninism to the concrete conditions of each country."[26]

To the Romanians under Ceauşescu it has not been primarily a ques-

[22] *Ibid.*
[23] Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago 1964), 164.
[24] The political stance Brzezinski has termed "domesticism" is based on the argument that diversity requires greater local power. The Romanian argument goes beyond domesticism.
[25] "Statement," in Griffith, 285.
[26] *Scînteia*, February 28, 1967.

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tion of the *need* to *allow* national parties more power and autonomy in order to cope with environmental diversity; rather it has been a question of and an argument based on the *right* of national parties to full power and autonomy because of their *ability* to deal with diversity. The final element in this particular synthesis is the Romanian party's conclusion that the development and strengthening of such an ability is possible only if cooperative norms define interparty relations. Thus, the norm of noninterference (*neamestec in treburile interne*) has become the critical element in interparty relations. It is quite natural for the Romanians to single out "interference" as the greatest threat to a Leninist party's political maturation, given their already well-articulated experience with the Soviets and the Comintern. That the Romanians do single out "interference" as the critical element in defining the type of interparty relations is made quite clear by the reference to this subject in every major Romanian article on "socialist internationalism" since 1964. Particularly striking in this respect were Ceauşescu's remarks in his speech on April 11, 1968, when he stated explicitly that the divisions within the Communist world "have not fallen from the sky" but are rather the result of infringements of the principles that should be at the base of relations among socialist countries. What principles were infringed on was made clear when Ceauşescu suggested the method for removing these divisions: "In our opinion, the liquidation of interference of any kind in the affairs of other parties and socialist countries is the way toward removing the differences, toward international unity and collaboration."[27]

The reasons for the Romanians' comprehensive condemnation of interference are quite clearly outlined and are also politically insightful. In a major article entitled "The Responsibility of the Communist Party Toward the Nation," Dumitru Popescu referred to the Romanian bête noire, the Comintern, and argued quite persuasively that interference by an outside party or agency resulted in ideological confusion, organizational incoherence in the form of factionalism, "errors in attitude toward certain social, political strata, and lessening of the [Party's] influence with the masses."[28]

[27] "Cuvîntare La Întîlnirea Cu Activul De Partid Din Judeţul Constanţa" [Speech at the Meeting with the Party Aktif in the County of Constanta] in Nicolae Ceauşescu, *România Pe Drumul Desăvîrşirii Construcţiei Socialiste* (Bucureşti 1969), III, 128.

[28] "Răspunderea Partidului Comunist În Faţa Naţiunii," *Scînteia*, April 2, 1968. At the 10th Party Congress Popescu was made a member of the Secretariat. The analysis presented in the above article by Popescu is a good example of the error involved when any absolute statement is made concerning the theoretical incapacity of ideologically committed individuals. Popescu's article is analytically quite sophisticated. For an excellent discussion of the relation between theory and ideology, see Clifford Geertz,

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Conflict Resolution Within the Bloc

The Romanian synthesis concerning the character of the bloc, the role of its components, and the nature of their relations—a syndrome best conceptualized in terms of reciprocal interdependence, i.e., coordination through mutual adjustment rather than standardization[29]—owes more to Adam Smith's conception of unity than to Stalin's, and it has not been unopposed within the bloc. This is not very surprising if we recognize the critical implications of such a synthesis for the bloc's political-ideological identity and the domestic position of several of the elites within it. Perhaps the most useful way to illustrate the nature and extent of opposition to the Romanian stance is to compare the Bulgarian approach to the questions of bloc unity and conflict with the Romanian. Here we may consider the Romanian posture as fairly representative of the Yugoslav, the Italian, and the Czechoslovak position (until August, 1968); the Bulgarian position stands in the same relation to that of the East Germans, Poles, Soviets, and Hungarians.

The Romanian elite has been quite consistent in drawing and integrating the conclusions associated with a cooperative definition of intrabloc relations. They have accepted the consequences of such a definition and have demonstrated this acceptance by their explicit and consistent stands on the issue of conflict resolution within the bloc. According to the Romanians, conflict can best be handled through voluntary attendance at bilateral and multilateral meetings whose main purpose is the distribution of information. Nonattendance at such (multilateral) meetings is in no way to impair the existing relations among the various parties within the Communist world nor should it place in question their credentials as Leninist or anti-imperialist political forces. When such meetings do occur the topics under consideration should not lead to any action that will threaten agreement and should emphasize any areas of agreement that might or do exist. The autonomy of each participant should be recognized and guaranteed through acceptance of certain prerequisites such as the agreement not to condemn any party's leadership nor domestic or foreign policy, not to exclude any party from consultations that affect that party in any way, and not to bias the outcome of any such meetings by requiring that decisions of former meetings (such as those in Moscow in 1957 and 1960) be considered programmatically binding.[30] The Romanians also argue that the ob-

"Ideology as a Cultural System," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York 1964), 47-77.

[29] See Thompson, 54-82.

[30] For an exposition of these several points see "Cuvîntarea Tovărăşului Nicolae

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jective as well as subjective bases of conflict within the bloc be recognized—that different levels of socioeconomic development and the right as well as ability of each party to elaborate policy will inevitably create some conflict. As a consequence of this position, the Romanians argue for patience (*răbdare*) in dealing with conflict. Finally, the Romanians have argued for the inclusion of *all* Communist and anti-imperialist parties in any meeting concerned with adopting a position toward imperialism.

Boris Velchev, member of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Bulgarian party, outlined the Bulgarian position at the preparatory meeting of parties in Budapest in February and March, 1968. Although both parties "appreciate" the aggressiveness of imperialism, the Bulgarian position stressed the need to fight the international class enemy and put particular emphasis on the threat posed by imperialism. The Bulgarian approach to the third-world anti-imperialist forces stressed assimilation rather than coalition. Thus, Velchev stated, "The various revolutionary forces in the developing countries . . . already call, not only for struggle in common with the socialist countries . . . *but also for an ideological rapprochement on the basis of scientific socialism.*"[31] With regard to party equality and autonomy, the Bulgarian position stressed each party's right to be sovereign but also asserted the need to criticize some parties when their positions or behavior jeopardize effective coordination within the system. This stance is related to two others. While the Romanian party has redefined internationalism to mean unity of all anti-imperialist forces, the BCP adheres to the traditional definition. During the Budapest meetings in March, 1968, Velchev commented, "Georghi Dimitrov said that the attitude to that great country (the Soviet Union) is the touchstone of the sincerity and honesty of every labor leader, every working-class party and working people's organization. . . . *These words are as valid as ever.*"[32] Also, the Bulgarian position recognizes only those differences among bloc members that are "subjective" differences, based on leadership errors in policy and ideological interpretation, and finds it difficult actually to admit the existence of objective differences. Consequently, the Bulgarians demand unanimity on all issues on the premise that all *genuine* Leninist parties can reach such agreement. To the Bulgarians, sustained differences are an indication that some parties are not genuine, and this leads to the

Ceauşescu la Consfătuirea Internaţională a Partidelor Comuniste Şi Muncitoreşti" [Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's Speech at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties], *Scînteia*, June 10, 1969.

[31] *Information Bulletin* (Toronto 1968), 106, italics added.

[32] *Ibid.*, 110, italics added.

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conclusion that they must not be allowed to prevent the occurrence of a meeting of the genuine parties.

In other words, it is clear that the Bulgarian position emphasizes the uniqueness rather than distinctiveness of Communist parties and demands that the parties reach agreement on major issues before meeting with other anti-imperialist forces. Finally, the Bulgarian position sees the world Communist movement as something more than the sum of all Communist parties and regimes. It demands that the decisions reached at multilateral meetings be binding on each of the participants and considers past decisions of such meetings authoritative.

It is possible to conceptualize the differences between these two syntheses and stances—the Romanian and Bulgarian—on a more abstract level. In terms of bloc unity and conflict resolution, the Romanians are willing to satisfice,[33] whereas the Bulgarians maintain a traditional belief in optimizing: i.e., complete unity is possible now. The Romanians appreciate diversity; the Bulgarians demand unity and define it as uniformity. The Romanians accept bargaining as a legitimate and necessary means of resolving conflict, but the Bulgarians still insist on persuasion or problem solving.[34] One values initiation; the other sees initiation by any party other than the Soviet as opposition, "splitting."

It is also possible to locate the areas that provide the clearest indicators of a given party's position. These areas are an elite's estimation of the ability of imperialism to achieve its objectives (all parties agree on its nature), the place of the Soviet Union within the Communist world movement, and a party's confidence in its capacity to deal successfully with the development of its national base. Perhaps the contrast between the Romanian and Bulgarian positions is best revealed in terms of elite confidence. The Bulgarian emphasis on the threat of imperialism, its dependence on the Soviet Union rather than a united front of forces, and its defensive domestic posture are all in contrast to the Romanian position, best expressed by Ceauşescu in his June 10, 1969, speech in Moscow. Addressing himself to the danger of imperialism and to the

[33] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York 1965), 140-41. Satisficing involves the selection of a satisfactory as opposed to an optimal alternative.

[34] There are a number of concepts in the field (of organization theory) that involve the same thing that March and Simon have in mind when they use the term "persuasion." Thompson and Tuden's notion of "computational decision-making" and Simon's "analytic" approach to conflict are examples. Louis Hartz's notion of "dogmatic liberalism" is also congruent with these concepts. All these concepts refer to an approach to conflict resolution that demands unanimity, assumes the possibility of such, and explain its absence in terms of the misperception, lack of information, or alien nature of the antagonist in the conflict situation. Those who adopt a "persuasion" approach to *all* conflict refuse to admit the structural basis of conflict or its legitimacy. This is equally true of a Brezhnev and of a Mayor Daley.

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strength and ability of Leninist parties and regimes, Ceauşescu noted that

> Imperialism did not succeed in stopping the way to socialism when the latter was victorious in only one country or in the first years after the war when the workers' and peasants' power in the socialist countries was not consolidated, when there still existed an exploiting class who possessed important economic and political positions. So much the more today when socialism represents a living reality in our countries, when the people are masters of their countries' destiny and have at hand every means of defense, when there exists a powerful world socialist system, it is inconceivable that any force . . . would be able to turn the peoples of the socialist countries from their path, stop their victorious march forward.[35]

Definitions of Bloc Unity and the Question of "Party Maturity"

We have already suggested that the major explanatory variable in understanding the new Romanian conception of bloc relations and conflict resolution is party institutionalization or, as the Romanians call it, party maturity. In fact, the Romanian term is analytically more useful because it specifies the particular aspect of institutionalization that has been crucial in stimulating and supporting the Romanian elite's attempts at formulating a new political-ideological synthesis. That aspect is adaptability. According to Huntington, it is "in a rough sense, a function of environmental challenge and age. . . . The more challenges which have arisen in its environment and the greater its age, the more adaptable (an organization) is. . . . Old organizations and procedures however are not necessarily adaptable if they existed in a static environment."[36] Within this framework we can now attempt to explain why certain parties, such as the Romanian, have begun to elaborate a new synthesis while others, like the Bulgarian, have maintained their commitment to Stalin's.

In Paige's treatment of emulation, he suggests that the propensity to emulate may be correlated with the degree of success in goal achievement experienced by an elite that has engaged in emulation.[37] We should like to "test" this hypothesis in our comparison of the Romanian

[35] "Cuvîntarea Tovărăşului Nicolae Ceauşescu la Confăturirea internaţională a Partidelor Comuniste Şi Muncitoreşti" [Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's Speech at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties] *Scînteia*, June 10, 1969.

[36] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," in Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Political Modernization* (Belmont, Calif. 1967), 215.

[37] Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Communist Strategies in Asia* (New York 1963), 246.

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and Bulgarian parties. One major difference between the Romanian elite's situation under Gheorghiu-Dej and the Bulgarian elite's situation during 1961-1964 was that the Romanian elite had to oppose the Soviet Union in order to pursue its goal of industrialization, but the Bulgarian elite was able to pursue the same goal through compliance and emulation. In fact, the Bulgarian elite was able to adopt and maintain this posture in part because of the oppositional stance adopted by the Romanians. Guinea's resistance to France in 1958 shaped France's more benign or at least cautious attitude toward Mali; similarly, Romania's opposition contributed to the Soviet's positive attitude towards Bulgarian industrialization. It would be misleading and incorrect to suggest that this is the only or major reason for the different policies adopted by the two regimes. The most critical factor was the character of the two elite coalitions and the extent to which each of the parties was organizationally coherent. However, the absence of any immediate or intense need for the Bulgarian elite to engage in critical forms of search behavior—a situation that contributed to and reinforced the defensive, rather incoherent character of the party and elite—was (and is) related to the positive posture the Soviet elite adopted with respect to Bulgarian industrialization.[38]

In contrast, the Romanian elite, with a fairly high level of organizational coherence, began to engage in critical forms of search behavior on general questions of sovereignty and autonomy precisely because its more specific concern, industrialization, remained threatened by Soviet intransigence. The consequences for the two elites have been quite different. The Bulgarians have maximized their immediate goal achievement in relation to a major specific concern (industrialization) but have jeopardized a more basic goal, party institutionalization; the Romanians increased the uncertainty over their program of industrialization in the short run, but placed themselves in a situation that facilitated a major growth in party institutionalization.

In February, 1963, the Romanian elite successfully handled the challenge posed by Khrushchev on the issue of a supranational Comecon body; April, 1964, was the setting for the Romanian elite's Statement on party sovereignty; March-July, 1965, witnessed the Romanian elite's successful handling of its first crisis of succession. We may assume that their skillful handling of challenges has had a definite effect on the level of party maturity or institutionalization and has increased the

[38] Similarly, the lack of a struggle-context with France may have been an element in the inability of Modibo Keita to establish his leadership and a sufficient degree of elite coherence within the Malian party.

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party's confidence in its ability not only to respond to challenges but also actively to define its environment.

On the basis of this comparison of the Romanian and Bulgarian parties a number of points can be made. It is clear that the Romanian elite's capacity for political initiative and ideological redefinition is not something innate. In one respect the Romanian case is one of "to him who has is given," while the Bulgarian case is an "avalanche of failure." The Romanian regime possessed a fairly united elite, a coherent organization, and elite members concerned with and capable of manipulating specific issues (such as industrialization) to achieve more basic goals (such as party autonomy). Since the party possessed a political character of this order, the conflict over industrialization presented it with an opportunity to exercise political and ideological initiative and contributed to its willingness to do so. The Bulgarian situation is quite the opposite. Since there was a rather fragmented elite and incoherent organization, the absence of conflict over the issue of industrialization removed a potential source of power redistribution within the elite, of political initiative, and of ideological creativity.

In another respect, however, the differing organization, as opposed to situational factors, is critical. The specific composition of the Romanian elite nucleus was and has been an integral part of the way in which situations—such as that which existed in 1962-1963—have been interpreted and acted on. We cannot fail to note that the definition of a situation is subject in varying degrees to the behavior of actors, something the Romanian elite has appreciated to a greater extent than has the Bulgarian.

A second point to be drawn from this analysis is that the possibility exists that the Bulgarian elite (or any such elite) may engage in a policy of initiation. Such a conclusion is based on several dynamic factors, namely, the co-aligning nature of elites, the continual bargaining over goals, the power of example (such as the Romanian and Czechoslovak), the impact of international events, and the process of mediation.

There is a third point that emerges indirectly from this comparison. We have suggested that one of the indicators that certain party-elites resist a new political-ideological synthesis with the world Communist movement in general and the bloc in particular is the confidence a given elite demonstrates (or fails to demonstrate) concerning its success in "socialist construction"—i.e., in effectively breaking through[39] the existing social system and then reintegrating a new political system with a new set of publics. A broader comparison of Leninist systems

[39] On "breaking through" see Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs.*

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makes it necessary to specify this argument further. It can be argued that parties with low levels of political confidence are emulating parties, who define proletarian internationalism in terms of Soviet primacy and maintain a dichotomous world-view stressing the power of the international imperialist class enemy. In such a case low political confidence reinforces emulation, which in turn threatens the level and character of political confidence (and performance). Such parties as the Bulgarian, Polish, Hungarian, and East German fit into this category. In these examples low political confidence may be related to indecisive national breakthroughs and/or rigid conceptions of what a breakthrough involves. Parties of this type actively oppose the synthesis offered by those of Romania, Yugoslavia, and Italy. However, parties with relatively high levels of institutionalization and success in breaking through may also oppose the Romanian type of synthesis. The case of China is particularly relevant here. Before the cultural revolution, the CCP was in favor of a more hostile though not aggressive posture for the world Communist movement. The reason, however, was not the CCP's lack of a political synthesis and vision of its own nor a low level of political confidence, but rather the nature of that political vision. Mao, if not individuals such as Liu Shao-Chi, sees the tasks of breaking through and political integration as being more than interdependent; he sees them as fused. System-building and community-building must be carried out simultaneously. He sees cultural redefinition as an integral and critical aspect of breaking through and system-redefinition and not as a by-product of mobilization and industrialization. Consequently, Mao's criteria of success in breaking through are much more ambitious than those held by a Stalin, a Khrushchev, or most current East European elites. In Mao's eyes, until there is what appears to be a successful process of cultural redefinition affecting the way in which human beings interact socially, think ideologically, and behave politically, there has been no decisive breakthrough.[40] One result of Mao's more comprehensive definition of success has been the Chinese demand that international accommodation be avoided as a threat to the continued and necessary sense of urgency toward the goal of a decisive breakthrough. Thus, *for different reasons* both the Chinese party, with its political and ideological fusion of the breaking-through and community-building processes, and the Bulgarian party, with its

[40] For Soviet and East European elites, creation of a democratically centralized party, removal of the threat of organized internal resistance, comprehensive industrialization, the creation of strategic support groups (i.e., skilled workers, state farmers, socialist intelligentsia) and, in the case of East Europe, alliance with the Soviet Union is considered a decisive breakthrough.

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system-oriented and rather rigidly defined breakthrough, could oppose aspects of the Romanian vision of the bloc and the bloc's relation to the rest of the world.

It is within this rather complex, dynamic, and intense setting that the future relation of the RCP to the world socialist system will be articulated and shaped.

The Romanian Communist Party and the World Socialist System

According to Haas, "a close study of negotiating processes in international relations suggests the prevalence of three types of compromise, each indicative of a certain measure of integration."[41] These types of compromise involve accommodation "on the basis of the minimum common denominator," accommodation by "splitting the difference," and the most ambitious of all, accommodation on the "basis of deliberately or inadvertently upgrading the common interests of the parties."[42]

As part of its program or synthesis, the Romanian elite has argued for all three types of compromise. In every statement concerning intra-bloc conflict, the Romanian elite has reiterated the request that nothing be done by any party to aggravate the conflict already existing within the movement. Simultaneously, it has stressed the importance of dealing with manageable problems, those areas on which there is agreement, and of leaving in abeyance those problems that appear to resist immediate resolution. However, the basic thrust in the Romanian approach to compromise within the bloc involves "upgrading the common interest" by redefining the basic condition for bloc unity—by arguing that the good of each unit guarantees the good of the whole, rather than vice versa. This is an attempt to upgrade the common interest by redefining the political situation so as to avoid the value and structural context that encourages conflict and within which any significant resolution—as opposed to repression or avoidance—of conflict is improbable.

The difficulty the Romanians have encountered in their attempt to revise the premises for bloc decisions is due largely to the type of "decision issues" that have occupied the Soviet elite's attention, the procedures the Soviets (and others) have adopted in their attempts at conflict resolution within the bloc, and the difficulty in finding mediators.

[41] Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process" in *International Political Communities* (New York 1966), 95.
[42] *Ibid.*, 95-96.

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The Soviet elite (together with those in several East European countries, such as the Hungarian) has demonstrated a great deal of concern and uncertainty over the range of political innovations and outcomes it considers legitimate.[43] This uncertainty has been evident in its approach to the question of whether or not Yugoslavia is a socialist country. It was most evident in the Soviet concern with developments within Czechoslovakia, and it remains a concern of the Soviet elite with respect to developments in Romanian policy. To the extent that the source of bloc conflict during the period 1963-1968 has involved "uncertainty over preferences regarding possible (political) outcomes" on the part of several bloc-members (i.e., Polish, Bulgarian, Soviet), it is possible to argue that this conflict has been sustained by the procedures adopted within the bloc for problem-solving.

According to Thompson, from whom we have borrowed the notion of "decision issues," a strategy of compromise is the most appropriate in a situation where parties conflict because of uncertainty over preference for specific outcomes—as was the case in 1968 when the Italians, Yugoslavs, and Romanians viewed the political outcomes associated with Dubcek's rule as acceptable, although the majority of Warsaw Pact members reacted in the opposite fashion. However, the Soviets have for the most part refused to adopt such a strategy. They have rather: (a) excluded those who disagree with them from discussions that have yielded critical decisions affecting conflict within the bloc; (b) pressed for multilateral meetings of all parties or of only those amenable to their views; (c) or—as has recently been the case (spring and summer, 1969)—jeopardized the efficacy of attempts at compromise within the bloc by their *pro forma* attachment to the procedures associated with a compromise strategy and their willingness to break their commitment to compromises previously reached. These points require some elaboration. (a) The Soviets excluded the Romanian party from discussions at Dresden that were related to the position of the Warsaw Pact on Czechoslovakia. (b) The view that a meeting of Communist parties should occur and that it should be held without delay was held by the Soviet Union and its closest allies. Such a view contained elements that were antithetical to arriving at some effective resolution of issues within the bloc since the "subtle processes of compromise cannot work with large numbers [such as those attending the meeting of parties in Moscow in June 1969]. . . . When power is widely dispersed, compromise issues can be ratified but cannot be decided by the domi-

[43] See Thompson, 134, for a discussion of "decision issues."

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nant coalition *in toto*."[44] To the extent that the Soviet Union demonstrated a great degree of impatience to hold such a meeting regardless of the preparatory work necessary, those regimes within the bloc who were parties to one or more of the conflicts within the system had just cause to fear the outcomes and doubt the efficacy of a general meeting. (c) For compromise to work as a strategy of conflict-resolution, a prior series of more delimited agreements by small numbers of parties is necessary—a series that will mesh at a certain level.[45] It would appear that by early 1968 the Soviets were at least recognizing and accepting this. In February, 1968, there was the preparatory meeting in Budapest, which has already been discussed, and several other such meetings were to occur before June, 1969, in some of which the Romanians participated. However, it can be argued that the Romanians quite legitimately viewed these preparatory meetings with some reservations. First, it is not meetings per se that are important in effecting a compromise, but the outcomes of such meetings—the extent to which they are successful in contributing to the partial resolution of outstanding issues. Second, by their behavior at Dresden and their actions after their discussions with the Czechoslovaks at Bratislava and Cierna, the Soviets seriously diminished the extent to which the Romanian elite accepted their commitment to and appreciation of compromise and patience. Finally, there was little evidence that the Soviets or their allies had revised their expectations or definitions of what would be considered desirable outcomes of a general meeting of parties.[46] For all these reasons, conflict within the bloc has remained at a high level; furthermore, the probability of future conflict, i.e., between the Romanian and Soviet elites, continues to remain high.

The difficulty in finding effective mediators has also contributed to the sustained atmosphere of conflict within the bloc. Among the obstacles is the Stalinist legacy within the bloc regarding problem-solving and the continued emphasis on a consensual approach to conflict within the Polish, East German, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Soviet elites. A more immediate complication is that the major issue at stake within

[44] *Ibid.*, 141.

[45] *Ibid.* In this as in many other instances, the current Romanian elite has demonstrated its organizational-theoretical abilities.

[46] Of greatest significance is the Soviet elite's sustained adherence to a traditionally Stalinist-consensual appreciation of bloc unity. Agreement between the Soviet and Yugoslavs or between the Soviets and Romanians has remained a matter of situational congruence, a temporally rather than value-based coincidence of interest. For this reason the Romanians are correct and cautious in their attitude toward and evaluation of the Soviets' zig-zag policy.

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the bloc is the question of party and national sovereignty; a direct consequence is that a party such as the Romanian is extremely sensitive to any interference in its affairs and is reluctant to consider a mediator drawn from within the bloc itself as a neutral agent. Thus, the consensual orientation toward conflict held by most bloc-regimes lowers the probability that a mediator will be drawn from outside the bloc—i.e., the French or Italian party—while the concern with sovereignty lowers the probability that regimes such as the Romanian will allow a "mediator" from within the bloc much scope for action. Such a set of factors does not rule out all mediation, as has been demonstrated by the role played by the Hungarian party during 1968-1969. Nor is it impossible that a party such as the French might assume a similar role. However, these factors do contribute to the difficulties associated with the quest for effective mediators.

By the end of 1968, intra-bloc conflict had assumed rather critical proportions. The "decision issue" was no longer intra-bloc uncertainty over outcome preferences, such as the range of political innovations that would be considered legitimate. Rather, there was a polarization of positions on this issue, and here developments within Czechoslovakia had a decisive influence.

It is generally accepted that prediction is hazardous if not impossible; yet in any attempt to understand the character of Romanian national development it is important to suggest how the Romanian elite may attempt to define its future relation to the world Communist movement. Our major hypothesis is that the tendency of the RCP to move toward a significant redefinition of the boundaries of the world socialist system will increase as a function of the Soviet Union's tendency to act on a consensual definition of membership and unity within the system. At least two supplemental propositions can be added to this: (a) That the constraints working against any significant political or ideological redefinition of the bloc by the RCP are not simply external but also endogenous; in other words, the RCP places a high value on maintaining its position within the bloc for ideological as well as survival reasons. (b) That a small state is particularly limited in the ways in which it can act on any given preference or tendency precisely because the question of political survival can so easily become a real issue. The stance and behavior of the Romanian elite between January, 1968, and July, 1969, can be analyzed in the light of these statements.

Prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Romanian elite

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gave real but minimal evidence of a predilection for redefining the boundaries of the world socialist system. In this instance as in so many others, there was an element of latent learning involved, for at the 1961 Soviet Party Congress it was Khrushchev who blurred the boundaries when he stated: "The tasks of people's democratic, national liberation and socialist revolutions are drawing closer together and becoming more intertwined in the present epoch. The logic of social development has caused all these revolutions to be directed primarily against one chief enemy—imperialism."[47]

Today, however, it is the Yugoslav party that is the most active agent in redefining the boundaries, a policy that finds some resonance in the new Romanian ideological definition of proletarian internationalism. The Romanians enjoy very close relations with the League of Yugoslav Communists. In fact, during Ceauşescu's visit to Yugoslavia in May, 1968, the Romanian press pointed out that Romanian-Yugoslav relations could serve as a proper model for relations among socialist nations. For our purposes, this visit was critical in that one of its major foci was the question of alignment and the boundaries of the world socialist movement. In this instance Ceauşescu's position might be characterized as cautious but open. On May 4, several weeks before the visit, the Romanian party paper, *Scînteia*, printed a detailed summary of an article that had appeared in the Yugoslav paper, *Borba*, entitled "The Daily *Borba* on the Position of the L.Y.C. Toward the Meeting of Communist Parties." This article was direct in criticizing the proposed meeting (which was finally held in June, 1969) for being limited to Communist parties and pointed out that although the rationale of such a meeting was to create an effective anti-imperialist front, not all the anti-imperialist forces were invited. *Borba* then went on to ask, "Do the communists have, perhaps, unique interests in the anti-imperialist struggle?"[48] The Romanians also printed Tito's statement that "between our two countries and parties there exists full accord on the fundamental principles according to which countries must conduct international relations," and that "our points of view concerning many international problems are either very close or identical."[49] On the other hand, Ceauşescu was quite explicit in stressing the *aligned* posi-

[47] "Report on the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU, October 18, 1961," in Alexander Dallin, ed., *Diversity in International Communism*, 37.

[48] "Ziarul Borba despre poziţia U.C.I. fată de consfătuirea partidelor comuniste," *Scînteia*, May 4, 1968.

[49] "Cuvîntarea tovarăşului Iosip Broz Tito" [Comrade Tito's Speech] *Scînteia*, May 28, 1968.

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tion of the Romanian party and regime. In reponse to Tito's comments on the need for a high-level conference of nonaligned nations and to his combining the notion of a socialist nation with a policy of nonalignment, Ceauşescu noted that the RCP and the Romanian Socialist Republic placed the socialist system and, in particular, relations with the Soviet Union—"which with its tremendous material and human potential plays a remarkable role in the contemporary world, in the defense of peace and security"[50]—in the center of their foreign policy. Continuing in this vein, the Romanian leader stressed the importance of Romanian relations with Bulgaria and Hungary.

Under our hypothesis, the Romanian elite's behavior prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, particularly its restrained response to Yugoslav statements on the relation between the sovereignty of socialist nations and a policy of nonalignment, was a function of several interacting factors: (a) Soviet elite intransigence toward a cooperative as opposed to consensual definition of intra-bloc relations was apparent as of July, 1968, but not decisive. The Czechoslovak "experiment" was still being conducted, and, consequently, the situation within the bloc provided the Romanian elite with latitude to work for change within the existing system and helped to maintain the belief that revision of existing relations was possible within the current boundaries of the bloc. (b) The Romanian elite was operating under a number of self-imposed value constraints, such as the desire to remain a bona fide member of the bloc in order to preserve a context seen as necessary to or supportive of its political and ideological identity. (c) The Romanian elite did not want to act in such a way as to bring the Czechoslovak experiment to an end. On the contrary, the Romanians felt that they should avoid action that might jeopardize the Czechoslovak development as well as their own position. (d) Consequently, the Romanian elite opted for a "Rubashov" role,[51] acting on the premise that its greatest resource in shaping the evolution and definition of intra-bloc relations was its presence as a bloc-member. Other arguments could be presented to explain why the Romanian elite was extremely reticent about the question of redefining the boundaries of the world Communist movement and world socialist system. However, its desire to maintain its Leninist identity and its connections with other Leninist parties, the "openness" of the situation in Czechoslovakia and the bloc,

[50] "Cuvîntarea tovarăşului Nicolae Ceauşescu" [Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's Speech] *Scînteia*, May 28, 1968.

[51] Rubashov is the major character in Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* (New York 1961), who for ideological and political reasons attempted to change the "Soviet" party's character from inside, i.e., while maintaining his membership in the party.

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the fear of giving support to those in opposition to the Czechoslovak developments, and the belief that its greatest resource in the battle for redefining the quality of bloc relations was its bloc-membership—all these helped minimize any tendency to offer a substantial redefinition of the world Communist movement.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary significantly altered the Romanian party's bloc-situation. Therefore, under our hypothesis we may expect that to the extent that the Soviet Union maintains or increases its dogmatic and aggressive posture, the Romanian elite will contemplate and engage in an ideological redefinition of the bloc's boundaries.[52] Assuming a situation of increased Soviet intransigence, one possible form of redefinition involves an ideological statement by the Romanian elite that defines radical anti-imperialist regimes as integral parts of the world socialist system. Such a statement would be consistent with the party's definition of proletarian internationalism and its concern over party and national sovereignty. The Romanian elite's rationale in defending such a position could stress the need to include units within the system that were free from the Stalinist experience, legacy, and orientation and that were therefore capable of stimulating "cooperative" relations based on the actual recognition of norms such as noninterference.

However, two situational facts continue to operate and to influence the direction and content of the Romanian party's political stance toward the bloc. First, the real possibility of a Soviet invasion constrains any tendency within the elite to redefine significantly the ideological

[52] As part of the elaboration of its stress on sovereignty and perhaps in reaction to continued Soviet intransigence, on the 25th anniversary of Romania's liberation the Party initiated a distinctly new definition of that event and by implication of the Romanian Socialist Republic's status in the world community. At one and the same time, the Soviet army is given more attention and credit than has been the case in the past few years, and the role of "other United Nations" forces is now also explicitly recognized. Finally, the role of the Romanian Party's activities prior to 1944 (i.e., 1940-1944) is elaborated in greater detail, while the role of the Romanian army after August 23, 1944, is stressed even more (i.e., its role in defeating the Nazis and the recognition of this role by the major powers at that time). This new approach to the period of liberation is consistent with the stress placed by the Romanian elite on the need to eliminate blocs and substitute for them a world of equal nations, voluntarily choosing what commitments they shall make.

The greater complexity associated with the Party's role in the early forties and the greater emphasis on autonomy—signalled by an approach to the events of 1944 that places the party and nation as major participants in international events (i.e., victory in World War II) rather than as an auxiliary and dependent force (i.e., on the Soviet Union)—are both indices of the regime's attempts at institutionalization.

See Nicolae Ceausescu's speech to the "Grand National Assembly Jubilee Session on Romania's 25th Anniversary of Liberation From the Fascist Yoke," in *Documents, Articles and Information on Romania* (Bucharest, August 22, 1969).

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character of the bloc and to translate any such ideological statement into policy. Second, if for no other reason than the relative lack of elite coherence with the Soviet leadership, Soviet behavior is likely to oscillate rather than simply progress in one direction. Under our hypothesis, to the extent that Soviet behavior is characterized by a *less* intransigent bloc and international posture—as was the case during the spring and summer of 1969—the Romanian elite's tendency to redefine the bloc's boundaries will not be reinforced. In fact, throughout the summer of 1969 this tended to be the case. On the one hand, the Romanians did not emphasize the meeting of nonaligned nations in Belgrade, and, on the other, they limited their statements on the bloc to those stressing the importance of avoiding international isolation (the "iron curtain" phenomenon) and of defining the world socialist system as one composed of all ruling parties—not simply of those with membership in Comecon and the Warsaw Pact.

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SOVIET POLITICS ON THE EVE OF THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESS

By SIDNEY I. PLOSS

SINCE Stalin's death in 1953, Russia's leaders have every four or five years convened the nominally supreme body of the Soviet Communist Party, its Congress, to ratify policy guidelines and power shifts. Khrushchev lent excitement to the Congresses he presided over, launching surprise attacks on domestic and foreign Communists who were critical of his unorthodox traits. At the 20th Congress in 1956, the Party First Secretary went beyond the text of an anti-Stalin report that had earlier been agreed upon in the Kremlin and he implicated rival associates in cases of Stalinist misrule. The same foes, eliminated from high places in 1957, were just as suddenly brought under heavy criticism by Khrushchev's group at the extraordinary 21st Congress in 1959 and the 22nd Congress in 1961. A delegation of observers from Communist China headed by Premier Chou En-lai walked out of the 22nd Congress after their Albanian clients were unexpectedly assailed for heretical beliefs close to those held in Peking. In contrast, dramatic challenges and disclosures were missing from the 23rd Congress, which the successors of Khrushchev organized in 1966. The flat nature of the proceedings underlined the fact that a cycle of renewal in post-Stalin politics had been superseded by what was essentially a cycle of consolidation.

As the Soviet leadership moves toward its 24th Congress, the hard choices that it faces may produce new surprises at or shortly before the grand assembly of power and prestige elites. Who should run the decision-making machinery that has been in the uncertain hands of a "collective leadership" since the fall of Khrushchev? How should scarce economic resources be allocated between civilian and military claimants who are working at cross-purposes? Is it safe to defy Stalinist tradition and grant broader freedom to the restless middle class of technicians and intellectuals? What kind of relations with the outer world are most desirable? These are the main questions that members of the ruling Politburo will have to answer before the Party Congress meets in March, 1971, to endorse changes in their own midst, and the ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975).

The basic decisions involving prospects of development for the USSR will, as usual, be arrived at in deep secrecy. But if past practice is any

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guide, it is almost certain that verdicts will result from bitter struggle and intrigue between different power groups in and around the Politburo. This assumption about the real substance of Kremlin politics is bolstered by hints at conflict and plurality that have arisen in the Soviet Press during recent years. The signs of discord give a rough idea of the variety of interests, views, and ambitions competing for supremacy behind the governing hierarchy's ancient façade of "monolithic unity." A partial knowledge of such political relations at the top of Soviet society may enable us better to understand and anticipate policy trends in Moscow, as well as frame diplomatic initiatives that are as sensible as possible.

I. The Controversy over Economic Priorities

All major governments have to make difficult decisions on budget outlays in order to meet their responsibilities for promoting social welfare and national security. The long-standing policy in the Soviet system of planned economy has been to place great emphasis on basic and military goods. The share of the national product devoted to spending on heavy and defense industry has indeed been so large as to depress the level of individual consumption to less than half that in Western Europe and to about one-quarter of what it is in America. The plight of the ordinary consumer has been a little eased in recent years, but the regional and rural markets still lack the simplest household goods. An official decree authorizing emergency measures in 1966 grossly understated the case when it noted that "the working people are not always able to buy in shops the necessary clothing, footwear, building materials, utensils, furniture, refrigerators and certain other commodities."[1]

Khrushchev's successors in 1965 gave first priority to heavy industry for defense and agriculture. Brezhnev, head of the Communist Party machine, openly favored this course of action, as had Khrushchev a decade earlier.[2] Critics of the program to expand the resource-base of farming were alluded to in March, 1967, by the Politburo's agricultural specialist, Dimitri S. Polyansky. He rebuked "some people" who were "beginning to argue that collective and state farms now can develop with even less material aid and that one can now reduce the volume of land reclamation work and reduce the deliveries of equipment and mineral fertilizers to agriculture." Polyansky contended that such argu-

[1] *Spravochnik Partiynogo Rabotnika* [Handbook of the Party Worker] (Moscow 1967), 236.

[2] *Pravda*, November 21, 1964; March 27, July 4 and 11, September 30, and October 24, 1965.

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ments were harmful and had to be decisively eradicated.[3] In spite of this warning, state investment in farming was cut by 13 percent for the period 1966-70, compared with the 1966 Directives on the Five-Year Plan. Polyansky vented his anger over this decision in an article published by the Party magazine *Kommunist*. He declared that "the main thing" was "uninterruptedly to increase state capital investment in agriculture."[4]

The funds originally earmarked for agriculture were apparently diverted toward light industry as well as defense. At the close of 1967, an unconventional decision was taken to manufacture consumer goods at a higher rate than producer goods. The word was that increases in wages and salaries had put into the hands of citizens more money than they could spend; a temporary increase of everyday necessities would check inflationary pressures.[5]

This new attention to consumer goods appealed to officials who were professionally concerned about the grave economic imbalances resulting from decades of military industrialization. Only a few weeks after the announcement, the magazine of the State Planning Committee featured an article that tacitly advised the continued emphasis on light industrial development beyond 1968. It affirmed that skillful management would enable the Soviet "to develop the output of consumer goods at the very same rates as the output of capital goods, or even at higher rates, for not only one year but for a longer period as well."[6]

Premier Kosygin, the Politburo's overlord of the economy, shared this unusual solicitude for the consumer. Addressing a gathering of local government officials in the Kremlin on December 25, 1967, Kosygin called for "special" attention to an upswing of the light and food industries and "satisfaction of the population's demand for goods of various assortment."[7] He further associated himself with the consumer-goods position when he addressed a Party rally in Minsk. Looking forward to the drafting of the next Five-Year Plan, the Premier hailed "new tendencies" in economic life, chiefly the closing of the huge gap that separated the growth rates of light and heavy industry. "We must," declared Kosygin, "fully solve the problem of uninterrupted supply of the population with varied foodstuffs, clothing, and other consumer goods."[8] Similar words were once uttered by Kosygin's fallen predecessors, Malenkov and, on the eve of his downfall, Khrushchev.

[3] *Ibid.*, March 3, 1967.
[4] *Kommunist*, No. 15 (1967), 35.
[5] *Pravda*, October 11, 1967.
[6] *Planovoe Khoziaystvo*, No. 12 (1967), 8.
[7] *Pravda*, December 26, 1967.
[8] *Sovetskaia Belorussiia*, February 15, 1968.

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In line with these reformist pronouncements, the journal of the State Planning Committee published in March, 1968, a favorable review of a book written by one of its editors, A. N. Yefimov, which polemicized that "neither in the theory nor practice of long-term planning can we deny the possibility of equal rates of development of heavy and light industry for certain periods."[9] This refreshing viewpoint was supported at an All-Union economics conference held in May, 1968, where the participants were sure that "the branches of our industry that manufacture consumer goods have attained a solid foundation for rapid development."[10] The implication was that farming and heavy industry might get along without large increments of capital assistance.

This flirting by Kosygin and his fellow managers of technology in the state bureaucracy with a Western type of economy drew markedly hostile reactions from Brezhnev and other Party technicians of power. The Party's General Secretary and his closest associates still aligned themselves with those who were convinced that the survival of the regime depended on a further expansion of military-industrial potential.

Only a few weeks after the decision was made to speed up light industry, threatening lessons were preached by Party "historians" at work in the ideological branches of the General Secretariat. They recalled Malenkov's unavailing effort in 1953-54 to equalize for some time the growth rates of heavy and light industry, and pointedly added that this error was recalled at the Central Committee meeting of June, 1957, which expelled Malenkov from the Party's ruling councils.[11]

Unlike Kosygin, Brezhnev in February, 1968, toughly came out for "preserving the accelerated development of heavy industry as the basis of our industrial might." He advised that the Soviet Union had to increase its steel production by another 22 million tons within three years, bringing to mind Khrushchev's abuse of "some comrades" who had "developed an appetite for giving the country as much metal as possible," even if light industry had to go begging.[12] Brezhnev seemed to object to Kosygin's accent on consumer goods as stimulants to labor productivity, by asserting on March 29, 1968, that "it would be wrong to reduce everything to material incentives; this would impoverish the inner world of Soviet man."[13]

[9] *Planovoe Khoziaystvo*, No. 4 (1968), 91.

[10] *Izvestiia*, May 15, 1968.

[11] F. M. Leonidov and others, *Lektsii po Istorii KPSS* [Lectures in the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (Moscow 1967), 323. The same passage was kept in a slightly revised version of this text reprinted early in 1969.

[12] Brezhnev's speech in Leningrad on February 16, 1968, was recorded by Western monitors of Soviet broadcasts.

[13] *Pravda*, March 30, 1968.

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After Brezhnev's defense-minded rhetoric, the cause of heavy industry was taken up by the press organs nearest to central Party headquarters. The editors of *Kommunist*, for example, ran an attack by the conservative economist Anatoly I. Pashkov on "certain economists" who challenged the thesis of absolute primacy for heavy industry.[14] The same magazine also carried a directive article for social scientists by Pyotr N. Demichev, a federal Party secretary whose fortunes had fared well under Brezhnev. "We must," instructed Demichev, "give thought to the matter of keeping our economy, *particularly heavy industry*, constantly on the level of present-day demands, so that it will insure a reliable base for further development of productive life and defense."[15] Party historians, demonstrating their taste for political parallels, reminisced about how the main architect of Stalin's first Five-Year Plan virtuously battled for "the rapid growth of heavy industry" against state experts who mistakenly advocated "cotton-dress industrialization."[16] The views of army leaders on the dispute over allocations were expressed in tones that suggested nostalgia for the iron rule of Stalin. The Ministry of Defense organ, *Krasnaia Zvezda*, stated that any who would cast doubt upon the rightness of conserving the time-honored pattern of investment threatened to weaken the foundations of national power.[17]

By that time, even so great a friend of the army as Brezhnev may have developed second thoughts about the wisdom of letting the military consume resources that could be better used on domestic programs. The Lenin Military-Political Academy, a training ground for party overseers of the army, in 1968 authorized a manual for those enrolled in economics courses at service academies. The manual issued an unusual warning that "there are objective limits to military spending and if they are exceeded this will have a negative effect not only on expanded production, but also on the strengthening of defense. . . . It is essential to observe definite ratios between the output of armaments and producer and consumer goods. . . . An expansion of military consumption beyond permissible boundaries does not lead to a strengthening of the military power of a state, but to its weakening and an inevitable breakdown of the economy as a whole and military-economic potential in particular."[18] (It was hardly coincidental that a few months

[14] *Kommunist*, No. 11 (1967), 93.
[15] *Ibid.*, No. 10 (1968), 22, italics added.
[16] *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 5 (1968), 102.
[17] *Krasnaia Zvezda*, June 6, 1968.
[18] P. V. Sokolov, ed., *Voenno-Ekonomicheskie Voprosy v Kurse Politekonomii* [Military-Economic Problems in the Course of Political Economy] (Moscow 1968), 254.

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later, on June 27, 1968, Foreign Minister Gromyko declared that his government was ready to exchange opinions with the United States on the limitation and later reduction of tremendously costly strategic weapons.)

Some civilian and military leaders clashed in the winter of 1968-69, following another compromise to produce consumer goods at a slightly higher rate than capital goods. The army daily *Krasnaia Zvezda* on December 31, 1968, extolled heavy industry as the "bedrock (*osnovy osnov*) of the might of a socialist power." *Izvestiia* less dogmatically asserted on February 28, 1969, that the maxim of faster growth of capital goods was merely "one of the foundations (*odnoi iz osnov*) of our economic policy." *Izvestiia* replied to those worried about the effect of moderately speeding light industry on economic growth: "Does this mean that we are 'eating up' the future, undermining the basis of future development? Of course not. For we do not need capital goods by themselves. Their value is measured by their capacity to produce, in the last resort, articles of consumption." Similarly, the columns of the magazine of the State Planning Committee were thrown open to an anti-Stalin economist, M. Breyev, who suggested that "possibly it would be expedient to envisage still in the plan for 1971-1975 higher rates of development of Sector B [light and food industry]."[19] Party historians retorted with praise of Stalin for having battled for the primacy of heavy over light industry.[20]

The military-political complex in Moscow stepped up its hard-line propaganda shortly before the Kremlin's decision to start strategic arms limitation talks with the United States. The Party newspaper *Sovetskaia Rossiia* gave prominence to the views of Marshal Nikolai I. Krylov, commander of Soviet missile forces, on August 30, 1969. Krylov suggested that an even greater strategic buildup was necessary. He berated "imperialist ideologists" who "are trying to lull the vigilance of the world's people by resorting to propaganda tricks, saying that there will be no victors in a future nuclear war." Krylov confidently asserted that "victory in war, if the imperialists manage to start one, will be on the side of world socialism." This evidently was a reminder to Soviet moderates that they should not be complacent over the new balance of armaments and should not rule out the possibility of an American attack on the USSR. It was implied that steps had to be taken to reduce the danger to the country if a nuclear war should break out. The firm

[19] *Planovoe Khoziaystvo*, No. 3 (1969), 66.

[20] F. M. Vaganov, *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 7 (1969), 91-105. See too Vaganov's article in *Kommunist Ukrainy*, No. 8 (1969), 82-90.

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measures would logically have included an expansion of antiballistic missile defenses around Soviet cities and stocks of intercontinental missiles to destroy enemy weapons before they were launched.

Krylov's call for strategic pre-eminence was echoed in *Krasnaia Zvezda* on September 25, 1969. Major General A. Lagovsky, the author of *Strategy and Economics* (1961), attached "the greatest importance" to "the struggle for military-technical superiority." Lagovsky used a standard Lenin quotation: "Everyone will agree that an army that does not train itself to master all arms, all means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess, is behaving in an unwise or even in a criminal manner." But it was highly unusual for Lagovsky to assert that "Special attention should be given to the words 'may possess.'" This may have alluded to a costly new system of air defense or multiple warhead missiles under development in the United States.

The Kremlin announced on October 26, 1969, that preliminary strategic arms limitation talks between representatives of the Soviet and the United States governments would open on November 17 in Helsinki. The economic motive underlying Politburo agreement to the arms talks may be gathered from statements in an internal propaganda booklet that was composed at the time. Word was supplied that "Soviet foreign policy has done and is doing everything to find all possible opportunities for lowering international tension and for solving the problem of disarmament or in the initial stages even for the freezing of the arms race. . . . Experience has shown that only under conditions of a relaxation of tension is it possible to concentrate a maximum of resources for accomplishing the plans for the building of communism."[21] The same pamphlet advised that in relations with the Western powers it was essential "soberly to take account of the existing real situation and difficulties" and not disregard "the importance of partial agreements and compromises." The partial nuclear test ban treaty and the accord to halt the spread of nuclear weapons were held up as examples of fruitful cooperation between the superpowers.[22]

After nearly a month of private talks between Soviet and American arms diplomatists in Helsinki, the Politburo on December 15, 1969, had the seal of approval placed on its 1970 budget by the Party Central Committee. The budget figures were kept secret for the moment, but the moderates now ventured to disagree with the extremist opinion of Marshal Krylov. Behaving like an "imperialist ideologist," the political

[21] K. P. Ivanov, *Leninskie Osnovy Vneshney Politiki SSSR* [Leninist Foundations of USSR Foreign Policy] (Moscow 1969), 50.
[22] *Ibid.*, 46 and 52.

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observer of *Izvestiia* on December 16, 1969, favorably cited a month-old statement by United States Secretary of State William Rogers: "The present situation, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union are able effectively to destroy each other, regardless of who attacks first, in large measure removes the justification for continuance of the arms race." *Izvestiia* editors perhaps knew that a high-ranking official of the Soviet government did not share Marshal Krylov's belief in victory in nuclear war, and felt it safe to contradict the marshal in public.

The symbolic figures for defense-spending given to the Soviet parliament on December 16, 1969, tend to suggest that a Politburo majority had formed against the thesis of army leaders that another great push had to be undertaken on the military-industrial front. Defense outlays were to increase by only 200 million rubles, or 1.1 percent, compared with 15 percent in 1968 and 6 percent in 1969. The military lobbyists whom Khrushchev once scored as "metal-eaters" were also bound to be displeased with the announcement that steel production would grow at a lower rate than in the previous two years. A more restrained attitude toward defense was also shown by the fact that for the first time since 1964, the *Pravda* leading article devoted to the results of the parliament's budgetary session failed to mention the importance of strengthening defense power.[23]

We thus find an incipient tendency in the direction of overcoming the lag of economic growth and absence of work-incentives resulting from the great strategic buildup of 1965-70. But very much remains to be done, especially in the technical outfitting of agriculture, the decline of which after a brief period of improvement has been marked by meat shortages and grumbling among the population. Industry, too, has suffered from a lack of new machinery that is aggravated by a labor shortage expected to become more acute with the passage of time. These difficulties open the way for various factional alliances to take shape in drafting of the ninth Five-Year Plan. The uneasy compromise reached by Brezhnev and Kosygin since 1967 may prove durable, and the interests of agriculture and industrial construction may again be sacrificed for the benefit of defense and light industry. A second possibility is that the military and farm-technology lobbies, which Brezhnev supported from 1965 to 1967, may prevail, with heavy industry gaining to the detriment of consumer-goods industry. Still another prospect is the clear-cut elevation of the civilian interest in welfare and industrial building over that of the military establishment.

[23] *Pravda*, December 11, 1965; December 21, 1966; October 14, 1967; December 15, 1968; and December 21, 1969.

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II. The Unsolved Question of Economic Management

A lagging of industrial growth and worker output has never failed to produce tension between rival forces in the Party hierarchy. This seems to have been the case following Brezhnev's secret speech on the matter to the Central Committee on December 15, 1969. Party members were shortly told to be on guard against criticism of economic ills that smacked of "demagogic fault-finding, squabbling, and squaring of private accounts."[24] The harshest of bureaucratic centralists were then seeking to nullify the quite modest concessions granted to factory managers back in 1965. So much is clear from an appeal for more rights to the managers in a normally conservative source that also rejected the view that work discipline be tightened by return to the use of an "iron hand," inspiring "trembling and fear."[25] These defensive statements tend to confirm the accuracy of reports circulating in eastern Europe in early March, 1969, that some Politburo members were assailing Brezhnev and Kosygin for economic set-backs.

If reversion to starkly centralized control was ruled out, judgment had to be passed on a proposal for a broadening of the half-hearted managerial reform of 1965. Professor A. Birman, a leading reform economist, endorsed the initial changes and argued with skeptics at the very same time that the Party majority was justifying itself. Birman favored steps to leave a bigger share of profit at the disposal of enterprises and fix prices in a manner that would encourage plant directors to introduce new techniques. He urged the legal securing of enterprise rights and the creation of a juridical mechanism for their implementation.[26]

The reformers like Birman were given some reassurance by the Party newspaper *Socialist Industry* on February 14, 1970. It advised that money-exchange relations were needed to provide economic incentives and cautioned against belittling their role in a planned economy. *Socialist Industry* approved of developing the economic reform of 1965 "both in depth and in breadth." But any far-reaching changes are opposed by most of the *apparatchiki* of the Party machine and old-time officials of the State Planning Committee. The power-position of the *apparatchiki* is after all justified in terms of Communist ideology. It would be undermined if an honest wage took the place of "revolutionary enthusiasm" and fuller recognition of the laws of supply and

[24] *Pravda*, February 13, 1970.
[25] *Pravda Ukrainy*, February 13, 1970.
[26] *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, No. 7 (February 11, 1970), 10.

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demand made "control" less necessary. Guided by their instinct for self-preservation, the *apparatchiki* have stood behind attacks on those who overemphasize financial profit in measuring the success of enterprises. They have instigated criticism of the idea that planning orders framed in terms of physical output—and that allow Party officials to take part in implementing economic decisions—be replaced by planning orders of the Yugoslav type that are based on strictly monetary criteria.[27] The rather unprofessional planners, in turn, have censured economists who raise the idea of planning the economy in terms of a system of prices obtained mathematically on the basis of relative scarcities. Bureaucratic critics of the notion that supply and demand should be upgraded in regulating production and consumption insist that it would diminish state authority and introduce "drift" into the matter of plan-fulfillment.[28] Only four and one-half years before this criticism of the mathematical economists several of them were nominated for Lenin Prizes, an event that indicated high-level support of their modernist approach to economic thinking.

Conflict over agriculture was brought into relief by public discussion of the draft of new rules for each collective farm (*kolkhoz*) published on April 24, 1969. The draft left open the question of whether to organize collective farmers into small teams or "links." Along with the existing system of using large field brigades, the new rules approved of assigning land and machinery to small teams for a long period. Pay in links would be dependent on the harvest and enable workers to identify more closely with the land. The small-teams proposal was supported by a member of the Politburo, Gennadi I. Voronov, in an article in *Komsomolskaia Pravda* on May 11, 1969. Voronov refuted the belief that links would give impulse to private-property tendencies in the countryside. The advantages of small working units in kolkhozes were also defended by specialists writing in *Pravda* on August 26, 1969.

The old fear of kolkhozes' dissolving into family farms recurred in Party circles, to judge from a *Pravda* discussion of agricultural affairs that was published on September 24, 1969. Nonetheless, letters in behalf of the small teams were carried by the Central Committee daily *Sovetskaia Rossiia* on November 15 and 16, 1969. Brezhnev and Polyansky, however, ignored the issue of links in their speeches to the Congress of Collective Farmers later in November. The victory of conservative Party leaders became obvious when the new rules for kolkhozes were released on November 30, 1969: the qualification "for several years" was

[27] *Pravda*, September 26, 1969.
[28] *Planovoe Khoziaystvo*, No. 11 (1969), 15.

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omitted from the provision that "pieces of land are to be allotted to productive sub-units of the kolkhoz." Voronov, however, soon resumed his campaign for links, enlisting the aid of sociologists against cautious bureaucrats and their patrons among the supreme *apparatchiki*.[29]

One of the controversial issues raised in the discussion of new rules for kolkhozes was the formation of an all-union peasant association or "kolkhoz union." A few kolkhoz unions existed in the USSR before the total socialization of individual land-holdings in the early 1930's. Stalin disbanded them, lest they become a pressure group that might interfere with his scheme for ruthless plundering of the countryside. Under Khrushchev, kolkhoz unions re-emerged, pooling farm resources for a variety of local projects. An attempt was made to merge the new bodies into a national federation that would have certain rights of decision-making. But the plan was shelved after resistance was put up at a meeting of the Central Committee in December, 1959. Orthodox Communists evidently feared that a grant of some authority to farm leaders would raise a challenge to the overwhelmingly favored position of large cities and industry in economic life.

The idea of setting up a vast rural cooperative was revived by economists and farm chairmen after Khrushchev was deposed. The 1969 draft rules gave to kolkhozes the right to join "associations and unions." A broad view of their possible functions was taken in *Pravda* a few months later. One correspondent told of nine farms in the Leningrad region that were allowed to co-ordinate their activities and bargain with state planners over crop delivery quotas. The association in Leningrad was still formally subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture, and its complete independence was requested. *Pravda*'s editors noted that "some people" were skeptical of this experiment, but tacitly endorsed it.[30] *Pravda* also opened its columns to a senior Party official in Central Asia who urged that operational leadership of farming be transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to a kolkhoz union.[31] Given the procedures for canvassing Party opinion that were formulated in the early stages of Soviet rule, this reformist outlook is not likely to have surfaced in the pages of *Pravda* without the backing of leading Party figures.

Opposition to full-blooded kolkhoz unions reared its head at the Ukrainian congress of collective farmers in the second week of November, 1969. First deputy premier Nikifor T. Kal'chenko regretted the "absence of supervision" shown by the Ministry of Agriculture

[29] *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, March 17, 1970, *Leninskoe Znamia*, March 24, 1970, and *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, April 3 and 7, 1970.
[30] *Pravda*, October 9, 1969.
[31] *Ibid.*, October 15, 1969.

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toward self-help groups created by local farms. He threw the curse of silence on the idea of a national kolkhoz union.[32] In contrast, the Party leader of Armenia, Anton E. Kochinian, at his regional farm congress did give publicity to the view that "it is necessary to create suitable central, republic, and local organs which should handle questions of co-ordination of the activities of kolkhozes and general leadership of them."[33]

The enemies of farm liberalization grew strong enough to voice their opinion in *Pravda* on November 21, 1969. Ivan G. Kebin, Party chief of Estonia, slyly agreed that it was impossible to overlook the desire of farms to unite on a cooperative basis. Kebin, however, feigned concern about the size of the bureaucracy and argued that a USSR Kolkhoz Union would only swell the ranks of officialdom. A former professor of Communist theory, Kebin apparently was unable to imagine that any benefit might flow from a dose of spontaneity. In any event, Kebin advised that the Ministry of Agriculture further regulate the scattered farm organizations.

Brezhnev eventually tended to the side of the conservatives. At the opening of the national farm congress he steered clear of the dispute over kolkhoz unions and unveiled a watered-down proposal for advisory farm "councils." Staffed by kolkhoz chairmen and technicians, the councils might only discuss rural affairs and make recommendations to the government.[34] This was a far cry from the vigorous bodies that defend peasant interests in some of the European Communist states, and that were advocated in some quarters of the Soviet Party. An added insult to the defeated reformers was to name as chairman of the national farm council the very same man whose power they wanted to diminish, the present Minister of Agriculture Vladimir V. Matskevich.[35]

III. The Stalin Issue

The question of how to judge Stalin produced much strife in the collective leadership of the 1953-57 period. This was understandable since the name of Stalin was a blazing symbol of mass discipline and administrative control from above, as well as of anti-Americanism. Soviet leaders who restlessly leaned toward experimentation with the style and content of policy urged an assault on the Stalin myth (notably Khrushchev and Mikoyan). Others, who safely wished to do no more

[32] *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 13, 1969.
[33] *Kommunist* (Armenia), October 31, 1969.
[34] *Pravda*, November 26, 1969.
[35] *Ibid.*, November 29, 1969.

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than consolidate the regime along less arbitrary lines, strove to keep the criticism of Stalin within narrow bounds (notably Molotov and Kaganovich). Today, too, the partial refurbishing of Stalin's image meets resistance from the more forward-looking elements in the hierarchy.

Brezhnev's failure to make a public pronouncement on Stalin at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966 suggests that members of the leading group had failed to reach agreement on the question. Soviet President Podgorny refused to join speakers who stressed the need to combat negativism toward Stalinist methods and instead cited only the harmfulness of those methods.[36] This hint of opposition to the Stalin renascence by Podgorny logically coincided with his usually moderate statements on investment and nationality policies since the fall of Khrushchev.

The Stalin question became an outstanding issue of public life early in 1968, when a group of intellectuals in Moscow circulated an appeal calling for preventive measures against "the impending danger of new Stalins." The authors of this remarkable letter deplored as cynical lawlessness the recent trials of independent-minded young people on charges of subverting the regime. They expressed disapproval of the revival of honor to Stalin's name in official media, as well as of the ban on literary works that turn attention to the crimes of the Stalin era. "What is most humiliating," said the protestors, "regular surveillance in all its forms has become a part of daily life for quite a few Soviet people." This letter forced a wide recognition of the fact that there were groups in the country who applauded the gradual restoration of Stalinism. The reactionaries included officials alarmed by the loosening of disciplinary bonds ("people with an obsequious yen for a strong man"). A second group reportedly consisted of the late dictator's henchmen, "who have sought vindication of what was their own conduct in the not so distant past." The petition's allusion to "people with remnants of perverted nationalist sentiments" indicated that anti-Semites in the bureaucracy also hankered for bygone times.[37]

There is every reason to believe that hounding of loyal citizens who spoke out for what they saw as historical truth and social justice was instigated by special policy-factions organized around central Party secretaries like Brezhnev and Suslov. The propaganda machinery at the disposal of the General Secretariat was increasingly used to inflame latent pro-Stalinist feeling in the ranks of officialdom. A second clique

[36] *Ibid.*, April 1, 1966.

[37] "To Soviet Intellectuals." An appeal circulated in Moscow against re-Stalinization (with reference notes), *Radio Liberty Research Paper* No. 21 (New York 1968).

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that pressed for the rehabilitation of Stalin was made up of army leaders. Responsible for morale of the military, the generals were disturbed by the spread of pacifist sentiment among younger citizens. The officer corps frowned too upon the mood of political skepticism that took root after Khrushchev's sensational exposés of high-level criminality during the reign of Stalin.

Anti-Stalinism in the Party was muffled after the Central Committee plenary session in April, 1968. The alliance of Party and military diehards on the Stalin question soon became particularly evident in the newspaper *Sovetskaia Rossiia*. This organ of the General Secretariat on June 20, 1968, published a significant review of the wartime memoirs of General Sergei M. Shtemenko. An alleged target of the spurious "Doctors' Plot," which Stalin had fabricated early in 1953 as a pretext for purging oppositionists, Shtemenko was demoted after the death of Stalin and vanished from public view for three years. He re-emerged on the eve of the radical decision to crush the Hungarian revolution in 1956, and was later named to secondary posts. (Shtemenko was appointed Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a few weeks before the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, a promotion that once more pointed up the connection of organizational and policy questions.) Now the Party apparatus warmly endorsed Shtemenko's book for its account of Stalin's allegedly courageous and confident direction of military operations.

Liberalizing critics of Stalinism were reproached by *Sovetskaia Rossiia* in an ensuing survey of war fiction. The review of July 26, 1968, dissociated Stalin's purge of talented Red Army commanders in 1937 from Soviet military defeats in the first year of the Russo-German war. It heaped scorn upon freedom-writers who depicted brutal agents of the Generalissimo's military police, and generously forgave Soviet soldiers who allowed themselves to fall into German captivity. "Such actions," declared the Party newspaper, "make it difficult to instill patriotic feelings in Soviet people during the present tense international situation, when we must keep our powder dry."

But Khrushchev's term of abuse for Stalin's heyday—"period of the cult of personality"—suddenly reappeared in early 1969. The ban on using this anti-Stalin rallying cry was violated by Vladimir N. Bazovsky, Party first secretary of Novgorod Region since 1961. Bazovsky had failed to gain promotion above the rank of candidate member of the Central Committee at the 23rd Congress and was not given any award of the USSR Supreme Soviet on his fiftieth birthday in 1967. The graduate of an industrial institute in Leningrad, Bazovsky does not

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seem to have had past ties with Brezhnev and his adherents from the Ukraine. He parried the thrust of recent pro-Stalinist propaganda by deploring "the excessive centralization that took root in the period of the cult of personality." The Bazovsky pamphlet tartly reminded readers that "the Party leader is not a single-handed ruler," and underscored the importance of collective leadership by taking notice of Politburo members Kosygin, Suslov, Shelepin, and Voronov, as well as Brezhnev.[38]

Hugh Seton-Watson reminds us, in *Neither War Nor Peace*, that "doctrinaire disputes, in Communist totalitarian states, are not mere academic exercises. They are intimately connected with struggles for power, with the interplay of factions, with the fight for control of the Party machine."[39] A "doctrinaire dispute" bearing on the Stalin question has recently occurred among Soviet Party historians. In August, 1969, an article in the Party historical journal declared that the postwar history of the Party should be divided into two basic periods: (1) "The Party in the struggle for restoration and further upswing of the national economy, for completing the building of socialism (1946-1958)," and (2) "The Party's course toward full-scale building of communism. Beginning of the gradual transition from socialism to communism (since 1959)." This mode of periodization implied that continuity with the Stalinist past was truly broken under Khrushchev. The article indeed remarked that Party congresses of the Khrushchev era "decisively exposed the cult of personality of Stalin."[40] This adaptive view was directly challenged in December of 1969 by another contributor to the same journal. He affirmed that in 1939—not in 1959—the Soviet Union had entered into a new stage of development, that of "completing the building of a socialist society and gradual transition from socialism to communism." The resolutions of the Stalinist Party congresses of 1939 and 1952 were depicted as beacons illuminating the road to full communism.[41] This reverence for Stalin's work was bound to have the effect of dampening enthusiasm for new methods of government. It is noteworthy that the first article, which played down the historical role of Stalin, quoted only Kosygin among present-day leaders and the second, which held Stalin in esteem, quoted only Brezhnev.

The vast network of political control and protection also insured that

[38] V. N. Bazovsky, *Leninskie Printsipy Vnutripartiynoy Demokratii v Deystvii* [Leninist Principles of Intra-Party Democracy in Action] (Moscow 1969), 9, 21-22 and 43.

[39] Hugh Seton-Watson, *Neither War Nor Peace* (New York 1966), 394.

[40] *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 9 (1969), 66-67.

[41] *Ibid.*, No. 12 (1969), 77-80.

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debates over Stalinism in the literary ranks would ultimately move into Party forums. A concerted onslaught by dogmatic Party officials and writers was mounted in the summer of 1969 against the chief editor of the liberalizing literary journal *Novy Mir*, Aleksandr T. Tvardovsky. The party critics were distressed that, among other things, one of the contributors to *Novy Mir* had depicted as a close friend of Lenin the old Bolshevik N. N. Krestinsky, who in 1937 had fallen victim to Stalin's Great Purge.[42] The Stalinist charge of "cosmopolitanism" was levelled against one of *Novy Mir*'s best known critics by eleven die-hard writers in the literary-political weekly *Ogonyok* on July 26, 1969. Tvardovsky and his fellow editors of *Novy Mir* hit back at this "crude demagogy" of "one narrow group of writers."[43]

The rival factions in the Politburo agreed to call for a truce on the literary front. This was the sense of an unsigned *Pravda* article of September 12, 1969, that instructed the participants in literary discussions not to cast slurs upon their opponents' "civic and human dignity." This moderation, however, was unacceptable to the neo-Stalinists. Early in November the Party bosses of the Ukraine made known their wish for a sharper crackdown on dissidents. They opened as a museum the birthplace of Andrei A. Zhdanov, Stalin's militant overseer of culture after the Second World War.[44] The insistence of the same Party faction on a tightening of the censorship bore fruit on November 10, 1969, when Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, the author of several anti-Stalinist works, was expelled from the writers' union of the Russian Republic. Tvardovsky was pressured into writing a letter condemning the unauthorized publication in the West of one of his poems, under the inflammatory title "Over Stalin's Remains." The letter appeared in the organ of the USSR Writers' Union, *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, on February 11, 1970, along with an announcement that four members of *Novy Mir*'s editorial staff had been replaced. Tvardovsky resigned two days later, apparently because his political support had vanished with a shifting of the Politburo majority on the crucial question of censorship. His successor at the helm of *Novy Mir* was Vasili A. Kosolapov, a grey administrator of literary periodicals, who was evidently acceptable to most of the factional groupings. That Party secretaries at top level were more intolerant than state leaders in this dispute was suggested by a press anomaly of March 25-26, 1970: praise of Tvardovsky's anti-Stalin poem, *Far Away and Beyond* (1960), in a speech at the Congress of Writers

[42] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, July 13, 1969.
[43] *New York Times*, August 30, 1969.
[44] *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 4, 1969.

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of the Russian Republic was reported in the state newspaper *Izvestiia*, but kept out of accounts in the Party dailies *Pravda* and *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

IV. Party-State Relations

The Soviet system is plagued by chronic conflict between Party and state officials. Broadly speaking, the interest of Party organizers lies in their control of economic decision-making and bureaucratic appointments, regardless of efficiency. The state technical experts strive for the right to manage the economy with minimal interference from the Party functionaries, and to select personnel without reference to dogmatic political criteria. The strains between the two groups of officials tend to be more acute in the absence of a single holder of all supreme offices. When that is the case, authority to make decisions on questions of policy and personnel is vested in the bureaus of Party committees from top to bottom. Since power is shared in the bureaus by state and Party representatives, the line officers of the Party machine find it more difficult to impose their will on state managers. The natural response of the Party *apparatchiki* is to try to shift the locus of power from the Party bureaus to the Party secretariats, which are their own domains. This struggle over power has significance for policy in so far as the state officials' immersion in practical affairs disposes them toward less doctrinaire solutions to problems of government than is the case with the watchdogs and theorists of the Party apparatus.

The delicate balance of Party and state leaders that was created in Moscow after the removal of Khrushchev was likely to have increased frictions in the Party-government relationship at all levels. One of the initial hints of this trend was the *Pravda* article of July 20, 1966, "Collectivity and Responsibility," written by an organizational specialist, F. Petrenko. It brought back the political formulas that require equality of status in Party legislative bodies:

> The practice of Party life of recent years shows quite clearly that for insuring the collective nature of leadership a special importance attaches to the character of mutual relations between the members of a Party committee or its bureau, on one hand, and the committee's first secretary on the other. The collective nature of leadership presupposes the acknowledgment and support of leaders who rely on the masses and unswervingly carry out the Party's line. But it is strengthened when respect for authority does not exceed sensible limits and when the secretaries of a Party committee possess ap-

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> propriate tact, civility, and self-critical temperament—qualities that are so essential if a collective exchange of opinions is not to be inhibited. . . . The secretary of a Party committee is not a commander and he is not endowed with the right to command. He is only the senior person in the organ of collective leadership elected by the Communists. He has a greater responsibility. But in the solving of problems he has only as many rights as other members of the committee.

The limited power of Party secretaries was made known more subtly by a revision of the manual of Party history used in political training schools. Although the 1966 edition at one point referred to Stalin as "General Secretary," that of 1967 omitted "General" and so detracted from the prestige of the office:

1966	1967
From June 30, 1941, all power in the country was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee, headed by the General Secretary of the CPSU(B) Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, J. V. Stalin.	From June 30, 1941, all power in the country was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee, headed by the Secretary of the CPSU(B) Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, J. V. Stalin.[45]

The state-oriented forces were also able to make a point in the Central Committee Theses for the 50th anniversary of the 1917 Revolution. That document instructed Party organs to play a leading role in society "through the system of state and public organizations" and to use "methods of organizational and indoctrinational work that are intrinsic to the Party."[46] In other words, the Party *apparatchiki* were to avoid meddling in the day-to-day work of the state administrators and economic managers.

In early 1968 the *apparatchiki* registered complaints about the growing assertiveness of state managers. Writing in the political monthly *Kommunist*, the first secretary of a regional Party committee attacked "people" who declared that "the Party [machine] should not at all interfere with the solution of practical tasks facing society."[47] *Pravda* on

[45] *Ocherki Istorii KPSS* [Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (Moscow 1966), 310-11 and *Ibid., Izdanie Vtoroe* (Moscow 1967), 322. On a similar incident in 1955, see Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.: The Study of Soviet Dynastics* (London 1961), 264.

[46] *Pravda*, June 25, 1967.

[47] *Kommunist*, No. 1 (1969), 73.

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February 26, 1968, aired the grievance of one of the Party bosses of Tiumen Region that state technicians "do not consult with us about the recruiting and placing of cadres and are therefore making gross mistakes." In March, 1969, the Moscow Party conference was notified that leaders of the Ministry of the Radio Industry did not always heed the opinion of Party executive bodies.[48] A backstairs intrigue to enhance the power of the Secretariat was later suggested by use of the revealing phrase, "Central Committee headed by the Political Bureau *and Secretariat*."[49] The very same man who used the phrase had done so in 1954, presumably to boost the cause of Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Party, as opposed to that of the premier, Malenkov.[50] Speaking for Malenkov's pro-state group at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, the industrialist I. F. Tevosian stressed the limitation of Khrushchev's power by referring to "the Central Committee headed by the C.C. Presidium," without mention of the Secretariat.[51] It could consequently be argued that Brezhnev, like Khrushchev before him, was maneuvering for the ascendancy of Party secretariats over Party bureaus.

A counteroffensive aimed at keeping the balance of power in regime councils was noticeable in 1969. One of Podgorny's former colleagues in the Ukraine strongly denounced would-be autocrats of the Party machine. Piotr M. Elistratov, First Secretary of the Mordva Regional Party Committee, advised in a political booklet:

> Recognition of the important role of the first secretary of a [Party] committee must not degenerate into immoderate worship of his authority. One cannot regard as normal a situation whereby an attempt to dispute the opinion of the first secretary is looked upon in some quarters as an attempt on his "primogeniture". . . .
>
> The secretary of a Party committee is not a dictator. He is only the senior person in the organ of collective leadership elected by the Communists. He has a greater responsibility. But in the solving of problems he has only as many rights as other members of the committee.[52]

[48] *Pravda*, March 30, 1968.

[49] D. Iu. Bakhshiev, *Marksistko-Leninskie Osnovy Stroitel'stva i Deiatel'nosti KPSS* [Marxist-Leninist Foundations of the Construction and Activity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (Moscow 1968), 227-28, italics added.

[50] See Conquest, 234.

[51] *XX S"ezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza. 14-25 fevralia 1956 goda. Stenograficheskiy Otchët* [Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. February 14-25, 1956. Stenographic Report] (Moscow 1956), II, 212.

[52] P. M. Elistratov, *O Leninskom Stile v Partiynoy Rabote* [On the Leninist Style in Party Work] (Moscow 1969), 32-33.

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In the same vein, a *Pravda* article of August 2, 1969, by a Party leader of the Georgian Republic, P. Rodionov, instructed that Party first secretaries must not single-handedly decide important questions, including those involving personnel. Rodionov spoke against the practice of first secretaries' giving any kind of directives to state agencies. That Party-state relations were then engaging the attention of top leaders is further apparent from the *Pravda* article of August 10, 1969, by Fikriat A. Tabeyev, First Secretary of the Tatar Regional Party Committee. Tabeyev reprimanded Party organizers who usurped the decision-making rights of state administrators and commended the activities of Party bureaus. The Soviet philosopher and promoter of computer technology Viktor G. Afanasyev helped the government side of the house in a *Pravda* article of December 4, 1969, which drew on rarely used Lenin quotations: "Proceeding from the fact that 'a single government party rules in our country,' Lenin pointed to the necessity of 'delimiting much more precisely the functions of the Party (and its Central Committee) and of soviet power; of raising the responsibility and independence of soviet officials and soviet institutions. . . .' "[53] The official planning journal likewise advocated a policy of less Party control, under the doctrinal flag of "the supremacy of economics over politics."[54]

On the other hand, the power interest of Party secretaries in rigorous control of the economy was advanced in no uncertain terms. A Party historian at the close of 1969 declared that collective leadership should not detract from the authority of Party "chiefs" (*vozhdei*). Held up as a model "chief" was the first man to lead the Party Secretariat, Yakov M. Sverdlov. It was recalled that Lenin had approved of Sverdlov's personally deciding "the most important organizational questions," without having to trouble about "all sorts of conferences" and "all sorts of formal voting."[55] This could be taken to mean that it was proper for today's General Secretary, Brezhnev, to shake off the restraints that were placed on his margin of maneuver by colleagues in the Politburo.

A turning-point in Party-state relations and the fight for Khrushchev's vacant throne may have been reached with Brezhnev's secret speech to the Central Committee on December 15, 1969. The throwing of blame for economic failings on state managers and a move to curb their authority were indicated by the Theses for the Lenin centenary, released on December 23, 1969. Unlike the similar manifesto issued two

[53] The quotations are from V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochineniy* [Complete Works] (Moscow 1964), XLV, 113, 61.
[54] *Planovoe Khoziaystvo*, No. 1 (1970), 3.
[55] *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 12 (1969), 11.

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and one-half years earlier for the 50th anniversary of the Revolution, this one overbearingly asserted that "The Party [machine] accomplishes its tasks *both directly* and through the soviets, state bodies and public organizations" (italics added). A renewed offensive of Party *apparatchiki* against state specialists was further highlighted by a decree of the Party center that was published in February, 1970. It required the Party committees of economic ministries to keep the Party's main office informed about shortcomings in the work of the administration.[56] This in effect made senior economic administrators personally responsible to Brezhnev as well as to Kosygin. The shifting nature of majorities under "collective leadership" made it likely that Kosygin would seek to restore the balance of power that Brezhnev was disrupting. The premier's efforts behind the scenes left a trace in the government daily *Izvestiia* on March 19, 1970. An economic administrator of the Czechoslovak Communist leadership wrote that Party organs should supervise and analyze the results of activity of state bodies, "without direct interference in this activity." Kosygin, however, soon lost ground in his fight for a more genuine separation of Party and state. *Pravda* disclosed on April 11, 1970, that two veterans of the Party machine had been named first deputy chairmen of state committees for economic planning and for science and technology.

V. A Conflict of Rival Traditions

The issues and attitudes discernible in the Kremlin power-struggle that has waged since Khrushchev's ouster bear a resemblance to those seen at earlier and comparable stages of Soviet political history. In several important respects, Brezhnev has acted like Stalin and Khrushchev during their battles to substitute personal rule for collective leadership. Brezhnev has fought to establish the absolute primacy of the highly centralized Party machine over the state bureaucracy. He has normally supported the power-interest of heavy industry and defense, as opposed to that of consumer-goods industry. The strict cultural controls urged by Brezhnev call to mind the harsh directives of Khrushchev at the time of his climb to supremacy at 1957.

As Brezhnev has tended to follow in the footsteps of Stalin and Khrushchev, some of his colleagues have assumed positions roughly similar to those of Bukharin and Malenkov in the 1920's and 1950's, respectively. Kosygin and Podgorny have worked for a more genuine separation of Party and state, viewing the political tutelage of state

[56] *Partiynaia Zhizn'*, No. 4 (1970), 3-6.

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experts by Party cadres as a hindrance to responsible management of the economy. Kosygin in particular has argued for more concern about human welfare and a reduction in the tempo of industrialization. While hardly liberal in the Western sense, the pro-state faction has shown a reluctance to curtail the limited freedom granted to the intelligentsia as part of de-Stalinization.

The disputes over internal policy are likely to have been paralleled by quarrels about the conduct of foreign relations. Brezhnev's partiality to the military would cause him to be more reserved in weighing the pros and cons of limiting strategic armament. His tendency to stress the value of political and social "discipline" is apt to raise his anger against the schismatic Communists in Peking, and to make him favor more guarded contact with the Western democracies. Kosygin's readiness to offer more concessions to the consumer at the expense of the army has presumably led him to urge a more conciliatory line in dealings with both America and China. The Soviet premier's diplomatic efforts at Glassboro and Peking, it would seem, were motivated in part by a personal desire to ease the external tensions that have always served to rationalize industrial militarism inside the USSR.

The recurrent anomalies in Soviet domestic propaganda do not allow us to conclude that a final reckoning in the Politburo was signaled by the unusual public exposure given to Brezhnev in connection with the Lenin centenary. A Brezhnev victory would mean a more cautious approach to solving domestic problems and renewed commitment to an activist role for Moscow in world affairs. At the same time, Brezhnev will not be able to avoid the introduction of some measure of internal reform. He is unlike the old and rigid Stalin in several ways. First, Brezhnev does not practise *lakirovka*, or the "varnishing" of economic shortcomings. His willingness to talk about inner defects is an essential first step in the direction of changing at least the scale of economic priorities—above all, the moving up of agriculture. Second, Brezhnev is not a mad obscurantist who, like Stalin, would close down various institutes for the study of economics and world politics. With the apparent support of Brezhnev, new study centers are indeed opening throughout the Soviet Union, and this development may eventuate in a more realistic appraisal of all societies. How much progress can now be made by heirs of the more adaptive and peaceful tradition inside Soviet communism will be seen at the 24th Party Congress.

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COMPARATIVE HISTORY AND THE THEORY OF MODERNIZATION

By LESTER M. SALAMON

I

ONE of the sorest needs in the social sciences is for clear and concise conceptual equipment to give structure to disciplines and order to the range of hypotheses these disciplines purport to explore. Perhaps nowhere is this need for conceptual equipment more pressing, however, than in that amorphous area of study that examines the broad range of social processes gathered under the rubric of "modernization." Depending on one's perspective, the process of modernization is either primarily economic, or political, or psychological, or social, or technological, or all of the above. Like the elephant in the old tale, the beast is different depending on who touches it and where.

Even when the focus is on the political aspect of the process, the conceptual confusion remains. In a 1965 article, Lucien Pye delineated no fewer than ten separate concepts masquerading under the term "political development."[1] Cutting the conceptual confusion into ten neat parts was itself somewhat revealing, of course, since the same concepts could have been arranged under five headings or fifteen with no greater loss of clarity. Indeed, Pye manages to distill them into three categories that he defines as the "development syndrome."[2] Obviously, a field of inquiry as broad as this could profit from exposure to more rigorous conceptual models, for such models provide the leading questions necessary to guide research and make it productive.

Perhaps it is the social scientist with a firm understanding of history who can be most useful in this search for fruitful models of modernization. Comparative history can generate readily testable hypotheses firmly grounded in empirical reality. At the very least, the social scientist concerned with understanding the process of modernization would do well to investigate what the comparative historian has to offer before he ventures out on his own. If nothing else, this is a possible cure for the parochialism of the country or area specialist.

Fortunately, three recently published works attempt to tackle this

[1] Lucian Pye, "The Concept of Political Development," *The Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science* (Spring 1965), reprinted in Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston 1966), 31-48.

[2] Pye, *Aspects*, 45-48.

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problem of formulating empirically based models of the process of modernization drawing on comparative historical materials. One of them—C. E. Black's *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York 1966)—was written by an historian turned social scientist. Another—Barrington Moore, Jr.'s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston 1966)—was written by a social scientist turned historian. The third—Samuel P. Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968)—comes from the pen of a political scientist who draws heavily on historical materials.

In all three cases the combination of social science and history is a fruitful one, even though the outcomes are quite different. Indeed, in some respects, each of these three works undertakes a different task. Black and Moore, for instance, attempt to formulate theories of history, Black to explain the speed of modernization in different countries, Moore to explain its costs. Huntington, on the other hand, tries to formulate not a theory of history but a theory of politics that attempts to specify the prerequisites of political order in times of social change.

Despite these differences, however, the three works also overlap. In particular, each author attempts to give some theoretical order to what Black refers to as "the central problem in political modernization," that is, "the process by which a society makes the transition from a political leadership wedded to the traditional system to one that favors thoroughgoing modernization." It is this area of overlap in these three works that we will analyze here. In particular, we will examine the conceptual tools these three scholars use to explore this process of transition from traditional to modernizing leadership.

Even a quick glance suggests that these conceptual tools are in fact different, emphasizing different aspects of this historical process, generating different suggestions about further lines of exploration, and producing different predictions about the future patterns of modernization in the world. Where Black and Huntington consider the political aspects of this process most critical, Moore focuses instead on economic relations. Where Black's typology groups Japan, Russia, and China together in one pattern and Germany in another, Moore's typology groups Germany together with Japan in one pattern and places Russia together with China in another.

What we propose to investigate in this article are the answers to two questions. First, what are the criteria for these different groupings? And second, which is the most productive and for what purposes? In other words, we propose to analyze these three works explicitly as models of the modernization process. This means, basically, that we

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will concentrate less on the accuracy of the facts each author presents than on the way he organizes this complicated field of inquiry. We will, in short, evaluate the *questions* they ask, not the answers they propose.

II

The use of conceptual models or typologies in thinking is not a matter of choice: it is the *sine qua non* of all understanding. As Karl Deutsch wrote in *The Nerves of Government*, "It seems clear . . . that we all use models in our thinking all the time, even though we may not stop to notice it. When we say that we 'understand' a situation, political or otherwise, we say, in effect, that we have in our mind an abstract model, vague or specific, that permits us to parallel or predict such changes in that situation of interest to us."[3] The primary function of a model, and of theory in general, therefore, is to provide scholars with criteria that specify which facts are relevant to a particular process and which are not. Thomas Kuhn stated this point well in his book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. "In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, all of the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant. As a result, early fact-finding is a far more nearly random activity than the one that subsequent scientific development makes familiar."[4] It is for this reason that Deutsch can argue that "progress in the effectiveness of symbols and symbol systems is thus basic progress in the technology of thinking and in the development of human powers of insight and action."[5]

Anyone who has studied the literature on modernization over the past decade must be sensitive to this need for "basic progress in the technology of thinking." A very impressive array of historical material has been gathered about a wide variety of societies, but there is still a need for conceptual equipment that can limit the field and locate the critical aspects of this all-encompassing process.

The task of a model, therefore, is not simply to describe but, more importantly, to explain by identifying the critical parts of the process under study. A good model organizes facts into a meaningful framework in such a way as to generate a series of testable hypotheses with predictive power, or at least a series of insights about where to look for something interesting. The best model is the one that performs

[3] Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York 1963), 12.
[4] Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Chicago 1962), 15.
[5] Deutsch, *Nerves*, 10.

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these functions most efficiently. But how can we recognize the best models? Indeed, on what grounds can we compare one model to another?

Karl Deutsch answered these questions in *The Nerves of Government*, in which he proposed three criteria for evaluating models. In Deutsch's terms, the quality of a model depends on its *economy*, its *originality*, and its *explanatory or predictive powers*.[6] Thus, in the first place, the better model is the one that is more *economical*, the one that truly identifies the more critical aspects of the process under study and thus produces a picture of reality that is significantly simpler than reality, thereby permitting selection of facts. In the second place, the better model is the one that is more *original*, the one that focuses attention on relationships that are not already obvious and are not trivial. In the third place, the better model is the one that has greater *explanatory and predictive capacities*. This is the most complicated of the three criteria. To be predictive, a model must have *rigor*, *combinatorial richness*, and *organizing power*. *Rigor* is a measure of the model's ability to produce unique answers at various stages of inquiry. *Combinatorial richness* refers to the range of hypotheses the model generates, the number of interesting and important relations it identifies. *Organizing power* consists of the capability of the model to explain processes other than those it was originally designed to explain.

Perhaps the best way to explain these criteria is to illustrate their utility in evaluating models in the physical sciences. Sixteenth-century astronomers faced the difficult choice between two alternative models of the cosmos. Both professed to explain the known facts about the movement of the heavenly bodies in mathematical terms. The Ptolemaic model portrayed the cosmos as a series of concentric spheres with the earth at the center. The Copernican model portrayed instead a cosmos with the sun at the center, encircled by a number of planets, among which was the earth. Since both models seemed to explain the observed facts, scholars had difficulty accepting one and rejecting the other. On what basis could this decision have been made? And why do scholars today accept the Copernican model?

The criteria cited above permit us to answer these questions. In Deutsch's terms, the Copernican model proved to be more *economical* and *predictive*. It was more economical because, especially after Kepler's improvements, it permitted astronomers to explain with a few brief statements what had taken Ptolemaic scholars intricate calculations to explain. The Ptolemaic model had accommodated the increas-

[6] *Ibid.*, 16-18.

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ingly detailed knowledge about the heavenly bodies only by elaborating a complex system of new cycles and epicycles, each described by an intricate mathematical statement, so that Milton, by his time, depicted the cosmos

> With Centric and Concentric scribbled o'er
> Cycle and Epicycle, Orb in Orb.

The Copernican model explained the same facts, but with much greater economy. A few simple mathematical statements accounted for the whole body of accumulated knowledge about the movement of the heavenly bodies.

The Copernican model was also more *predictive* than the Ptolemaic, largely because it had greater *combinatorial richness* and *organizing power*. Its greater *combinatorial richness* was evident in its ability to explain everything that the Ptolemaic model had explained and in addition account for a great many hitherto unexplained facts, such as the appearance of meteors. Very significantly, the widespread acceptance of the Copernican model coincided with the discovery of phenomena that had formerly escaped the notice of astronomers wedded to the Ptolemaic model, a development that suggests that models lead not only to the explanation of facts, but also to their discovery.[7] New models can make scholars sensitive to facts they had formerly overlooked or ignored. The model that accounts for more of these formerly ignored facts must certainly deserve our adherence.

The greater *organizing power* of the Copernican model is evident in its great flexibility: the ease with which it has accommodated speculations about other solar systems, its ability to explain the trajectory of man-made bodies as they circle the earth, and the success with which it has survived the application of the theory of gravity to the movement of the heavenly bodies.

The criteria Deutsch suggests thus permit us to explain the nature of the superiority of the Copernican model of the cosmos over the Ptolemaic. What we must do now is to apply these same criteria to three social science models of the process of modernization. Even if we do not derive from this exercise a model comparable to either the Copernican or Ptolemaic one, we should nevertheless succeed in identi-

[7] Thomas Kuhn discusses this point in the following terms: "Can it conceivably be an accident, for example, that Western astronomers first saw change in the previously immutable heavens during the half-century after Copernicus' new paradigm was first proposed? . . . The very ease and rapidity with which astronomers saw new things when looking at old objects with old instruments may make us wish to say that, after Copernicus, astronomers lived in a different world. In any case, their research responded as though that were the case." Kuhn, *Structure*, 115-16.

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fying where the existing models lead us and where they fall short. Let us begin with the model developed by Cyril E. Black in *The Dynamics of Modernization.*

III

Black begins by identifying four "critical problems that all modernizing societies must face" (p. 67). The first is what he calls the "challenge of modernity," and it consists of "the initial confrontation of a society within its traditional framework of knowledge, with modern ideas and institutions, and the emergence of advocates of modernity." The second problem is "the consolidation of modernizing leadership," the transfer of power from traditional to modernizing leaders. The third is the "economic and social transformation," the process of industrialization and urbanization. The fourth problem, finally, is the "integration of society," which he defines as the "phase in which economic and social transformation produces a fundamental reorganization of the social structure throughout the society" (pp. 68-69).

According to Black, there are significant similarities in the ways various societies cope with these four problems. He illustrates this point by elaborating a typology of the ways in which societies have coped with the problem of the "consolidation of modernizing leadership." The typology allocates each of the more than 170 politically organized societies into one of seven patterns "according to the characteristic political problems that modernizing leaders have faced in gaining power and in implementing their programs" (p. 96). Five criteria form the basis of the typology's grouping of societies, and it is therefore on the usefulness and fruitfulness of these criteria that the worth of Black's typology must be evaluated. The five criteria can be stated in five questions as follows:

1. Did the transfer of political power from traditional to modernizing leaders in a society occur early or late in relation to other societies?
2. Was the immediate challenge of modernity internal or external?
3. Did the society enjoy continuity of territory and population during the modern era?
4. Did the society experience colonial rule in the modern era?
5. Did the society enter the modern era with institutions sufficiently well developed to permit adaptation to the functions of modernity?

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Essentially, this model explains two aspects of the modernization process: (1) the speed with which the transition to modernizing leadership occurs, and (2) the degree of instability that accompanies this transition. Thus, Black hypothesizes that where modernization occurred early, where the challenge of modernity was essentially internal, where no problems of territorial discontinuity plagued the modernizing leaders, where no foreign colonial power thwarted modernizing efforts, and where institutions existed capable of adapting to modernization—where all these conditions existed, the transition to modernizing leadership was accomplished fairly peacefully and fairly quickly. England, therefore, is the "ideal type" of modernizing society that enjoyed almost all of these blessings, and France is a close second. Together, they constitute Black's "first pattern." Other societies have had a more difficult time, depending on which of the five benefits they lacked. The societies in Black's "third pattern"—including Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands—enjoyed the advantage of completing the transition to modernizing leadership fairly early, thus escaping the application of unsuitable foreign models, but they suffered because modernization came to them externally, and they all faced severe problems of nation-building that distracted attention from the other tasks of modernization. Russia, China, and Japan ("fifth pattern"), on the other hand, form a distinct pattern because, although they relied on external models, their traditional institutions were well enough developed before the challenge of modernity appeared to permit them to resist outside influences and complete the transition to modernizing leadership without direct outside intervention. Altogether, Black identifies seven patterns on the basis of these five criteria, the seventh including only the countries of sub-Sahara Africa, which, in Black's view, lack the traditional institutions capable of making a creative adaptation to the functions of modernity.

Black's typology provides us with a simple set of concepts around which a vast array of historical material can be organized. In the terms elaborated earlier, therefore, the model seems to be quite *economical*, as Black demonstrates when he applies it to no fewer than 170 societies. The problem, however, is that Black pays a high price for this economy, perhaps too high a price. In particular, the model purchases economy only by sacrificing *originality* and *predictive power*, the two other criteria of a good model.

The sacrifice of *originality* is evident in the operational definitions Black supplies for several of the key factors in his typology. Take the second criterion in the typology, which distinguishes between societies

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in which the challenge of modernity was external and those in which it was essentially internal. Black argues convincingly that this distinction helps to explain three aspects of the modernization process: the nature of the struggle between traditional and modernizing leaders, the length of time required to consolidate modernizing leadership, and the extent to which stable modern institutions are established (p. 98). These are all extremely significant aspects and Black's distinction is therefore potentially important and nontrivial. But then Black explains the operational meaning of his distinction. The difference between societies in which the challenge of modernity was essentially external and those in which it was internal, we learn, depends merely on whether the society experienced a "decisive confrontation on native soil with foreign occupying forces" (p. 98). Certainly this must be an obvious point: a foreign military invasion is bound to affect the nature of the struggle between traditional and modernizing leaders. But what about the less obvious types of external challenges? What effects do they have? Indeed, do all foreign invasions have similar effects? In short, Black's formulation begs more questions than it answers; and the questions it begs seem more interesting and significant than those it answers.

In many places, to be sure, Black's model identifies more complicated and original explanatory factors. In these places, however, the model too frequently suffers from a second shortcoming: limited *explanatory and predictive capacities* caused, in the first place, by lack of *rigor*, and, in the second place, by lack of *combinatorial richness*.

Given the nature of the phenomena social science tries to explain, lack of *rigor* is almost a necessary occupational hazard. The critic must therefore be careful not to require such high standards of rigor that he forecloses the possibility of any comparative history and conceptualization at all. The concern for rigor, however, need not be only an impediment to conceptualization. It can also be an asset if it forces scholars to explain their conceptual categories more clearly. In the case of Black's model, several of the criteria lack this clarity.

Perhaps most striking in this respect is his fifth criterion: the existence of "traditional institutions . . . sufficiently developed to be adaptable to the functions of modernity" (p. 103). The notion that the nature of a society's "traditional" institutions affects its pattern of modernization is certainly an interesting hypothesis deserving careful study. The problem, however, is Black's failure to give some objective or operational meaning to his concept of "under-developed" traditional institutions. The division between those societies where the "level of development of traditional institutions is on the whole not adequate to

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provide the basis for adaptation" and those societies where the level of development *is* adequate seems quite arbitrary, for Black supplies us with only the most rudimentary clues about how to gauge this aspect of institutional development. At the worst, therefore, his hypothesis about the level of development of traditional institutions can be reduced to a tautology: it attributes poorly developed traditional institutions to those societies that have not yet modernized, and then hypothesizes that those countries with poorly developed traditional institutions have trouble modernizing. What is needed is a more objective and "rigorous" definition of poorly developed traditional institutions.

Another indication of the lack of rigor of Black's model is his failure to try to test his hypotheses about the speed and stability of the modernization process. Even though he does not bother to make the calculations, however, his figures seem to confirm his hypotheses, at least about the speed of modernization. Thus the societies in the "third pattern," which faced difficult problems of nation-building, required an average of 61 years for the modernizing leadership to consolidate itself, while the societies in the "fifth pattern," which escaped these problems, required only an average of 42 years to accomplish this consolidation. All of these calculations depend, however, on the accuracy of the cut-off points Black suggests for the various stages of modernization; and these dates are, to say the least, somewhat arbitrary.

When we turn to the problem of assessing the degree of stability or instability that accompanied the process of modernization, the problem of measurement becomes even more serious. Black copes with it by ignoring it completely. He assumes that certain societies entered the modern world with less violence and instability than did others, but he makes no attempt to support this assumption. Moreover, he makes no attempt to distinguish between the violence modernization implies for some of the former colonial areas now attempting to modernize and the violence that accompanied modernization in the United Kingdom in the form of the enclosure movement. The presumption is that the latter was not violence at all.

Lack of *rigor* is only one cause of the limited *explanatory and predictive capacity* of Black's model, however. The model also lacks *combinatorial richness*. It identifies only a very limited range of hypotheses. It concentrates on the speed and stability of the modernization process, but has little to say about whether modernization will occur at all in a society, and if it does, what specific form it will take. When Black attempts to deal with these questions, his argument tends to fall back on a single factor: culture. Thus he explains that Russia and China be-

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came totalitarian because "the weight of tradition predisposed them to extreme forms of centralization. . ." (p. 85). Similarly, democracy developed only in those countries that had "a deeply rooted tradition of individual rights." The problem with such explanations is that they fail to explain how these particular traditions became functional in these specific societies and not in others. After all, Black himself noted that all traditional societies had elements of nondemocratic traditions. Why did these prevail in some cases and not in others? The model offers no clues about where to look for the answers to this kind of question. Its *combinatorial richness*, in short, is limited.

The model Black offers, therefore, provides us with a very rough sketch of the terrain of modernization. Considering the size of the terrain, this is no mean achievement. But it would be wrong to overstate the achievement. Black's sketch indicates where the ocean stops and the land begins. Therefore, the scholar seeking to explore the interior had best begin with this rough sketch; but he would be wise not to venture too far from the shore with it as his only guide. Black identifies certain critical obstacles that must be surmounted in the course of modernization and some of the elements affecting a society's ability to overcome these obstacles. His emphasis on the impact of foreign influences on modernization is particularly important in this regard and is a factor all too frequently overlooked. The model is of only limited use, however, when we turn to more difficult research questions. What effects do various aspects of the pre-modern social structure have on the way a society modernizes? Are there significant differences among different types of modernizing elites that affect the process of modernization? What determines the form that the transition to modernizing leadership will take? To comprehend these aspects of the modernizing process we need additional conceptual equipment. Samuel P. Huntington undertakes to devise some of this equipment in one portion of his book, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. The following section, therefore, will evaluate Huntington's effort to conceptualize the process of transition to modernizing leadership.

IV

In large part, Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* focuses on the political aspects of what Black would term the stage of "economic and social transformation," the stage that follows the "consolidation of modernizing leadership." He analyzes with great insight the challenge to political institutions this transformation poses and

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argues persuasively for the need to understand the implications modernization has for the durability and effectiveness of political institutions. In a section of his first chapter, however, Huntington elaborates a model dealing with what Black considers an earlier stage, the "consolidation of modernizing leadership." It is this part of Huntington's presentation that we will investigate here.

The model Huntington develops focuses primarily on the dialectical relation between urban and rural areas—what Huntington terms the "city-country gap." The model divides the modernization process into four interrelated stages, each characterized by a particular urban-rural relation. In the first stage, what Huntington calls the "typical traditional phase," the countryside dominates the city socially, economically, and politically; but both city and country are fundamentally stable, with political participation restricted to a small aristocratic group of landowners in the countryside. The beginnings of economic and social change, however, lead to a second stage as urban groups develop strength and begin to challenge the rural elite: in Huntington's words, "the urban middle class, in short, makes its appearance in politics and makes the city the source of unrest and opposition to the political and social system which is still dominated by the country" (p. 73). The third stage appears when the urban groups overthrow the ruling rural elite, producing what Huntington calls the "urban breakthrough." The fourth stage is perhaps the most complex, for it involves the re-uniting of the polity through the inauguration of the rural masses into politics. This can occur in any of four ways, depending on whether the sponsors of the "Green Uprising" are: (1) nationalist intellectuals; (2) a section of the urban elite trying to overwhelm its more narrowly based urban political opponents; (3) a rurally oriented military junta; or (4) a clique of revolutionary urban intellectuals. Each of these four forms of the "Green Uprising" has implications for the target of the uprising and the framework in which it occurs. The first three forms, however, mobilize the peasants *into the system* and thus re-establish order by "containing" urban instability. The last form mobilizes the peasants *against* the system and leads to a joint urban-rural attack on the existing social and political order. "Thus," says Huntington, "paradoxically, the Green Uprising has either a highly traditionalizing impact on the political system or a profoundly revolutionary one" (p. 77).

The model Huntington proposes seems to satisfy at least two of the three criteria of a good model that we defined earlier. In the first place, it seems to be quite *economical*, for it seems to be capable of organizing a complex array of historical material efficiently and meaningfully. In

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the second place, it identifies at least two very fruitful and *non-trivial* hypotheses for research: first, that "the timing, the method, and the auspices of the Green Uprising . . . decisively influence the subsequent political evolution of the society"; and second, that "a society is . . . vulnerable to revolution only when the opposition of the middle class to the political system coincides with the opposition of the peasants" (p. 78). Nevertheless, the model fails to satisfy our third requirement, for it has somewhat limited *explanatory and predictive capacities*. In particular, the model lacks what we earlier termed *rigor*, *organizing power*, and *combinatorial richness*.

The limited *rigor* of Huntington's model is perhaps its least significant shortcoming, for, as we have already had occasion to observe, social science models lack rigor almost as a matter of necessity. Indeed, any model that demarcates successive stages of historical development is in danger of sacrificing rigor to clarity, and Huntington's is no exception. His four stages are archetypes that serve to underline certain important historical configurations. However, when we try to find examples of these stages in the historical record, problems immediately arise, because the separate stages have a tendency to flow into one another. The lines of demarcation in fact are not nearly so sharp as they are in theory. And Huntington supplies us with only the roughest clues about how to determine, in a specific case, which stage we are in.

More serious than the model's lack of rigor, however, is its limited *organizing power*, its inability to explain processes other than those it was originally designed to explain. The problem is that it fails to account for some important alternative patterns of historical development. The "urban breakthrough" Huntington posits as a critical stage in his model of modernization resembles, at first glance, the concept of "bourgeois revolution" formulated by Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto*, complete with the dialectic of urban (bourgeois) and rural (feudal) conflict culminating in a revolutionary surge. According to Marx and Engels, "We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, . . . the feudal organization of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property, became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. *They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.*"[8] Thus, the urban breakthrough.

[8] Lewis Feuer, ed., *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy* (New York 1959), 12.

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In Huntington's case, of course, it is not only "productive forces" that provide the engine of change, but also what Marx and Engels would term the "relations of production." The source of the "urban breakthrough" is the new political elite that takes power in a society and undertakes to transform the society's "productive forces." In Huntington's model the initiative rests with the politicians.

The problem with this model, however, is that it applies to only a very restricted range of historical experience, namely, to those societies in which an independent urban middle class did in fact develop, and in which this urban middle class did in fact become "the source of opposition to the political and social system which is still dominated by the country" (Huntington, p. 73). Neither of these developments is inevitable. In fact, they are far from being even probable. The weakness of the urban middle classes in Germany and Japan is well known. But this weakness did not prevent modernization. Indeed, the mere appearance of an urban middle class is no guarantee that this middle class will oppose the prevailing rurally dominated social system. To the contrary, as Maurice Dobb has noted, at least the commercial elements of the urban middle class are "more likely to be under an inducement to preserve the existing mode of production than to transform it."[9] Politics may move to the city but still protect the country's interests. The *organizing power* of Huntington's model is therefore somewhat limited because the model fails to equip the scholar both with a set of concepts that help him comprehend the pattern modernization takes in the absence of an urban breakthrough, and with a set of criteria to enable him to determine clearly whether this "breakthrough" has in fact occurred.

Closely related to the limited *organizing power* of the model is its restricted *combinatorial richness*, the restricted range of hypotheses the model generates. Although Huntington specifies four possible patterns of Green Uprising and asserts that the particular pattern that prevails is highly important, he nevertheless fails to offer a convincing explanation of why one pattern occurs and not another. His model, in short, *identifies* the four patterns, but fails to provide clues about where to look to *explain* the patterns. In fact, he offers only one suggestion to explain the appearance of one pattern of Green Uprising and not another. It depends, he asserts, on the *choices* of leaders. "Whether a society evolves through a more or less revolutionary path thus depends upon the *choices* made by its leaders and their urban opponents *after* the city asserts its role in the political system" (p. 78, italics added). From this it would appear that Huntington considers any of the four

[9] Maurice Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (New York 1963), 17-18.

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patterns of Green Uprising equally likely for any society. While no one would deny that the choices of political leaders are quite important in determining the form of the Green Uprising, it seems equally difficult to deny that at least some features of the objective situation affect the leaders' choices.

Elsewhere in his book Huntington does specify some of these features. In particular, he concentrates on the political structure of the traditional society and argues that the structure of power in the traditional political system significantly affects the character of the Green Uprising. To modernize, argues Huntington, a society must have political institutions capable of innovating policy and absorbing increased political participation. The first requires the concentration of power, the latter its dispersal. Societies with highly concentrated political power, like the centralized monarchies of France, China, and Russia, are best able to promote innovation, but least able to absorb the increased participation innovation invariably produces. As a result, these societies are most susceptible to revolution. On the other hand, traditional systems in which power is dispersed may not modernize so quickly, but will do so less violently because they will be able to absorb increased political participation (pp. 274-78).

This concept of the "absorptive capacity" of a political system is a fruitful one, which Huntington develops with great skill and which he uses to explain the incidence of revolution in France, China, Russia, Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cuba. The concept, and the model of which it is a part, are somewhat less helpful, however, in explaining why certain societies with similar traditional political structures develop so differently—why England, for instance, became a liberal democracy and Japan a fascist dictatorship, even though both societies had dispersed traditional political institutions.

A large part of the explanation of these variations seems to lie in the nature of the social forces produced by economic change, and thus in the character of this economic change itself. What we need in order to comprehend these variations, therefore, is conceptual equipment addressed explicitly to the problem of ordering the social and economic determinants of the transition to modernizing leadership, much as Huntington's model orders the political factors. The work of Barrington Moore, Jr., is one attempt to formulate such equipment.

V

In his *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Moore identifies three basic patterns of modernization. What he terms the "capitalist-

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democratic route" corresponds very roughly to what Huntington identifies as the "urban breakthrough cum containment" pattern. What Moore refers to as the "communist route" corresponds in a very rough way with what Huntington terms the "Green Uprising: Revolution." What Moore terms the "fascist route" corresponds to the pattern of modernization without an urban breakthrough, a pattern that Huntington fails to consider.

This apparent similarity between the concepts used by Huntington and those used by Moore masks, however, the basic dissimilarity in the orientations of the models they develop. Where Huntington concentrates simply on the basic dichotomy between urban and rural sectors of a society, Moore concentrates on the complex set of interrelations among four critical sets of actors in the pre-modern society: the landed upper classes, the peasantry, the urban bourgeoisie, and the governmental bureaucracy. Where Huntington tends to stress political relations, Moore focuses instead on economic relations. Indeed, Moore defines his three patterns of modernization in terms of the social class that sponsors the commercialization of agriculture. Thus the "capitalist-democratic route" prevails where a strong commercial and industrial bourgeoisie sponsors the commercialization of agriculture either by converting the landed elite to capitalist methods of farming, as in England, or by destroying the economic power of the landed elite, as in France. In the second pattern, the "fascist route," the landed upper class itself sponsors the transition to modern capitalistic production on the land *before* the urban bourgeoisie has a chance to establish its power. Finally, the "communist route" occurs where, in the absence of a modernizing, commercializing surge from the landed elites *or* the urban bourgeoisie, the peasantry itself, in co-operation with one or another group in the society, takes the initiative.

Four central hypotheses thus form the core of Moore's model. The hypotheses are, to be sure, rather ponderous; but this reflects as much the complexity of the underlying social processes as it does the limitations of the approach. In brief, these hypotheses can be reduced to the following, even though Moore never states them in this form:

1. Given a strong and independent urban commercial and industrial middle class, the probability is high that democratic capitalism will develop, but only if a rough balance exists between the governmental bureaucracy and the landed upper classes in the society and if the urban bourgeoisie manages to exert its control over national policy, either by converting the landed elites as in England or by destroying their power as in France.

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2. In the absence of a strong and independent bourgeoisie, fascism is likely when the landed upper classes sponsor the commercialization of agriculture themselves and, in the process, expropriate and rationalize the machinery of government to enforce labor discipline in the countryside and secure worker identification with the state in the city.
3. Where the urban bourgeoisie is weak and the landed upper classes fail to commercialize agriculture, the intrusion of market relations into the countryside makes peasant revolution likely, but only when the peasant community is itself cohesive and the link between the peasant and the landlord is weak, and even then only when the peasants can find allies with organizational skills.
4. Where the urban bourgeoisie is weak, the landed upper classes see no incentive to commercialize agriculture, and the peasant community lacks the cohesion necessary for effective political action, the probability is high that modernization will simply not occur until one of these conditions disappears and, particularly, until one of these social groupings makes a decisive break with the past.

The particular historical events that produce these constellations of forces can, of course, vary. Thus the middle classes can be weak because the landed upper classes bypass the cities and retain control of commerce in their own hands (Germany), or because a foreign colonial power has monopolized the functions an indigenous middle class might have performed (India). In either case, the outcome is essentially the same: a weak commercial and industrial class and consequently a weak democratic challenge to the landed elites. Depending on other factors, therefore, the result will be fascism or communism or stagnation—but probably not capitalist democracy.

Moore's "three routes to the modern world" conceptualize a great deal of human experience with great clarity. Compared to the other models we have considered, Moore's model, to use our earlier terminology, is somewhat less *economical*. Nevertheless, its *originality* more than compensates for its shortcomings in economy, and is in fact a prime cause of them. The simple fact is that Moore's model attempts more than the others we have considered: it attempts to explain not only *whether* modernization will occur, but also *what form* it will take, and what consequences various forms have for human freedom and suffering. The leading questions Moore poses to guide research may,

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therefore, lack elegance and economy, but they more than make up for this by being thoroughly nontrivial.

Despite these assets, the model contains some shortcomings that limit its *explanatory and predictive power*. In particular, the model lacks *rigor* and suffers from some interesting lapses in *combinatorial richness* and *organizing power*.

As we have had occasion to note twice already, the critic of social science models must relax somewhat his demands for rigor lest these demands foreclose all possibility of conceptualization. In the field of comparative history, the criteria for success of a model cannot yet be how close the model takes us to definite and precise quantitative predictions, but rather how far it takes us from the position that "anything is possible." Moore's model takes us quite far in this direction, and it is this that gives it great value for the researcher. Nevertheless, there is reason to doubt whether Moore has provided those who wish to use his concepts with clear enough explanations of their meaning and precise enough indications about how to apply them. As a result, there is a serious danger that the hypotheses he identifies may become, in the hands of less careful scholars, mere tautologies.

The concept of a "strong and independent bourgeoisie," for instance, is critical to Moore's argument and plays an important part in his model. Where such a group exists, the chances are good for some form of democracy; where it is absent, fascism, peasant revolution, or stagnation are more likely. But how are we to recognize such a group and to gauge its strength and independence? One way, of course, would be to determine the size of the middle classes and the share of the nation's wealth they control. A close reading of Moore's analysis, however, suggests that these measures of middle-class strength and independence are not sufficient. They must be supplemented by a consideration of the degree of cultural autonomy of the bourgeoisie, the degree to which the bourgeoisie adopts or rejects the cultural norms and traits of the landed elite. Such a consideration, however, is difficult to make and is of necessity highly subjective. The danger, therefore, is that the strength of the bourgeoisie in any society will be evaluated by looking at what that bourgeoisie does—e.g., does it challenge the landed upper class? Does a capitalist revolution occur? Such an approach will transform Moore's hypothesis about the *effects* of having a strong bourgeoisie into a tautology, for it makes these effects part of the definition of a "strong and independent bourgeoisie." While the social consequences may be the same when we have a weak bourgeoisie as when we have a strong one that fails to act wisely, the explanations of these two

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phenomena are quite different. Moore's use of the concept of a "strong and independent bourgeoisie" confuses the two.

The same is true of such concepts as "a rough balance between the Crown and the landed upper classes," "exploitative landlordism," and a "revolutionary break with the past." The difficulty in providing an objective definition of these concepts produces a temptation to define them, at least partly, in terms of their hypothesized consequences. Thus, there is a temptation to establish the existence of "exploitative landlordism" by reference to peasant violence, and then to use the concept of "exploitative landlordism" as an explanation of this very violence.

For the most part, Moore avoids these traps in his analyses of specific societies. Nevertheless, his failure to provide clear, objective, and non-tautological meanings to his concepts undermines somewhat his model's usefulness for other researchers. In the terms we introduced earlier, this failure limits its *explanatory and predictive capacities*.

Another, and closely related, limit on the explanatory and predictive capacities of Moore's model arises from a lapse in its *combinatorial richness*. For the most part, the model perceives political events as derivative. It is therefore rich in hypotheses that explain particular political events by reference to particular social and economic configurations. In a sense, politics is "over-explained" in economic and social terms, leaving little room for political explanations of political events. Moore's model, in short, neglects precisely what is central to Huntington's—what we might term the organizational or institutional dimension of social change.

This dimension, however, is an important part of any explanation of different forms of modernization. The appearance of fascism in Germany in 1933, for instance, must be attributed, at least in part, to an institutional breakdown, to the inability of the German middle classes and workers to develop political organizations resilient enough to withstand the shock of depression. The appearance of a Communist regime in Russia in 1917 was a result, at least partly, of the superior political organizing skills of the Bolsheviks. Had a strong Communist party organization existed in France in 1789, the same thing might have occurred there too, regardless of the vast structural differences between the two societies. The simple fact appears to be that the skills of the politician play an important part in explaining the route a particular country takes. The winner of a revolution is not necessarily the group that commits the violence, but the one that builds the institutions that survive afterward.

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Organizational skills are the monopoly of no particular social class, unless the intellectuals can be considered a social class. The route a particular country takes to the modern world may therefore be as much a function of the ideology and political skill of the intellectuals as it is a function of the strength of the landed elite and commercial bourgeoisie. A bourgeoisie that is strong in numbers and wealth but poor in organizational skill may fare far worse than one small and poor in everything but the capacity to organize. This may be one of the most important differences between the German and English middle classes: the latter had a long history of self-government through commercial guilds and urban government corporations; the former displayed a tendency for nothing so much as internecine warfare and ideological controversy. At the very least, an otherwise weak bourgeoisie can maximize its influence through effective organization. Perhaps, in the last analysis, fascism emerged in Germany not because the landed elite was economically "stronger" than the bourgeoisie, but because the army and the state bureaucracy were *better organized* than the middle-class political parties. If this is so, the safeguard against fascism may not necessarily be social revolution aimed at destroying the landed elite, but may rather be political organization among the urban middle class. Moore's model goes far in explaining the context in which this political skill, this ability to organize political institutions, operates. In the process, however, he downgrades the importance of political skill itself.[10]

Political skill undoubtedly has important economic causes: it is almost impossible to organize a political party among plantation slaves. But there also seem to be other determinants of political skill, such as those deriving from the cultural values of a particular society. Where these operate, the problem a ruling class faces is much more complex than Moore concedes. It may be, as Moore argues, that a society's values reflect the economic needs of its ruling classes. However, a set of values serving the *economic* interests of the ruling class may nevertheless undermine the long-term *political* position of this class by unwittingly inculcating a set of norms conducive to political organization. As two students of India demonstrate, the very caste system that serves so well to facilitate exploitation by the upper classes also acts as a ready-made vehicle for horizontal political organization aimed at undermining the political power of this upper class.[11] By neglecting this

[10] Samuel P. Huntington treats this issue skillfully in the first chapter of his book, *Political Order in Changing Societies.*

[11] Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago 1967), 17-154.

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organizational and institutional dimension of social change, Moore limits the *combinatorial richness* of his model and thereby restricts its *explanatory and predictive capacity*.

A third restriction on the *explanatory and predictive capacity* of the model Moore presents is its somewhat limited *organizing power*, its limited ability to explain the processes of change in societies other than those from which the model was developed. Moore's model emerged from the comparative study of eight separate societies: England, France, Germany, United States, China, Russia, Japan, and India. Curiously, however, six of these societies shared at least one important historical characteristic, a characteristic that plays a prominent role in the typology formulated by Black. Except for India and the United States, all of these societies escaped colonial rule in the modern era; and although America experienced colonial rule, it escaped something far more significant—namely, a "traditional" agrarian structure, either feudal or bureaucratic. It may not be surprising, therefore, to find that none of Moore's three models applies to India, even though the Indian case provides a check on the accuracy of the "bourgeois revolution" model. Since India and most of the currently modernizing societies *did* experience colonial rule or something comparable, it is important to understand the significance of this fact.

In general, those societies that escaped foreign control enjoyed the opportunity to modernize in response to essentially internal forces. Therefore, a model such as Moore's, which explains modernization largely in terms of these internal social and economic configurations, seems to apply quite well to these cases. It fails to explain adequately, however, the evolution of the ex-colonies where outside forces interfered with what would otherwise have been their "natural" evolution.

Surprisingly enough, this interference may have been most significant in the political sphere, where colonial powers imposed foreign political forms like parliamentary institutions and political parties. In most cases, to be sure, traditional ruling groups adapted themselves to these new institutions and learned to use them for their own purposes. The survival of these political forms imposed from outside, however, facilitates the creation of new types of power, resting, for instance, on the organizational network of a modern political party. These political institutions, therefore, open a new historical possibility, a "fourth route to the modern world" through the creation of mass political parties.

In his discussion of India, Moore implicitly acknowledges the possibility of this fourth route, even though it depends on a form of power his model fails to allow for, partly as a result of its neglect of what we

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earlier termed the "organizational dimension" of change. "Nehru," Moore observes, "was a very powerful political leader. To deny that he had a great deal of room to maneuver seems absurd" (p. 407). But Nehru's power derived not simply from his class position or from hereditary right, but from his position in a "modern," mass, political party that had exploited to advantage the British-imposed parliamentary institutions. This party created a new form of political power and a new basis of legitimacy, both of which are potentially available to leaders who wish to modernize their societies yet avoid the three routes that Moore outlines. Indeed, thanks to the changes in communications technology that make it far easier to organize mass political institutions today, this fourth route may be a common one in the foreseeable future.

The creation of mass political parties does not guarantee modernization, however. For modernization to succeed, the new bases of political power and legitimacy must be used, in Moore's phrase, to "channel into industrial construction the resources that agriculture does generate" (p. 406). It was Nehru's shortcoming as a political leader that he neglected this necessity and thereby failed to exploit fully the opportunity his political power gave him. While this shortcoming was not unexpected given the social bases of the Congress Party's power, it was far from inevitable. And it need not be repeated by other political leaders who enjoy the same opportunity.

VI

It should be apparent by now that the three models of modernization considered here are at least partly complementary. Of the three, I find Moore's model most useful in explaining the economic and social bases of the transition to modernizing leadership and thereby identifying the essential processes most efficiently. Nevertheless, Black's stress on external influences on modernization and Huntington's stress on the institutional or organizational dimensions seem to be necessary complements without which Moore's analysis falls short.

The three models discussed here do not exhaust the repertoire of comparative historical approaches to modernization. The discussion here will have accomplished its goal, nevertheless, if it has systematically located some of the shortcomings in these three models and, in the process, developed a way to evaluate these other approaches.

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I GET BY WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS

By NORMAN FROHLICH AND JOE A. OPPENHEIMER*

I. The Relation of the Problem to Political Analysis

ENDING the war in Vietnam, preventing similar conflicts elsewhere, solving the problems associated with the pollution of our environment, and securing a just domestic social order are among the most important political issues of our time. These issues have one characteristic in common: the securing (or non-securing) of these objectives will be shared by all citizens of the United States. Consequently, these and similar phenomena can be analyzed in terms of collective goods: goods that, if consumed by one member of a specified group, cannot be withheld from the other members.[1] Indeed, much of politics can be seen to be concerned with the securing (or non-securing) of collective goods. The reason for this is well expressed by Mancur Olson:

> *The achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest means that a public or collective good has been provided for that group.* The very fact that a goal or purpose is *common* to a group means that no one in the group is excluded from the benefit or satisfaction brought about by its achievement. . . . It is of the essence of an organization that it provides an inseparable, generalized benefit. It follows that the provision of public or collective goods is the fundamental function of organizations generally. A state is first of all an organization that provides public goods for its members, the citizens; and other types of organizations similarly provide collective goods for their members.[2]

* We have a special intellectual debt to Oran R. Young. This problem was first analyzed as part of a larger manuscript written jointly with him: *Political Leadership and Collective Goods* (Princeton forthcoming). The arguments developed there were essential for the current formulation. We should also like to thank Isaac Balbus, William J. Baumol, Jr., Charles F. Hermann, Harold Kuhn, Marion J. Levy, Jr., Edward L. Morse, and Ronald Rogowski for going over various drafts of this manuscript with us. We hope we have met the valid objections they raised.

[1] "Goods" will be used here in the "economic" sense: as a combination of scarce resources. The word is not meant to connote positive valuation. A "good" may not be good. Indeed, "goods" may have negative valuations placed upon them. Thus some individuals might be willing to pay to get rid of some "goods" (e.g., pollution). Similarly, "benefits" should not be viewed as necessarily carrying a positive valuation. One of the "benefits" of residing on the eastern coast of the United States of America is the breathing of industrial wastes.

[2] Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York 1968), 15, italics in original.

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The fact that organizations can be viewed as suppliers of collective goods has broad theoretical implications. Chief among these is the thorny problem economists have dubbed "the free-rider problem." Free-riders occur because individuals acting in a self-interested fashion see incentives to withhold their resources, hoping that the efforts of others will suffice to provide the good. By the collective nature of the good, individuals would receive the good even if they did not contribute toward its supply. Such a "free-rider" tendency can jeopardize the supply of collective goods. The provision of a collective good, therefore, requires that this tendency of individuals to limit their contributions be contained. Thus, the successful functioning of any organization must be based on some circumvention of the free-rider problem.

In light of Olson's argument, a number of the subjects of central concern to political scientists can be seen to have aspects relating to the overcoming of a potential free-rider problem. In the field of international relations, a number of examples come to mind: how voluntary alliances can be maintained; how a stable arrangement for the sharing of the burdens of such alliances among the participants can be established; how to obtain compliance with attempts at international regulation; and how to arrange for the establishment of international organization. Also, many topics in the field of comparative politics are related to the problems of supplying collective goods. The most obvious example is the analysis of the rise of political organizations and movements designed to secure collective benefits for a group of individuals, and the factors that make for differences and similarities among such endeavors. Thus, for example, revolutionary movements could be analyzed from the standpoint of collective goods. These and other topics are clearly and strongly related to the problems identified by Olson's perspective.

Indeed, political theorists have been aware of the overcoming of the free-rider problem as the "central political problem" for many centuries. In *A Treatise of Human Nature*, David Hume touched on the problem and gave a concrete example of its operation. He discussed the barriers that a thousand peasants might encounter in voluntarily coordinating their behavior so as to drain a meadow they hold in common:

> It is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons should agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; *while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble*

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and expense, and would lay the whole burden on others. Political society easily remedies both these inconveniences. Magistrates find an immediate interest in the interest of any considerable part of their subjects. They need consult nobody but themselves to form any scheme for promoting that interest. And as the failure of any one piece in the execution is connected, though not immediately, with the failure of the whole, they prevent that failure, because they find no interest in it, either immediate or remote. Thus, bridges are built, harbors opened, ramparts raised, canals formed, fleets equipped, and armies disciplined, everywhere, by the care of government, which though composed of men subject to all human infirmities, becomes, by one of the finest and most subtile inventions imaginable, a composition which is in some measure exempted from all these infirmities.[3]

Rousseau also discussed this problem in *A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*. Kenneth Waltz cites this example of the "stag hunt":

> Assume that five men who have acquired a rudimentary ability to speak and to understand each other happen to come together at a time when all of them suffer from hunger. The hunger of each will be satisfied by the fifth part of a stag, so they "agree" to cooperate in a project to trap one. But also the hunger of any one of them will be satisfied by a hare, so as a hare comes within reach, one of them grabs it. The defector obtains the means of satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape. His immediate interest prevails over consideration for his fellows.
>
> The story is simple; the implications are tremendous. In cooperative action, even when all agree on the goal and have an equal interest in the project, one cannot rely on others.[4]

Waltz says that this allegory is "worth reproducing, for it is the point of departure for the establishment of government and contains the basis for his [Rousseau's] explanation of conflict in international relations as well."[5]

Although political theorists have long been aware of the importance of the free-rider problem in the analysis of the supply of group interests, recently a number of economists, as well, have begun to focus on this problem.[6] Many have concluded that the problem is especially

[3] As quoted by Olson, n. 53, 33-34, italics added.
[4] Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York 1965). 167-68.
[5] *Ibid.*, 167.
[6] The original formulation of the problem in economic terms was by Paul Samuelson,

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prevalent in larger groups, and that the larger the group, the more severe will be the problem.[7] These economists maintain that the relationship between group-size and the occurrence of the free-rider problem is the logical consequence of rational, self-interested behavior.[8] Their main conclusion has been that the size of the group is important in determining the extent of the problem caused by free-riders, and that, consequently, in large groups the supply of collective goods is so threatened by free-riders that other factors must be used to explain the supply of such goods.[9]

It is the contention of this essay that their arguments cannot be sustained by using only the assumptions of rationality, self-interest, and expected-value valuation. The failure of their argument, moreover, will be shown to have a number of far-reaching implications for the analysis of political behavior.

II. The Argument

The argument offered here will consist of a formal representation of a generalized situation involving the supply of collective goods. The implications of this situation for individual behavior will be spelled out so as to demonstrate that a totally obstructive free-rider effect—one that precludes the supply of collective goods—is not a necessary consequence

in "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XXXVI (November 1954), 387-89. Other contributions to this subject include Julius Margolis, "A Comment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XXXVII (November 1955), 347-49; Mancur Olson, *Logic of Collective Action*; and James Buchanan, *The Demand and Supply of Public Goods* (Chicago 1968).

[7] This has especially been the position of Buchanan and Olson.

[8] As Olson argues on his first two pages: "it is *not* in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their self-interest follows logically from the premise of rational and self-interested behavior. It does *not* follow, because all of the individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group objective, that they would act to achieve that objective, even if they were rational and self-interested. Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make the individuals act in their common interest, *rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.* . . . The notion that groups of individuals will act to achieve their common or group interests, far from being a logical implication of the assumption that the individuals in a group will rationally further their individual interests, is in fact inconsistent with that assumption," italics in original.

[9] Thus, Olson concludes his book by saying: "The remaining type of group is the unorganized group—the group that has no lobby and takes no action. Groups of this kind fit the main argument of this book best of all. They illustrate its central point: that large or latent groups have no tendency voluntarily to act to further their common interests. This point was asserted in the Introduction, and it is with this point that the study must conclude. For the unorganized groups, the groups that have no lobbies and exert no pressure, are among the largest groups in the nation, and they have some of the most vital common interests." 165.

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of increasing group-size, given the assumptions of rationality and self-interest. Rather, the conditions that determine the extent of the free-rider problem can be shown to be independent of these assumptions. Indeed, although a free-rider *potential* exists whenever there is an attempt to supply collective goods, there are situations in which, regardless of the size of the group, free-rider tendencies can be overcome among rational, self-interested individuals. Theoretically, the factors that determine whether these tendencies will be overcome are identical in large and small groups.[10] Perhaps it is not without reason, therefore, that an earlier theorist who maintained that free-rider effects would be overcome voluntarily only in small groups was forced to conclude: "During periods of extreme stress, such as was apparently evidenced by the British during World War II, behavior characteristic of small groups may have extended over almost the whole population."[11]

In treating the relation of the free-rider problem to group-size, it is necessary to specify which variables are to be held constant and which are allowed to fluctuate as a function of group-size. Without such a specification, it would be difficult to separate the effects on individual behavior of increasing group-size from the effects of other variables that might, themselves, be functions of group-size.

First, we must allow the individual's valuation of the good to be independent of group-size. That is, we shall not admit of "crowding" effects. In the real world, there are crowding effects, which make the individual's valuation of the good a function of the number of individuals who enjoy the good. But in order to examine the effect of increasing group-size on the free-rider problem, we will want to consider the case when the individual's valuation is not a function of the size of the group.[12]

[10] We do, however, admit that with regard to the supply of many collective goods, the problems of coordination necessary to overcome the free-rider tendencies in the group could increase as the group gets larger. However, group-size is then related to the problems of free-riders by exogenous variables and *not* because of rationality and self-interest. As the argument below indicates, we would expect that most of the relations between size and free-riders stem from changes in the costs of the goods and the costs of communication among the individuals who would receive the goods, were they to be supplied.

[11] Buchanan, 91. (To paraphrase Churchill: Some small group!)

[12] It would not be necessary to belabor this point except that some of the arguments purporting to demonstrate the general occurrence of the free-rider problem have been based on crowding effects. The most obvious example of such an argument is in Buchanan, 88-90. He contrasts the probability of having a good supplied (the cost being $5,000) when 100 people each valued the good at $10 and when 10 men each valued the good at $1,000. Clearly, the contrast is misleading. The free-rider problem must be formulated so as to contrast the probability of having the good supplied when there are 10 men who value the good at $1,000 with the probability when there are 1000 men who each value the good at $1,000.

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Second, we must allow that the cost of supplying the good is also not a function of the size of the group that enjoys the good. That is, there can be no extra costs involved in supplying the good to additional members of the group. This too is often not the case in the real world. There are usually additional costs involved in expanding the group that benefits from the supply of the good. But to examine the effects of group size on the free-rider problem, we will want to isolate the free-rider phenomenon from other problems that can generate effects that similarly jeopardize the supply of the good.

Finally, for purposes of our argument, we will distinguish between "lumpy" and "nonlumpy" goods. Lumpy goods are defined as those that can be supplied only in discrete amounts. A fixed amount of resources is required for the provision of each unit, and only units can be supplied. In many respects, a bridge is an example of a lumpy good. A bridge either spans the distance between two points or it does not. No bridge can be supplied unless enough resources are applied to the project to get a span between the points. Other goods may be supplied on a continuous basis; any amount of resource may be applied to the supply of an increment of such a nonlumpy good. Thus, for example, cleaning up a neighborhood can be thought of as a nonlumpy good. Virtually any amount of resources can be applied to "clean up a neighborhood"; virtually no "minimum" is required to do some of the work. We will analyze the problem for both types of goods.[13]

Let us consider a formal representation of the problem of obtaining resources for a valued collective good from a rational, self-interested individual. In doing so, we will identify the conditions that will determine whether or not he makes a voluntary contribution, and if he does, what size it will be. If he makes no donation to the good he values and would receive it if it were supplied, he attempts to be a free-rider.

Suppose that there is some numeraire, a resource that is usable as a perfect means of exchange, contributions of which can be made. We will focus our analysis on the i^{th} individual, who is a potential donor to the provision of the collective good (which we designate as X), and a sure beneficiary of X if it is supplied. First, assume that X, if it is provided at all, must be provided at a single level and at a specified cost (i.e., X is a lumpy good). Let n denote i's net utility valuation of X, as measured in the numeraire resource, and assume that n is less than

[13] What follows is a rather technical discussion relating group size to the generation of free-rider problems. An informal sketch of the argument and its consequences are contained in Sections III and IV.

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the cost of providing X.[14] To see how group-size can affect j's behavior, we will compare his behavior as a rational member of a group of m individuals with his behavior as a rational member of an augmented group of $m+r$ individuals.

Let us consider a matrix of choices that might confront the j^{th} individual deciding on his action on the provision of X. The rows of the matrix will represent different potential levels of donations on his part. He may contribute one unit of the numeraire, or any number up to n.[15]

MATRIX I

THE INDIVIDUAL'S DECISION-MATRIX REGARDING POSSIBLE DONATIONS FOR A LUMPY GOOD

AMOUNTS BY WHICH THE TOTAL DONATIONS OF "OTHERS" MAY FALL SHORT OF THE COST OF PROVIDING THE GOOD

RANGE OF j'S POSSIBLE DONATIONS	0	1	2	...	i	...	n	$n+1$
0	n	0	0		0		0	0
1	$n-1$	$n-1$	-1		-1		-1	-1
2	$n-2$	$n-2$	$n-2$		-2		-2	-2
⋮								
D	$n-D$	$n-D$	$n-D$		$(n-D, -D)$*		$-D$	$-D$
⋮								
$n-1$	1	1	1		1		$-(n-1)$	$-(n-1)$
n	0	0	0		0		0	$-n$
	P_0	P_1	P_2		P_i		P_n	P_{n+1}

PROBABILITY j ASSIGNS TO THE POSSIBILITIES THAT THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF OTHERS WILL AGGREGATE TO THE SPECIFIED SUM

* The value of the entry is $n-D$ if D is less than or equal to i. Otherwise it is $-D$.

The columns of the matrix represent different potential net donations from the other members of the group who might contribute to the pro-

[14] This assumption is a device for simplifying the exposition of the problem. All results obtained will hold without this assumption.

[15] Once again, for simplicity of presentation, we assume that he considers contributing only whole units of the numeraire. If the numeraire were infinitely divisible he might consider any number of alternative donations within the range of 0 to n. But for a matrix presentation this would create problems. At a later stage we will discuss the consequences of relaxing this restriction.

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vision of X and who would receive the benefits of X were it provided.[16] The columns are indexed so as to represent the amounts by which the net donations of others will fall short of the cost of providing the good X. Thus, column o represents the situation in which sufficient or excessive resources are donated by other members to provide X. Column 1 represents the situation in which the net donations fall one unit short of the amount necessary for the provision of the good, etc. Note that column $n+1$, however, represents the situation in which the net contributions of others do not come within n units of the cost of providing X. In that column, j's maximum donation will be insufficient to insure the supply of the good. That column, like o, is a collection of possibilities. Finally, let P_i represent j's subjective estimation of the probability that the net donations of others will fall i units short of the amount required to supply X.[17] Thus, the D^{th} entry in the i^{th} column in the matrix is the net benefit that accrues to j if he donates D when others have donated enough units to fall i units short of the cost of the good. Then the entries in the matrix represent the payoffs to j for donating different amounts of resources as a function of the aggregated contributions of the other members of the group.

The expected value to j of each of these alternatives (each represented by a row in the matrix) can be represented by the sum of the expected values of the payoffs within each row. Denote the expected value to j of donating D units as V_D. Then V_D equals the expected value of the payoffs in the D^{th} row. Thus:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_0 &= nP_0 && + (o)\sum_{i=1}^{n+1} P_i \\
V_1 &= (n-1)\sum_{i=0}^{1} P_i && + (-1)\sum_{i=2}^{n+1} P_i \\
&\vdots \\
V_D &= (n-D)\sum_{i=0}^{D} P_i && + (-D)\sum_{i=D+1}^{n+1} P_i
\end{aligned}$$

The general term of this set may be factored and represented as $V_D = n\sum_{i=0}^{D} P_i - D$. Rational self-interested behavior on the part of j would consist of his choosing the largest of the V_D's.[18] Thus, if he makes

[16] The preceding footnote is relevant here also, since we begin by considering only a finite number of alternatives based on discrete donations of other members.

[17] Note that i can take on values from o to $n+1$. It is the columnar index.

[18] The conditions governing j's choices can also be expressed in marginal terms if we allow continuous distributions of P_i and D. Then for any given level of donations, j would continue to donate so long as $ndP_i - dD > o$, and would stop when $ndP_i - dD = o$. Of course, the second-order conditions for local maxima would also have

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any donation $(D \neq o)$ it must be that $V_{D \neq 0} > V_0$. If we examine the problem in terms of the original matrix formulation, it is clear that if j finds it valuable to make a donation (D) in a group of size m, then it must be the case that:

$$(V_D - V_0)_m > o; \text{ or } (n \sum_{i=1}^{D} P_i - D)_m > o; \text{ or } (n \sum_{i=1}^{D} P_i > D)_m \quad (1)$$

It may be of help to interpret the last formulation of the inequality: $(n \sum_{i=1}^{D} P_i > D)_m$, which must hold if the individual donates. The meaning of the inequality should be clear. On the left, we have the expected value of receiving the good, and on the right we have the cost to the individual of making his donation. That is, by making a larger donation, the individual is increasing the probability that he will receive the good. The other individuals can fall short in their donations by a greater amount without his losing the good. Thus, the benefits that accrue to the contributor are on the left, and the costs on the right. The individual must receive some net benefit, if he is to donate. That is, the value of his benefits must be greater than the value of his costs. To find the equilibrium point in marginal terms is now relatively simple, and the conditions pointed out in footnote 18 can clearly be seen to be derivable.

Now, by contrast, consider how j might behave in a larger group: in an augmented group of $m+r$ individuals, all of whom would get X were it to be supplied. What would be j's basis for reaching a decision regarding donations in this case? His decision matrix would be similar to that considered in the earlier case. His net valuation of the good, n, would not be different, since we have ruled out crowding effects. Therefore, the range of donations he (and others) would logically consider would not vary. The only element that would be subject to fluctuation as a function of group-size would be his own subjective estimations regarding the way in which the donations of others are likely to aggregate.

If he had an incentive to donate an amount, D, in a group of size m, then it must have been that $(n \sum_{i=1}^{D} P_i > D)_m$. If he does not have an incentive to donate D in a group of size $m+r$, it must be the case that his probability estimation regarding how the donations of others

to hold, and his utility at that point would have to be greater than when $D = o$ or $D = n$. The argument is formulated in this way in Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young.

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would aggregate has changed, and that $(\sum_{i=1}^{D} P_i)_{m+r} < (\sum_{i=1}^{D} P_i)_m$. Since $\sum_{i=0}^{n+1} P_i = 1$, if the $\sum_{i=1}^{D} P_i$ has decreased in a group of size $m+r$, j must have assigned a higher probability either to the possibility that the good will be supplied without him (P_0), or to the possibility that the group without him will fall farther than D units short of the amount needed to supply X, i.e., to $(\sum_{i=D+1}^{n+1} P_i)$.

If the former is true, then j's increased estimation of the probability that others will contribute enough to provide the good without him must be based on the assumption that the increase in group-size has made the "others" act as if they are less capable of taking his actions into account. In other words, for j to increase P_0 with an increase in group-size, he must feel that the others in the larger group are more likely to make a mistake in estimating his actions, leading them to defray the entire cost of the good without any assistance from him.

On the other hand, if j increases his estimation of the probabilities assigned from columns $D+1$ to $n+1$, one of two things must be occurring. First, the sum of the probabilities assigned from $D+1$ through n may have been increased, in which case it must be that j assumes that in the larger group the others act as if they expect him to shoulder a greater portion of the burden of providing X than was expected of him in the smaller group, while these others expect their portion of the burden to be decreasing. Thus, he must assume that the members act as if they make an estimate of asymmetry regarding the portion of the burden they must bear and the portion of the burden others must bear, as group-size increases. Second, the probability assignment to the final column, $n+1$, may have been increased. In this case, j must assume that in the augmented group, individuals are less likely of being capable of coordinated collective action. That is, j must increase his estimate of the probability that the others will so miscalculate that no good will be supplied.

Although there may be empirical factors that might justify imputing any of these thoughts to a given member in a given situation (e.g., those characterized by positive bargaining and transaction costs and imperfect and costly information), there are no grounds within the assumptions of rationality and self-interest for imputing such reasoning to the general member in the general case. The assumptions of rationality and self-interest do not indicate how subjectively assigned probabilities vary from situation to situation. In the absence of specific

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additional assumptions regarding how these estimates of probability vary with group-size, there is as little justification for concluding that, in general, members of large groups will err in estimating their fellows' actions and thereby endanger the supply of the collective good as there is for concluding that they will not err and therefore will be successful in securing the supply of the goods. In short, there is no justification derivable from the assumptions of rationality and self-interest for concluding that there is any difference in the likelihood that large groups will supply themselves with collective goods and the likelihood that small groups will do so.

But this discussion of the provision of a collective good was all conducted under the assumption that the good in question was "lumpy." How might the argument be changed if we were to consider a "non-lumpy" good, a good such that the amount of the good supplied is a continuously increasing function of the total amount donated?

Once again, we will set up the problem in matrix form for a group of size m, and contrast that case with one of a group of size $m+r$.

Again, the columns of the matrix will represent different amounts of contributions from the individuals other than j. Again, each row will represent a different level of possible donation by j. However, this time the width of the matrix is not defined by the total possible cost of the good; rather it is the total possible range of donations by others, here designated as k. Similarly, j's range of possible donations will be equal to the maximum he would be willing to donate in any of the situations defined by each of the columns. That is, the i^{th} column represents the case when the others donate i units, and the D^{th} row still represents the case when j donates D units. Then the D^{th} entry in the i^{th} column in the matrix is the net benefit that accrues to j if he donates D when the others have donated i. That is, the D^{th}, i^{th} entry is the utility j derives from having $D+i$ units of resources spent on the good in question, minus the cost of the donation he made (D). In the matrix, this is designated as $U_{i+D}-D$. j's estimate of the probability that the total contributions of others will amount to i units of resources will be designated as P_i. Then, the matrix takes on the form of Matrix II.

The value to j of making a donation (D) is now merely the sum of the expected values of the payoffs in the D^{th} row of the matrix, as it was last time:

$$V_D = \sum_{i=0}^{k} U_{i+D}P_i - D$$

The value of making no donation is:

$$V_0 = \sum_{i=0}^{k} U_iP_i$$

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Matrix II

The Individual's Decision-matrix Regarding Possible Donations for a Nonlumpy Good

TOTAL RESOURCES CONTRIBUTED BY OTHERS

RANGE OF j'S POSSIBLE DONATIONS	k	$k-1$		$i+1$	i	$i-1$		2	1	0
0	U_k	U_{k-1}		U_{i+1}	U_i	U_{i-1}		U_2	U_1	U_0
1	$U_{k+1}-1$	U_k-1		$U_{i+2}-1$	$U_{i+1}-1$	U_1-1		U_3-1	U_2-1	U_1-1
⋮										
D	$U_{k+D}-D$	$U_{k-1+D}-D$		$U_{i+1+D}-D$	$U_{i+D}-D$	$U_{i+D-1}-D$		$U_{D+2}-D$	$U_{D+1}-D$	U_D-D
⋮										
n	$U_{k+n}-n$	$U_{k-1+n}-n$		$U_{i+1+n}-n$	$U_{i+n}-n$	$U_{i-1+n}-n$		$U_{n+2}-n$	$U_{n+1}-n$	U_n-n
	P_k	P_{k-1}		P_{i+1}	P_i	P_{i-1}		P_2	P_1	P_0

PROBABILITY j ASSIGNS TO THE POSSIBILITIES THAT THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF OTHERS WILL AGGREGATE TO THE SPECIFIED SUM

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If we again ask when he will donate, we again answer that this will occur whenever $V_{D\neq 0} > V_0$, or whenever:

$$(\sum_{i=0}^{k} U_{i+D}P_i - D > \sum_{i=0}^{k} U_iP_i)_m$$

or $$(\sum_{i=0}^{k} U_{i+D}P_i - \sum_{i=0}^{k} U_iP_i > D)_m$$

or $$(\sum_{i=0}^{k} \Delta U_iP_i)_m > D$$

Once again this inequality can be explained in intuitive terms. The left-hand side represents the expected benefits to j of making a donation of size D (i.e., increases in his utility from the added bit of the good his donation would bring for each level of possible contributions by others, multiplied by the probability that those levels will occur). The right hand side represents the cost to him of making the donation, D. He will make the donation when the benefits outweigh the costs.

Suppose, then, that there is some D for which j finds it worthwhile making the donation of that size. How might his behavior be changed as a member of an augmented group of size $m+r$? The analysis for this case of a "nonlumpy" good is similar to that for the case of the "lumpy" good. As a member of a larger group, j would have to consider a matrix similar to the one he dealt with as a member of the smaller group. His utility valuations of various levels of the good would not change as a function of group-size. And even if we allow for increased levels of possible aggregate donations from other members, leading to possible increases in the levels of supply of the good, an increased free-rider tendency need not occur. Once again, only if his estimates of the probable behavior of others have shifted in a particular manner can we predict an increased free-rider problem. Even the assumptions of decreasing marginal utility *plus* an increasing probability that larger aggregate donations will be forthcoming from larger groups of "others" need only generate a decrease in, and not a cessation of, j's donations.

If j does not find it worthwhile to make a donation of size D as a member of a group of $m+r$ individuals, then his estimates of the probable aggregate behavior of others must be different in this case than it was when he was a member of a group of size m. The probability weightings he assigns to the occurrence of the various alternatives must be different. Here, as in the last case, the assumptions of rationality and self-interest offer no guide to the nature of the shift in the probability

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estimations as a function of group-size. Additional assumptions or special conditions must be posited to fix the nature of these shifts and to indicate any relation between group-size and a free-rider problem. In the absence of such parameters the questions remains moot.

III. Nontechnical Summary of the Argument

The preceding analysis has shown that rational, self-interested behavior on the part of individuals does not suffice to provide increasing free-rider problems with increasing group-size. This was shown by abstracting each individual from the rest of the group and examining his decision-process. The individual must decide how much to donate, and in arriving at his decision he must estimate the probabilities that his donation will be efficacious. To do this, he must estimate the probabilities associated with the possible levels of donations by others. This allows an estimation of the efficacy of his donation in obtaining an increase in his own utility. For by making a larger donation the individual increases the probability that he will receive the good for any given set of probabilities he attaches to the behavior of others, in the case of a lumpy good. In the case of a nonlumpy good, larger donations merely bring larger amounts of the good.

Given a fixed utility function, only variables that affect the individual's estimation of the total contributions of others can affect his decision regarding the size of his donation.[19]

First let us consider the case of a lumpy good. If a member, j, of a small group makes a donation toward the collective good, and fails to do so as a member of a larger group, then one or both of two conditions must hold. Either j must feel that the addition of members to the smaller group 1) increases the probability that the contributions of others will so aggregate as to make his donation unnecessary, or 2) increases the probability that the donations of others will fall shorter of the requisite amount. Only in the first situation would he be a free-rider, but the two situations have a common source. In both instances j's decision not to donate must be predicated on the assumption that

[19] The assumption of a fixed utility derived from a given quantity of a good may be relaxed by making the utility valuations a function of the number of people who consume the good (i.e., by introducing a crowding effect). Under such a relaxation the analysis must be modified, but the modification required does not present serious problems. Note, however, that crowding can be introduced in a variety of ways. Specifying that j's utility valuation of a good is *not* affected by the number of other consumers fully defines a situation. If we specify that j's valuation of the good *is* a function of the number of other consumers, however, a specification of the exact nature of the functional relation is required. Only after that is done can crowding be handled in a formal fashion.

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larger numbers of individuals are less able to coordinate their behavior so as to take into account *j*'s donations than are fewer individuals.

Yet nothing in the assumptions of rationality and self-interest necessitates this conclusion on *j*'s part. Means may exist whereby individuals may be able to coordinate their expectations so as to take into account the probable behavior of additional members and adjust their donations as group-size changes. The members of the group may be able, by means of some mechanism for coordinating expectations, to decrease their donations as group-size increases by an amount that is equal to the amount added by the additional members. True, a guarantee of this result would require the introduction of some exogenous mechanism, but the burden of the argument is that a guaranteed free-rider effect as a function of group-size also requires the introduction of some exogenous assumptions such as information costs and transactions costs.

If, on the other hand, we treat the case of a nonlumpy good, where the utility derived by the individual is a continuous function of the amount of resources expended, conclusions similar to those above also follow. For an individual to choose not to donate in a larger group, he must feel that the increase in the size affects the aggregate contributions of others so that no donation of his is likely to secure an added amount of the collective good sufficient to compensate him for the cost of the donation. For this to be true it is necessary that the individual estimate that the aggregate donations of others will fall within a range such that the cost of providing an additional bit of the good is greater than his valuation of that bit. In other words, for the individual to find it no longer valuable to make a donation as a result of increasing group-size, he must be adjusting his probability estimations in a very specific fashion. He must be increasing the weight he gives to the occurrences of aggregate donations of others that are at levels such that the added increment of utility his donation would bring at that level of purchase is lower than the value of the donation. But even assumptions of decreasing marginal valuation of the good X, and increasingly high assignments of probabilities to higher levels of donations of others with increasing group-size, are insufficient to cause an increased free-rider problem. These two assumptions only suffice to bring about ever smaller donations by an individual, with increasing group-size. Thus, even further restrictions would be needed to produce a relation between group-size and a free-rider problem. But none of these restrictive assumptions follows from rationality and self-interest. They, or similar assumptions, must be introduced exogenously to create such a relation.

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IV. Some Consequences of the Analysis

The above analysis leads to the conclusion that the ability of self-interested, rational individuals to supply themselves with valued collective goods rests on the existence of some mechanism whereby they can coordinate their expectations regarding the probable actions of others. Without such a mechanism, if we ask what the effects might be of increasing the size of the group, no firm answer can be given. Some members are likely to give proportionately more, others less. The aggregation of these changes may or may not cancel one another out.

Indeed, given that free-rider effects need not be a function of changing group-size, the extent of the free-rider problem, in groups of any size, will depend on the existence of a coordinating mechanism. Without such a mechanism there is no *a priori* reason to believe that goods will be collectively supplied to groups of any size.

If some such coordinating mechanism does exist, however, certain consequences follow. The benefits of any mechanism are collectively supplied to members of the group. Consequently, there will be incentives for the members of the group to contribute toward the maintenance of the mechanism. If the coordination were supplied by a political leader, for example, we might expect that the members of the group would be willing to reward the leader for his efforts. The very fact that resources may be contributed voluntarily toward the supply of a collective good, even though the supply be non-optimal, points to the possibility that the coordinator of the expectations might expect to make a "profit" from his activities. Individuals might well be willing to subsidize his activity in order to increase the probability that the collective benefits will be received.

Of course, mechanisms other than a leadership-role might suffice to coordinate expectations so that collective goods are supplied.[20] In transient-benefit groups, cultural patterns, traditions, and the like may be sufficient to handle needs for collective goods that are not omnipresent. Such cultural mechanisms may have been the creation of some founding leader who supplied the group with a binding set of ethical parameters, which the members of the group count on. Again, in these situations individuals may be willing to contribute voluntarily toward the maintainance of the mechanism because of its value to them. But in situations in which the group continually needs costly collective goods, or where the costs of permanent coordination are high (one reason for

[20] We wish to thank Manfred Halpern and Ronald Rogowski for first calling our attention to this possibility.

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this *may* be size) we should expect a more permanent and flexible mechanism: one instituted by a political leader for a profit.

Furthermore, it can be shown that the mechanism offered by some economists to explain the supply of collective goods does not represent a sufficient explanation. Their assertion that collective goods are supplied in large groups only when revenue to supply them is raised by coercive means, or through exchanges of private goods can be shown to be unsupportable. In fact, their analysis rests upon an implicit acceptance of the conclusions reached in the argument above. Suppose that a tax is collected through coercion. What is to prevent those who collect the tax from absconding with the proceeds? Any mechanism for insuring that revenues so collected are turned toward the supply of collective goods would itself be a costly collective good. How would that collective good be paid for? They give no answer. Thus their analysis changes the collective good to be secured but does not solve the free-rider problem. In an analogous fashion, the sale of private goods for a profit can be shown to be an inadequate mechanism to explain the supply of collective goods.

The attempts by political analysts and economists to relate collective goods to politics have been well aimed. Problems associated with the supply and demand of collective goods can be related to political behavior in a formal fashion. The difficulty with previous analyses was the presumption that in large groups no one would voluntarily donate toward the supply of collective goods. By demonstrating that such contributions are consistent with self-interested rationality, we can open up a whole new line of analysis. If voluntary donations for the provision of collective goods are possible, there is a potential for the emergence of a political entrepreneur whose profits are tied to the supply of such goods. Moreover there is a potential for the emergence of competition to such an entrepreneur. The possibility of developing a formal model to explain the behavior of political leaders in terms of profit motivation follows directly. Such a model would be applicable to a wide variety of political phenomena.[21]

[21] The model developed in Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young is built upon these concepts. There the analysis is extended to treat such diverse subjects as the differences between political and economic entrepreneurs, political competition, politicization, the development of extremist movements, and peaking and bandwagon effects.

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Review Article

THE FRENCH BUREAUCRACY AND ITS STUDENTS:

Toward the Desanctification of the State

By EZRA N. SULEIMAN*

Books Reviewed

Gérard Belorgey, *Le Gouvernement et l'Administration de la France*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1967, 447 pp., NF 38.00.

Robert Catherine et Guy Thuiller, *Introduction à une Philosophie de l'Administration*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1969, 375 pp., NF 19.00.

Marie-Christine Kessler, *Le Conseil d'Etat*, Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, No. 167, Paris, Armand Colin, 1969, 389 pp., NF 42.00.

J. Siwek-Pouydesseau, *Le Personnel de Direction des Ministères*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1969, 144 pp., NF 7.50.

Traité de Science Administrative, Paris, Mouton, 1966, 901 pp., NF 87.00.

I

"FUTURE revolutions will doubtless be directed against the administration and not against the political system." Thus states one writer in the opening sentence of his book on *l'Administration au pouvoir*.[1] There is little doubt that the institution in France that today bears the brunt of attacks coming from the entire range of the political, economic, and social spectrum, is the French administration—the state bureaucracy that, since the early part of the nineteenth century, has been charged with directing most of the state's affairs. Today, the parties of the Left, Right, and Center; big business, small business, and the propertyless; the privileged and the underprivileged; the in-

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[1] Charles Debbasch, *L'Administration au pouvoir: fonctionnaires et politiques dans la V^e République* (Paris 1969), 9. All translations from the French are my own.

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tellectuals, the students, and the unions—all these groups, that is to say, the French people, are agreed on what they regard to be the excessive and nefarious role that the bureaucracy plays in French life. Few Frenchmen would agree with François Gazier, former Director of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, when he writes in his preface to Belorgey's book that "the French administration, thriving under praise and criticism alike, can at least be credited with one success: it has known how to keep in tune with its times" (p. 7). One is tempted to say that were these words not merely the manifestation of hyperbolic tendencies sometimes common in preface-writing, some courage would have been needed to write them. It is hard to conceive in present-day France of an attempt to sustain the thesis that the administration is in tune with its times.[2]

The scorn, criticism, and vilification previously heaped on the politicians and the political parties appears now to have converged on the bureaucracy, which is accused of over-centralization, of technocratic power and arrogance, of bureaucratic high-handedness and inefficiency, of inefficient management of the state's affairs, and of constituting a closed caste and a ruling class—all these accusations being common to groups that have little else in common.[3] No longer is it possible to maintain, as does one student of administrative reforms, that the demand for administrative reform is a theme of the political opposition.[4] It is, today, a theme that both the government and the opposition attempt to exploit.

The ministers of the Fifth Republic have not hesitated to criticize the administration. Albin Chalandon, the current Minister of Equipment and Housing, has made numerous attacks on the administration as a whole and on the administration of his own ministry in particular.

[2] Although this thesis is implicit in much of the scholarly work on the French administration. See below, pp. 132ff.

[3] It would be impossible to list all the publications that have recently appeared bearing on these themes. The following is, therefore, only a partial list. (Other titles are mentioned below.) Georges Elgozy, *Le Paradoxe des technocrats* (Paris 1966); Club Jean Moulin, *L'Etat et le citoyen* (Paris 1961); Edgard Pisani, *La Région . . . pour quoi faire? ou le triomphe des jacondins* (Paris 1969); Philippe Bernard, *La France au singulier* (Paris 1968); Julian Cheverny, *Les cadres* (Paris 1967); Octave Gelinier, *Le Secret des structures compétitives* (Paris 1966); Philippe Bauchard, *Les Technocrates et le pouvoir* (Paris 1966); Jean Meynaud, *La Technocratie: mythe ou réalité?* (Paris 1964). It is especially interesting to note that at a time when the French are beginning seriously to question their own administrative methods and training system, other countries are coming to regard the French system as worthy of emulation. See, for example, Brian Chapman's *British Government Observed: Some European Reflections* (London 1963).

[4] Albert Lanza, *Les Projets de réforme administrative en France de 1919 à nos jours* (Paris 1968), 160.

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"France is stifled," he has said, "by the excessive hold of the state."[5] The severe criticism directed at the administration by Couve de Murville at the time he was Prime Minister is yet another example. In a speech before the Alumni Association of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, he delivered a scathing attack on the insensitivity of the French administration and on its basically undemocratic character.[6] Gone perhaps are the days when the leading politicians of the country told the students of this school that they were, as General de Gaulle called them, "an elite in every respect, an intellectual elite, a moral elite,"[7] or that their school was "a wheel in a mechanism, the mechanism of French Democracy."[8] Far be it from any Prime Minister or President of the Republic to praise the administration today. Only a few months after he entered the Elysée, Georges Pompidou denounced before a solemn session of the Cour des Comptes what he called the "administrative labyrinths."[9]

That far-reaching administrative reforms are urgently needed in France today is a matter that hardly anyone questions. Future historians of the Fifth Republic will undoubtedly see the inertia of the Gaullist regime in this domain as one of its more serious shortcomings. But, as M. Lanza has justly noted, "Administrative reform must be wanted, not merely wished for, by the political bodies, which must consent to devote themselves to reforms even at the risk of meeting with difficulties and unpopularity."[10] It is evident that these requirements were absent during General de Gaulle's period of office. Nevertheless, it is well to note that the outcry against the current state of the French administration is not matched by any serious agreements on the kinds of reforms needed.

To be sure, "Administrative reform is a political act that slow and lengthy studies prepare but will never replace."[11] But the opposite is also true: namely, the "political act" does not negate the need for reflection and profound study. The regional reform proposal, for example, that led to the downfall of General de Gaulle was not only hastily prepared and ill-conceived; it demonstrated a remarkable blind-

[5] *L'Express*, 29 September-5 October 1962, 62. See also *Le Monde*, 10 January 1970, and Michel Boyer, "M. Albin Chalandon s'en prend au corps des ponts et chaussées," *Le Monde*, 12 May 1970.
[6] *Le Monde*, 9-10 February 1969.
[7] General Charles de Gaulle, Speech at E.N.A., in *Promotions*, No. 52, 1962, 11.
[8] Michel Debré, "Naissance et perspectives d'une institution," *Promotions*, No. 35, 1955, 27.
[9] *Le Monde*, 26 September 1969.
[10] Lanza, *Les Projets de réforme administrative en France*, 100.
[11] *Ibid.*

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ness to some of the most pressing problems confronting French society, some of which it was more likely to aggravate than alleviate. Its motivations were "political" and it was not preceded by detailed study.

It has been remarked that most attempts at administrative reform in France have taken place in the wake of a national crisis.[12] It took the Second World War and the Vichy experience to institute the first major administrative reform since the early part of the nineteenth century. The chief element of the reform was the codification of regulations pertaining to the civil servant's rights, embodied in the *Statut général des fonctionnaires*.[13] In addition, there was a drastic overhaul of the procedure of recruitment into the upper ranks of the civil service, henceforth to be the monopoly of the newly created Ecole Nationale d'Administration.[14] Despite its important measures, the reform was scarcely a major event in the post-Liberation period; it was passed in the National Assembly almost without debate,[15] and even outside the Assembly hardly a voice was raised to contest any of its measures.

Nor was the interest of French scholars aroused by this far-reaching reform. When, for example, a few years after World War II, leading American and French experts on France surveyed every aspect of French society,[16] there was not the slightest attention paid either to the 1945 reform of the civil service or to the role of the bureaucracy in French society. Indeed, between the postwar period and the beginning of the Fifth Republic, there seems to have existed something approaching a moratorium on studies of the French administration.[17] Since the

[12] Raymond Isay, "Grands Corps et Grands Commis—Introduction," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 June 1958, 633.

[13] See Roger Grégoire, *La Fonction publique* (Paris 1946). For the conditions prevailing prior to the reform, see Walter Rice Sharp, *The French Civil Service: Bureaucracy in Transition* (New York 1931).

[14] For the philosophy underlying this reform, see Michel Debré, *Réforme de la Fonction publique* (Paris 1946).

[15] See *Journal Officiel*, Débats Parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale, October 5, 1946. It should be noted that the *Statut* was promulgated by law, whereas the nationalization of the Ecole libre des sciences politiques in Paris, its transformation into the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, the creation of other Instituts d'Etudes Politiques in the provinces, and the creation of E.N.A. were promulgated by Decree.

[16] See Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics* (Princeton 1951).

[17] One of the early articles that generated some interest at the time of its publication was Charles Brindillac's "Les hauts fonctionnaires," *Esprit*, VI (June 1953). Similar studies followed a few years later. See the series of articles that appeared in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*: Roland Maspetiol, "Grands Corps et Grands Commis: I. Le Conseil d'Etat," June 15, 1958; Wladimir D'Ormesson, "Grands Corps et Grands Commis: II. La Carrière diplomatique," July 1, 1958; Henri Deroy, "Grand Corps et Grands Commis: III. L'Inspection des Finances," August 1, 1958; Paul Loppin, "Grands Corps et Grands Commis: IV. La Magistrature," September 1, 1958; Pierre Escoube, "Grands Corps et Grands Commis: V. La Cour des Comptes," October 1, 1958. One has to add that the articles in this series are characterized by a glaring, and at times embarrassing, com-

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early or mid-1960's, on the other hand, we have been seeing a veritable deluge of books on this institution. Before we turn to the examination of the extent to which some of these studies have contributed to our understanding of the institution that "has been one of the main driving forces, if not *the* driving force, in French life,"[18] a word needs to be said about the reasons for the relative dearth of attention that the French administraton received following the 1945 reform up until the early 1960's.

In the first place, the 1945 administrative reform was passed very hastily and in a moment of quasi-national unity. It was pushed through by the joint effort of Gaullists and Communists and its chief architects were the most unlikely of bedfellows, Michel Debré and Maurice Thorez. One might wonder how Thorez was able to accept the creation of an institution whose chief function was to train the higher civil servants, few of whom would come from the more disadvantaged groups of French society. If we bear in mind, however, the enormous gains in job security, pay increases, and other guarantees that the *Statut* promised for the majority of civil servants, we might conclude that it was a small concession that Thorez was obliged to make in order to procure these gains. As for Debré, the *Statut* was for him a necessary concession for the establishment of an institution that represented the fulfillment of the Napoleonic aspiration for a uniformly trained cadre of *grands commis*. While Debré, therefore, reserved his praise almost entirely for the recruitment aspect of the reform,[19] Thorez concerned himself solely with the *Statut*,[20] which represented a remarkable achievement for him personally and for his party, being the culmination of the long struggle of administrative syndicalism in France. The unity of the two major opposing forces in the France of the Liberation period undoubtedly served to de-politicize the issue of administrative reform, an issue that throughout the years of the Third Republic had been highly sensitive and political. But the agreement of the Gaullists and Communists was not of a general nature; it was manifested in the issue of administrative reform because both sides were prepared for

placency. This is no doubt partly because each article on a corps is written by a member of that corps. See also Paul Bouteiller, "Les administrations centrales de l'Etat et les réformes de 1945," *Promotions*, LIII (1960); Maurice Papon, "La Haute administration de l'Etat," *Revue de la Défense Nationale*, XIV (November 1958); and Pierre Lalumière, *L'Inspection des Finances* (Paris 1959).

[18] F. Ridley and J. Blondel, *Public Administration In France* (New York 1965), 54.

[19] See his *Réforme de la fonction publique* and his *Au service de la nation* (Paris 1963) 250-56.

[20] Maurice Thorez, *Le Statut général des fonctionnaires* (Paris n.d.). This pamphlet was published at about the same time as Debré's *Réforme de la fonction publique*.

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a give-and-take. It was not repeated in the Liberation period, for even on the question of nationalization the Gaullists and Communists were severely divided.[21]

Another reason for the lack of interest in the French administration during the postwar years was that the period following the reform was one of unusual political turbulence. On the domestic scene, the political "System"[22] of the Fourth Republic contrived to relegate the civil servant to an inconspicuous role and to reserve the places closest to the sun for the Deputies. This shift was further accentuated by the external problems confronting France during the same period. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that during the years of what Roger Priouret has called *La République des députés*,[23] no major study of the French administration was published.

With the death of the Fourth Republic, everyday politics was shorn of its turbulence, a stable executive ruled, and Parliament came to play an insignificant role. General de Gaulle's appointment of civil servants (Giscard d'Estaing, Chenot, Pisani, Sudreau, Chalandon, Couve de Murville, Chirac, Ortoli, Guéna) to key ministerial posts,[24] as well as the stable nature of a regime that appeared to do away with politicians and politics,[25] brought the administration to prominence as never before. Just as the Fourth Republic had been seen as the heyday of the Deputies, so the Fifth Republic has come to be seen as *La République des fonctionnaires*[26] and as the epoch that witnessed the rise to power of the civil servant.[27]

It would be simplistic, however, to see in these changes between the

[21] See Georgette Elgey, *La République des illusions* (Paris 1965), 31-35.

[22] Philip M. Williams, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic* (New York 1966) 465-96.

[23] (Paris 1959.)

[24] For some of the effects of appointing technicians as ministers, see Bernard Chenot, *Etre Ministre* (Paris 1967), 22-25. A distinction needs to be made between those who, like Chalandon, Chirac, and Guéna, were first elected to Parliament before becoming ministers and those who, like Chenot, Couve de Murville, and Ortoli, came to occupy ministerial posts without first being elected to Parliament. The former are continuing a venerable tradition that began with the Third Republic. The latter represent an innovation of the Fifth Republic.

[25] See Georges Vedel, ed., *La Dépolitisation, mythe ou réalité* (Paris 1962).

[26] See Pierre Avril, *Le Gouvernement de la France* (Paris 1969), 139-54; Charles Debbasch, 25-101; Georges Elgozy, *Lettre ouverte à un jeune technocrate* (Paris 1968).

[27] François Mitterand, though accusing the civil servants of usurping power under the Fourth Republic, nevertheless writes that the "technocrats" have known "their finest hour" under the Fifth Republic. See his *Le Coup d'état permanent* (Paris 1965), 144. See also Roger Priouret, "Face à face avec Edgar Faure," *L'Expansion*, XXII (September 1969). In this interview, Edgar Faure applies Galbraith's thesis of *The New Industrial State* to French society. Galbraith's "technostructure" is composed in France, says Faure, of a small network of civil servants who constitute the real decision-makers. For an elaboration of this, see Faure's *L'Ame du combat* (Paris 1970), 54-60.

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Fourth and Fifth Republics a reflection of the relative power of the bureaucracy under the two regimes. In fact, the argument, popularized by Herbert Luethy, that "France is not ruled, but administered"[28] by a group that regards itself as the embodiment of the state and that has been impervious to political upheavals suggests the contrary. According to this argument, the bureaucracy substituted, on account of the constant changes in regimes and governments, for the politicians who came and went. As the only permanent and stable force in French society, the bureaucracy had had thrust upon it—or, if one prefers, had usurped—the task of directing the state's affairs. It would follow from this argument that the power of the bureaucracy was not less, and was perhaps even greater, under the regimes preceding the establishment of the Fifth Republic.

Few arguments have been so widely accepted—and few have been used to explain so much about French politics—as that based on the premise that the Republic passes but the administration stays. The logical neatness of this thesis has earned for it a universal acceptance that has rendered unnecessary the need for its empirical verification. Yet it contains two distinct and empirically verifiable elements: that the bureaucracy survives changes in regimes and that its power is inversely proportional to the power of the political sector. As concerns the question of administrative permanence, there is a preliminary problem of definition. There has been little agreement on what precisely is meant by administrative permanence. To some it has meant that the French bureaucracy was and has remained the preserve of the French bourgeoisie. The most recent attempt to sustain this thesis is E. Beau de Loménie's four-volume study, *Les Responsabilités des dynasties bourgeoises*.[29] De Loménie undertakes to show the remarkable survival of the bourgeois dynasties over several generations. His concern is with the social origin of the administrative and political elites. To other students of the French administration, the permanence of the bureaucracy has meant the possibility of upward mobility within the administration for the civil servants. Grégoire, in his *La Fonction publique*, supports this view by pointing to a few office-boy-to-manager cases. Still a third view of administrative permanence sees the administration as a cohesive elite continuing in office after the collapse of regimes. There has never been an attempt to define and to verify the concept of administrative

[28] Herbert Luethy, *France Against Herself* (New York 1953), 40. See also Alfred Diamant, "The French Administrative System," in W. J. Siffin, ed., *Toward The Comparative Study of Public Administrations* (Bloomington 1959) and Williams, *Crisis and Compromise*, 365.

[29] (Paris 1947-1954).

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continuity. Such an attempt would necessitate a rigorous distinction between social continuity and administrative continuity. Most writers on the subject have tended to confuse the two. The one study that I am aware of where this distinction has been made is Nicholas Richardson's *The French Prefectoral Corps, 1814-1830*.[30]

However one defines administrative continuity, the degree to which it has existed in France is open to question. Patronage had throughout the nineteenth century and part of the twentieth been a central feature of the French administrative system. The minister's power to hire and fire, and to reorganize the services in his ministry, was formidable. Moreover, some recent evidence suggests that changes in regimes have led to major turnover in the administration. René Rémond has pointed to the vast turnover in administrative personnel that followed in the wake of the Revolution of 1848.[31] Richardson's study on the Prefectoral Corps has analyzed in detail the upheaval the corps underwent in the transition from the Empire to the Bourbon Restoration. The purges of Vichy and the counter-purges of the Liberation are another example. Nor is it certain that changes in administrative personnel have been confined to succession of regimes; they may well have occurred between changes in governments *within* regimes.[32]

The second part of the argument—that the power of the bureaucracy varies with the degree of ministerial stability—has rested on the premise that ministerial instability facilitated and encouraged the usurpation of power by the bureaucracy. That the extent of ministerial instability in France has been exaggerated seems hardly open to question any longer. Already in 1939 Soulier, in his *L'Instabilité ministérielle sous la Troisième République*,[33] showed that there was a remarkable degree of ministerial stability in the Third Republic despite the frequent changes of governments. In a more recent study, Jacques Ollé-Laprune has documented the phenomenon of ministerial stability for the Third Republic in an extremely rigorous analysis.[34] What appears to have occurred in France under the Third and Fourth Republics is that

[30] (Cambridge 1966).

[31] *The Right Wing in France from 1815 to De Gaulle* (Philadelphia 1966), 84.

[32] Although this needs to be more fully documented, there are indications that such changes may in fact have occurred. In examining a number of personnel dossiers of civil servants who served under the Third Republic in the Archives Nationales in Paris, I gained the impression that, in certain ministries and at certain periods at least, turnover in personnel was a function of the turnover in ministers and governments. Also, Richardson's study shows the changes experienced by the prefectoral corps under the various governments of the Restoration. See pp. 208-10. True, the prefectoral corps has always been more susceptible to purges than other corps. But how much more?

[33] (Paris 1939).

[34] *La Stabilité des ministres sous la Troisième République, 1879-1940* (Paris 1962).

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despite the governmental instability of the regimes there was nevertheless a remarkable degree of ministerial stability. Whether the bureaucracy has therefore exerted greater weight and influence under relatively unstable political regimes with an all-powerful Parliament or whether it has, on the contrary, been more influential under the stable regime of the Fifth Republic with its impotent Parliament, is one of those crucial and complex questions that remain yet to be analyzed.[35]

There is little doubt that the demands made upon the bureaucracy, simply because of its pervasive role in French society, have increased very considerably over the past fifteen years. This increase has resulted not so much from the political system of the Fifth Republic as from the economic and social transformation that began under the Fourth Republic. The crises now taking place in education, highway construction, housing, urbanism, and the telephone system, to cite only a few key examples, attest to a sudden surge of problems that may be proving overpowering for the administration.[36] The problem is one of adaptation. Why has the French state encountered severe difficulties in adapting to the "consumer society?" The posing of this seemingly simple question may seem superfluous, if not downright laughable, for there is in present-day France a ready answer to it: namely, that centralization is the root cause of the maladaptation of French institutions to modern industrial society. I would suggest that this is an inadequate answer to what is fundamentally a complex question. For even given that excessive centralization may be largely to blame for the inadaptability of French institutions, there nonetheless remains the question of what is to blame for excessive centralization.

It was De Tocqueville who first argued that the trend toward centralization had been inexorable in France, having begun before the Revolution of 1789. Napoleon was thus merely following the path that Louis XIV had paved. What is needed today, however, is perhaps another Tocqueville to explain how and why the process of centralization continued unabated throughout the nineteenth century—in other words, why no forces sprang up under the Second Empire and the Third Republic to counter the trend. Is it not possible that the state was gradually undertaking to fill social needs that were shunned by the private sector? If, as we are so often told, France is a country of shopkeepers and if Malthusianism is the characteristic French attitude to-

[35] In my study of the French bureaucracy I have attempted to deal with this question and I have suggested that the influence of the bureaucracy is only incidentally, if at all, linked to the role of Parliament and to the degree of ministerial stability.

[36] See John Ardagh, *The New French Revolution* (New York 1969).

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ward commerce,[37] is this the result of a process of state centralization that stifled private initiative—or, on the contrary, did the Malthusianism of the French bourgeoisie oblige or encourage the state to fulfill tasks that it might have preferred to leave to others? Did not the bourgeoisie in the early nineteenth century, as many historians have noted, adopt the values of the waning aristocracy and "put money gained in commerce, manufacturing, finance and the state service into land?"[38] It has been variously argued that France is basically a country in which peasant or aristocratic or bourgeois values predominate. The values of which class have made the greatest imprint on French society is not at all clear. What is clear is that all those who have argued for one or another of these values have arrived at the same conclusion: that there is among Frenchmen a fear of and resistance to change.[39] This conclusion becomes highly significant when it is applied to the elites of French society and compared to the responsiveness of the elites in other societies to changing conditions. Consider, for example, the reaction of the British aristocracy to the demands for universal suffrage in the early part of the nineteenth century. As W. L. Guttsman has shown, the British cabinet that was responsible for the Reform Act of 1832 was the most aristocratic in British history.[40] The British aristocracy, like that of Germany, shifted to politics and to industry and did not retire to its castles as did the French aristocracy. What all this suggests is that a centralized state is born of a complex of historical factors, foremost among which is the responsiveness of elites to the increasing demands of society.

The important point is that the state did not, over a period of two hundred and fifty years, purely and simply seize power from the society. There are a number of instances of institutions having a good deal more power than they choose to use. Also, reforms for decentralization have generally encountered vigorous opposition. This opposition has been, in the main, due to two causes. First, it has been due to a greater mistrust of other institutions, particularly the private sector. For example, the recent proposal of Albin Chalandon to hand over the construction of highways to the private sector and considerably to ease building regulations has created a tumultuous debate in France. Al-

[37] See the essays by John Christopher, John E. Sawyer, and David S. Landes, in Earle, *Modern France*.

[38] Norman Birnbaum, *The Crisis of Industrial Society* (New York 1969), 29.

[39] See Luethy; André Siegfried, *France: A Study of Nationality* (New Haven 1930); Jacques Fauvet, *La France déchirée* (Paris 1957); Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," in Hoffmann and others, *In Search of France* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963).

[40] W. L. Guttsman, *The British Political Elite* (New York 1963), 39.

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though it is true that Chalandon is concerned more with profit than with beauty, his opponents have only incidentally been concerned with the esthetic argument against his plans. Opposition to Chalandon's policies has, on the contrary, been based on the fear of handing over to the *patronat* what belongs to the state. When, to take another example, the current Minister of Post and Telecommunications announced that the state was planning to remedy the appalling shortage of telephones by attracting funds from private investors, the same attack was delivered against him. He felt constrained to say publicly on a number of occasions that this did not imply that the state intended to compromise in any way its monopoly of the telephone system. Nor is the opposition to the state's unburdening itself of certain functions confined to a particular segment of the French political spectrum. The distrust of the private sector is so widespread that the state is always seen as the lesser evil. Decentralization is interpreted as shifting a quantum of power from the state to the advantage of a particular group.[41]

The second reason for the general opposition to plans for decentralization is that, because the issue is of such grave importance, opponents of the regime use it to the utmost to try to bring the regime down even when the reform happens to coincide with their own views. The regional reform project of April, 1969, proposed, among other things, to do away with the Senate in its present form. Now, the Communist Party had fought bitterly for the abolition of the Second Chamber in 1945 and has continued to believe in government by a single chamber. Yet, in 1969 the P.C.F. came to the rescue of the Senate and fought for its preservation as assiduously as it had fought for its abolition in 1945. This same proposed reform had also contained a number of proposals, concerning particularly the Senate and interest-representation in local and national assemblies, that Mendès-France had outlined in his book, *A Modern French Republic*.[42] Yet Mendès-France fought bitterly against De Gaulle's proposed reform. It is clear

[41] In no way do I imply here that the only alternative to decentralization is the transfer of powers from the state to the private sector, which is clearly Chalandon's view of things. I merely wish to point to certain forces in French society that encourage the process of centralization. As Pierre Grémion and Jean-Pierre Worms have pointed out, the alternative to excessive centralization need not be the liberal state, which is liable to have disastrous consequences for France. See their article, "L'Etat et les collectivités locales," in *Esprit*, Special Number, January 1970, 20-35. For Chalandon's views, see his article, "Comment je conçois le rôle de l'Etat," *Preuves*, II (1970). See also his exchange with Michel Rocard in *L'Expansion*, XXVIII (March 1970).

[42] (New York 1963.) The referendum of April, 1969, was far more than a vote to decide the French people's confidence in De Gaulle. For the various issues at stake, see J.E.S. Hayward, "Presidential Suicide by Plebiscite: De Gaulle's Exit, April 1969," *Parliamentary Affairs*, XXII (Autumn 1969), 289-319. See also Philip M. Williams, *French Politicians and Elections, 1951-1969* (Cambridge 1970), 282-89.

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that Chalandon's views often leave much to be desired, as did De Gaulle's plans for regional reform. But the opposition that is elicited by any proposal that threatens to divest the state of some of its traditional duties or functions (or, ultimately, powers) creates a climate that in the end turns out to be conducive only to preserving the *status quo*.

Despite the general recognition of the paramount role of the bureaucracy in French society, there has been a lamentable absence of studies in depth of this institution. The study of public administration in France has until very recently been the province of the Law Faculties, who have been carrying forward the venerable tradition of explaining the juridical underpinnings of the administration. For the jurists, the administration exists, functions, and is to be understood solely by its legal rules and regulations. The political scientists, who might have contributed a corrective to this traditional approach, have never found the bureaucracy a particularly attractive subject for study. Even while recognizing its paramount importance in French society, they have shied away from subjecting it to the kind of analysis that would be needed for the accumulation of a body of knowledge about its mechanisms. The recent publication of a number of books on various aspects of the French bureaucracy that profess to deviate from the traditional (legal) approach by employing more modern tools of analysis is therefore to be welcomed. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent these studies fulfill their objective and enhance our understanding of the French bureaucracy.

II

Scarcely a scholarly book published in France today on the French administration goes without noting in its introduction or preface that the administration has for too long been studied as part of *droit administratif* instead of *science administrative*, and without saying that it itself adopts the latter approach. Gérard Belorgey's *Le Gouvernement et l'administration de la France* is presented by its prefacer as "a living, factually based portrait of the government and administration of France in 1967" (p. 6). The author himself informs us that his study, far from being an introduction to theoretical questions of jurisprudence, "emphasizes the *raison d'être*, the structure, the powers, the functioning, and the tasks of the state institutions" (p. 9). We are thus led at the outset to anticipate a study of the anatomy of the French bureaucracy, its interactions with society, and its mechanisms. This is precisely what M. Belorgey's study is not about. It is, strictly speaking, intended as an

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apologia for and defense of the centralized state. "The considerable extension," writes Belorgey in the opening sentence of his book, "of the power of the state is accepted by the citizens because it appears, on the whole, as the necessary condition for the rendering of services needed by society. In other words, public service is the contemporary legitimacy of power. Is it also the *raison d'être* of the state?" (p. 11) Belorgey's basic assumption is peculiarly French, and to some extent continental, in that it sees the state's role of providing services as an indispensable element of its *raison d'être*. Brian Chapman has noted that although in Britain the state may provide as many services as do any of the European states, there is nevertheless a general feeling that these services should not be provided by the state.[43] The difference is basically one of attitude, and carries with it wide ramifications as far as those responsible for the conduct of the state's affairs are concerned. This view that Belorgey holds of the role of the state forms his point of departure, and he proceeds to examine French institutions against the backdrop of a centralized state that itself is not open to question and that admits of no tampering.

For Belorgey, the state institutions exist and function as legal (hence legitimate) entities, independently of the civil servants who are responsible for their existence and their operation, as well as independently of those whom the institutions are intended to serve. Implicit in Belorgey's analysis is not only a strict Jacobin view of the state that requires it to be served by its citizens rather than being at their service, but a particular ideological viewpoint that sees the state as the representative of the people, the guardian of their rights and stipulator of their duties. This same ideological outlook unmistakably marked the proposal for regional reform that defeated General de Gaulle in the Referendum of April 27, 1969. For behind the façade of decentralization and participation the reform offered, there was a clear attempt to leave intact, or even augment, the centralized nature of the French state. That Belorgey shares this view of the French state is made obvious on almost every page of his book. As M. Gazier reminds us, Belorgey "does not feel it necessary to adhere to the supercilious political neutrality of professors and of British higher civil servants: his political commitment is clear and he makes no mystery of it" (p. 6).

Taking the view that the centralized state is desirable, necessary, and legitimate—i.e., sacrosanct—Belorgey's book is a classic example of the utilization of law in the service of the *status quo*. Legal texts are sometimes appended to the end of chapters in order to demonstrate

[43] Chapman, *British Government Observed: Some European Reflections*, 17.

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a faithful adherence to sources. Never for a moment does the author raise the possibility of there being a conflict between legality and legitimacy. A political system, as we have learned from Weber and others, may be legitimized by factors other than laws. In France, the war hero, the charismatic figure, the savior, or, as Stanley Hoffmann calls him, the "heroic leader,"[44] has frequently gained legitimacy independently, and frequently in flagrant violation of the law. Thus, although the phenomenon of legality may be always uppermost in the mind of a law professor or a civil servant, it cannot be viewed as the only legitimizing element of a political system. Every chapter in Belorgey's book, regardless of the institution that it treats, concerns itself solely with the (legal) powers of the state. It is as if one had merely to glance at a constitution to comprehend the workings of a political system. But perhaps we ought not to be surprised by Belorgey's approach; after all, he does state in his book that "institutions and political life will be considered only to the extent that they are necessary for situating 'executive power' " (p. 9).

It is clear that the functioning, structures, and missions of the French state institutions, as they are presented in Belorgey's book, bear no relation to reality.[45] The author is concerned, above all, with an abstraction. How else could he describe the role of the civil servant as being merely to execute government policy (pp. 22 and 435)? That the civil servant's power in both the decision-making process and the application of decisions is enormous ought to be fairly evident to M. Belorgey, himself a higher civil servant of considerable influence.[46] The author eschews discussion of his own experiences in favor of describing an abstraction to which he is fervently attached. This attests not only to Belorgey's own ideological predilections, alluded to above, but also to the wide gap that necessarily exists between his quasi-legalistic descriptions of institutions and their reality.

But the fact that Belorgey's book bears little relation to anything approaching a description of "the government and administration of France of 1967," let alone to a science of administration, is perhaps not its most glaring shortcoming. To my mind, it is an unfortunate book, perhaps even a dangerous one, because although in effect an ideological exegesis, it is presented as a dispassionate textbook for *lycée*

[44] Stanley Hoffmann, "Heroic Leadership: The Case of Modern France," in Lewis J. Edinger, *Political Leadership In Industrialized Societies* (New York 1967), 108-54.

[45] A number of higher civil servants in France remarked to me that they were scarcely able to recognize their institutions through M. Belorgey's analysis.

[46] Belorgey, a graduate of E.N.A., is now a sub-Prefect. Until a few months ago he was *Directeur de Cabinet* of the Secretary of State for Economy and Finance.

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and university students, appearing in a prestigious series directed by Alfred Grosser. Its influence, if only for this reason, will undoubtedly be considerable. Yet it will propagate a view of politics and of the role of the state that is questioned everywhere, not least in France.

That the method of studying the administration as an abstraction is susceptible to variations is shown in the recently published *Introduction à une philosophie de l'administration*, by Robert Catherine and Guy Thuiller,[47] which appears in a series whose chief aim is to alter the existing balance in the study of the French administration in favor of the "scientific" approach.[48] Though this study is on an even higher plane of abstraction than Belorgey's, it nevertheless shares his view of the state. The idea that the administration can, or ought to, be studied from a philosophical viewpoint surely serves to demonstrate the elevated esteem in which it is held by those who study it. What is truly remarkable about Catherine's and Thuiller's philosophical study of the administration is that it is designed to answer questions that are, by their very nature, empirical. Yet the study is not only unempirical but positively anti-scientific. Its preface is written by the eminent philosopher, Professor Vladimir Jankélévitch, who informs us that the object of the book "was to offer us, as it were, a phenomenology of the administrative being. This being is here revealed to us, as one would put it today, in terms of Mental Structures" (p. 9). We are also assured by Professor Jankélévitch that "this book is in many respects a collection of thoughts on the commerce of men and on the art of living; and in this respect it is well in the tradition of the great *moralistes* of the seventeenth century" (pp. 9-10).

The authors of *Introduction à une philosophie de l'administration* state their objectives in less grandiose fashion, for they tell us that their method "rests on an examination of the administrative experiences as it is lived" (p. 12). But how is it possible, we may well ask, to attempt to describe the "lived administrative experience" of civil servants without recourse to data resulting from empirical studies?[49] How is it possible to tackle this question while deliberately avoiding, as the authors tell us at the outset of their study is their intention, the sociological approach (p. 12)? Is the question that the authors pose not one that

[47] Catherine, author of numerous studies on the French administration, is Editor in Chief of *La Revue Administrative*. Thuiller is a higher civil servant and a member of the Cour des Comptes.

[48] See the statement by the Editor of the series, Professor Roland Drago, that appears in all the volumes in the series.

[49] For such an approach, see Michel Crozier, *Petits fonctionnaires au travail* (Paris 1955).

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lends itself ideally to empirical investigation and hardly at all to philosophic inquiry? Can the administration really be studied fruitfully from a philosophical viewpoint? The authors evidently think that it can, and they employ a phenomenological approach to the subject, describing the administrator's view of time, space, ethics. Surely this is a gratuitous approach since there is hardly anything to indicate that the administrator's "lived administrative experience," as it is described by Catherine and Thuiller, is different from that of, say, a clerk in a large insurance company. Or, if there is a difference, is it phenomenology that will illuminate it? The administration is seen in this study, as in Belorgey's, as an institution operating in some kind of sacred vacuum, neither concerned with nor affected by the larger society.

The philosophical approach illustrates the point made earlier: that the administration, by virtue of the elevated or sanctified position that it occupies in the eyes of its students, can be subjected to study by methods that would be considered somewhat absurd if applied to other institutions. Moreover, it hardly requires pointing out that, with all due respect to the seventeenth century *moralistes*, studies of the French administration do not require, nor is it wholly desirable that they attract, a Pascal, a La Rochefoucauld, or a La Bruyère.

It is always difficult to break with an intellectual tradition that has outlived its usefulness, even when a conscious attempt is made to do so. Just how difficult this can be is illustrated by the publication of a treatise on public administration that has been compared to the work of Michel Crozier[50] and that sees itself as constituting a "landmark" in the study of this field, and that recognizes its own sharp break with the past by treating its subject as *science administrative*. The *Traité de science administrative* is regarded by its authors or, more precisely, by its prefacer, M. Vedel, as opening an entire new horizon. "The future," he writes, "will fortunately see the proliferation of monographs and works of synthesis; other treatises will see the day, without prejudicing future editions of this one. But it is the *Traité*, published today that, for France, will have shown the way" (p. 9).

That the *Traité* is a major collaborative effort can hardly be questioned. It contains essays by some forty-five authors, half of whom are jurists, and is nine hundred pages in length. It is an admirable effort to put into a single volume the prevailing approaches to the study of public administration by French specialists. As such, it is an excellent synthesis. But as it aspires to innovate rather than merely to synthesize,

[50] F. Ridely and J. Blondel, *Public Administration in France* (London, second edition, 1969), *x*.

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the question ought to be asked in what its novelty consists. The general introduction, consisting of approximately one hundred and fifty pages, outlines the history of administrative thought and treats the question of a *science* of administration. Of particular interest in this section is Louis Boulet's article, "La méthode en science administrative" (124-40), which deals with some of the implications of a scientific approach to the study of public administration. But it is unfortunate that M. Boulet appears to reject the logical implications of his discussion—i.e., the necessity for an empirical approach—by stating that the complexity of the administrative structure, as well as the "*méfiance*" civil servants supposedly hold toward the outside world, largely precludes empirical investigations. "One has to accept the fact," he writes, "that the administrative phenomenon cannot be studied from the outside by an objective observer" (p. 133). Rather than seeking to encourage behavioral inquiries, which he believes to be the *sine qua non* of a science of administration, M. Boulet contributes to the propagation of the myth of the impenetrability of the administration and thereby denies the practical applicability of a scientific study of the administration.

Part two of the *Traité*, which seeks to examine "*L'administration et son milieu*," is concerned with (a) the social milieu, (b) the political milieu, and (c) the legal milieu of the administration. For the authors of these essays, a milieu is either a juridically defined phenomenon, as in the case of the essays by Jean-Marie Auby and Michel Lasage dealing with the legal and political milieux, or it is a philosophical-legal derivative, as in Claude Goyard's discussion of the social milieu. The world of the administration, as it is presented in this part of the *Traité*, is thus a combination of the world sketched for us by Belorgey and Catherine and Thuiller. For all these authors, the world of the administration and of the administrator is not the result of a complex of dialectical relations but is, more often than not, legally grounded and susceptible of definition on this basis.

The section devoted to "*Les structures*" (part four) consists of a lengthy article by Professor Charles Eisenman. The central preoccupation of this essay is not so much the organization of the administration as such, but the structure of the centralized state. It is a highly competent, if wholly juridical, treatment of the centralized nature of the state. The author examines the implications of decentralization versus deconcentration and of what he calls functional unity versus functional division (p. 305). Since the discussion is for the most part confined to a theoretical realm, it never really deals with either the practical complexities or the immediacy of these questions.

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The parts devoted to "*L'administration et son milieu*" (part two), "*Les missions*" (part three), and "*Les hommes*" (part five) are potentially among the most interesting. But save for the fine articles by J.-F. Kesler on the social origins of civil servants[51] (pp. 354-400), the articles in these sections evidence no originality and, in effect, constitute no more than a grab-bag of material that has been made available all too often to students of *droit administratif*. One of the essays in the section on "*Les hommes*" is entitled "*Le fonctionnaire et l'administration*" and turns out to be a repetition of those technical matters—recruitment, obligations, protection, discipline, retirement—that are defined in the *Statut des fonctionnaires* and that have formed the basis of a remarkable number of studies whose utility long ago met with diminishing returns. Part six, on "*Le fonctionnement*," is made up largely of factual information on the teaching of public relations in France, on information and documentation centers and the like. In short, it conceives of the "functioning" of the administration in a sense that is far too narrow to be of much value.

Considering the eclectic nature of the *Traité*, it seems entirely fitting, although unfortunate, that the concluding section does not so much elucidate "*notre jeune science administrative*" and elaborate upon its research potentialities as mirror the contents of the book. The concluding essay by Catherine and Thuiller oscillates between the trivial (office space, location) and the philosophical (*l'être administratif, le mépris*) so that we are at the end of the treatise as unenlightened about the science of administration and about the French administration as we were at its outset.

It is truly remarkable that in a treatise that not only is nine hundred pages long but that lays claim to being a "landmark," there is only one article (Crozier's) that sees a relation between its theoretical orientations and empirical observation (pp. 759-80), and only one (Kesler's) that is based on empirical research. What is most serious is that none of the other articles appears even to recognize the critical need for empirical studies—that is, for a corpus of knowledge upon which such a treatise would necessarily have had to be based if it were to constitute a veritable watershed in the study of public administration. As it stands, the treatise is totally lacking in methodology and tools of analysis as well as in an awareness of the importance of both for a science of administration. There is, for example, little or no acknowledgement of the importance of the literature on organization. In fact, most refer-

[51] See also Kesler's article, "Les anciens élèves de l'E.N.A.," *Revue Française des sciences politiques*, XIV (April 1964).

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ences in most of the articles are to books on administrative law. In no sense can the *Traité* be regarded as ushering in a new era in the study of public administration in France. On the contrary, it is in many respects the prototype of the traditional studies that seek to confine the French administration to a sphere so elevated that it becomes well-nigh impervious to objective analysis. Above all, the *Traité* evinces an undeniable reluctance to *analyze* the institution it purports to study, and demonstrates little respect for research. How otherwise can we explain the categorical assertion—appearing, symptomatically, in the introductory section—that the administration cannot be studied from the outside by objective observers? The title of the *Traité* suggests an acknowledgment of the importance of science in our age; but the work itself manifests a profound mistrust of the uses to which science may be put.

The slight concession made so far to the empirical method in the area of public administration in France has been the collection of data on the social background of civil servants, although there does not as yet exist a comprehensive study on the social origins of civil servants.[52] This type of research was undoubtedly stimulated by the publication of two influential studies, Alain Girard's *La Réussite sociale en France*[53] and Pierre Bourdieu's and J.-C. Passeron's *Les héritiers*.[54] Social background data are extremely important in elite studies, since they permit an appraisal of the relative representativeness of a society's groups and classes in its elites. They help to answer the question of *who* runs the society. But it is easy to exaggerate the significance of such data and to regard them as master keys that unlock all doors. In fact, they ought to be regarded as no more than a first step toward understanding a society or a particular institution. Beyond the question of who runs an institution there looms the larger question of its mechanisms, which may or may not be related to the social status of those who occupy the key posts. This is a matter that calls for empirical investigation. It cannot be assumed from the social origins of the leaders. As Dankwart Rustow has justly noted in his review of a number of elite studies, "a study of social backgrounds can furnish clues for a study of political

[52] An attempt to fill this gap has been undertaken by the Centre de Sociologie Européenne, which is sponsoring a large-scale study on the French administration. See the first volume of the project, Alain Darbel and Dominique Schnapper, *Les Agents du système administratif* (Paris 1969).

[53] (Paris 1961.)

[54] Because the thesis of this book is that the single most important factor accounting for academic success is social origin, it became a bible for the revolutionary students during the May, 1968, uprising. See also the authors' recently published *La Reproduction* (Paris 1970).

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performances, but . . . the first cannot substitute for the second."[55] In order to demonstrate a correlation between power and social status, one must, as Rustow has pointed out, do three things: "identify each of the two correlates and demonstrate a connection between them."[56]

A common pitfall in the gathering of data on social backgrounds of elites is the tendency to use these data as the basis for answering some important questions about power and behavior. The unfortunate results of such a method can be clearly seen in J. Siwek-Pouydesseau's recently published *Le Personnel de direction des ministères*, in which the author attempts to treat the crucial and complex problem of the relation between politics and administration in France. "The study of the relationship between Politics and Administration," writes Siwek-Pouydesseau in the opening sentence of her book, "is essential for the comprehension of 'Government' in a broad sense, or in the British sense of the term. How and by whom are decisions made? How and by whom are they elaborated and executed?" (p. 7) For the author, all these complex questions can be subsumed under the more simple query: who are the Directors of the central administration and the members of ministerial cabinets? She assembles a good bit of data on their age, academic training, and professional background, though she neither compares these data to those for other groups in French society nor attempts to decipher the various nuances of such data that obtain within the administration itself. The data are left to stand on their own, and ultimately reveal little about the administration. When she attempts to analyze the relation between politics and administration, her conclusions are based not only on any empirical evidence but on speculation that is sometimes, it is true, quite perceptive.

In treating the important question of the relation between the Directors of the central administration who occupy the highest administrative posts in the ministries and the members of a minister's cabinet, who are the personal collaborators of a minister and thus come and go with him, Mme. Siwek-Pouydesseau points to the tensions that can exist between these two groups. Considering that her study purports to deal with both these groups, Mme. Siwek-Pouydesseau never quite enters into the complexities of this relation. She merely states that the tensions between the Directors and cabinet members are lessened "when the Director has already belonged to a cabinet, when he be-

[55] Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When, and How," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), 699.
[56] *Ibid.*, 701.

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longs to the same corps or to a generation close to that of the member of the cabinet" (p. 122).

Although this explanation sounds reasonable and logical, it unfortunately has no basis in reality. In my interviews with Directors of the central administration and members of ministerial cabinets, I found that the tensions between these two groups were seldom reduced as a result of proximity in the ages of the two groups or of a common membership in a corps,[57] and *never* reduced as a result of a Director's having himself previously been a member of a cabinet. Indeed, the central question that requires answering is this: why do most Directors of the central administration express an unequivocal hostility toward the ministerial cabinet when most of them have had the experience of belonging to at least one cabinet, and frequently to several? Clearly what is involved is a role-conflict, the perception of one's role changing as one moves from one position to another. It is only by a thorough examination of this relation, which has long been recognized as uncomfortable,[58] that a better understanding can be gained of the relation between politics and administration in France. Such an examination would show that the role of the cabinet is as administrative as that of the Directors is political, and that the desire for a clearly delimited sphere of activity on the part of both groups—a desire that is frustrated by the nature of their respective tasks—is at the heart of the conflict.

As part of this same empirical inquiry, the attempt to understand what Karl Mannheim has referred to as the "military-bureaucratic mentality"[59] is extremely significant for analyzing the role-perception and the behavior of the administrator. Mme. Siwek-Pouydesseau states that the Directors make no distinction between administrative (or technical) and political functions (p. 123). This is an assertion whose significance escapes Mme. Siwek-Pouydesseau, for it implies that the Directors perceive their tasks in much the same manner as do the members of the cabinet. More importantly, it implies a remarkable degree of openness to the society at large, to interest groups, to Deputies, as

[57] One question that I examined in greater detail in the course of my study is why ministers only rarely take into their cabinet members of the corps that the Ministry is identified with. An exception to this is the Ministry of Finance, where the corps of the *Inspection des Finances* is thoroughly represented in the administrative posts proper and in the minister's cabinet.

[58] Already in the early years of the Third Republic, the cabinets were known as *les pieuvres* (the octopi) and as *la plaie de la troisième République* (the ulcer of the Third Republic). See Henri Chardon, *L'Administration de la France: les fonctionnaires* (Paris 1908), 129. See also Robert de Jouvenel, *La République des camarades* (Paris 1914) 104-113. For criticism of the cabinets under the Fourth Republic, see René Massigli, *Sur quelques maladies de l'Etat* (Paris 1958) 40-55.

[59] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York 1936), 118-23.

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well as a genuine willingness to become involved in the decisions of the minister, with all the responsibility that this implies. Now, it happens that the assertion lacks any factual foundation; it is, in fact, totally false. In my interviews with the Directors, I found that they were at pains to make a very definite distinction between the domain of politics and that of administration, the one having very little to do with the other. Why this should be the case, what its implications are, and why the members of ministerial cabinets do not make this distinction are questions that require further analysis. The foregoing, however, is enough to suggest that the misrepresentations in which Mme. Siwek-Pouydesseau's book abounds are due to her approach, which consists in making the long jump from the background data to the explanation of behavior. The result is the falsification of all the conclusions that transcend data on social background.[60] This is all the more unfortunate in view of the fact that Mme. Siwek-Pouydesseau is the first person to have considered not only the Directors but also the members of ministerial cabinets (who are also for the most part civil servants) as part of *le Personnel de direction* of a ministry.

The genesis of Siwek-Pouydesseau's book suggests a somewhat equivocal attitude toward empirical research. The material in *Le Personnel de direction des ministères* is a condensed version of two widely quoted theses that the author completed some years ago[61] and parts of which have already been published.[62] For the theses, she interviewed some Directors of the central administration and members of ministerial cabinets. Her questionnaires are included in appendices at the end of the theses, as are the lists of people interviewed. Not only are the lists rather short but those selected for interviews appear to have been chosen without the least concern for their representativeness or, frequently, even for the posts they held. A number of them had never held the post that Siwek-Pouydesseau was intending to study. The choice of her subjects appears to have been dictated largely by the availability of erstwhile civil servants who happen to be professors at the Institut d'Etudes

[60] Mme. Siwek-Pouydesseau seeks to justify her method in the conclusion of her book by stating that "As for the relationship between cabinets and Directors, they cannot be understood or appreciated unless one takes account of the background of the two groups" (p. 129). That this is a specious and misguided approach has already been seen. This same method, though to a slightly lesser degree, is employed in Siwek-Pouydesseau's *Le Corps préfectoral sous la IIIe et IVe République* (Paris 1969).

[61] *Les Cabinets ministériels et leur évolution* (Thèse pour le doctorat de Recherche, Fondation nationale des Sciences politiques, Paris 1962); and *Les Directeurs des administrations centrales* (D.E.S., Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques, Paris 1963).

[62] B. Gournay, J.-F. Kesler, and J. Siwek-Pouydesseau, *Administrations Publiques* (Paris 1967). See particularly the section by Siwek-Pouydesseau.

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Politiques and at the Faculté de Droit. Although many of these men are highly erudite and respected, they can hardly be regarded as good samples for a study of higher civil servants. Siwek-Pouydesseau's method could have been improved. But what is curious, and highly significant, is that when this material came to be published in book form, not only was the method not improved, but no mention whatever was made of the fact that the author had sought to obtain first-hand knowledge upon which to base her conclusions. One is at a loss to explain why the homage to modern methods of social science was good enough for a thesis but not for a book.

This same attitude toward empirical research is illustrated again in *Le Conseil d'Etat* by Marie-Christine Kessler, published in the prestigious series of the Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Mme. Kessler lays claim to a novel approach "which combines political science with sociology" (p. 369). At the outset of her study, she discusses the methodological questions involved in interviewing and informs us that the posing of direct or detailed questions was not possible within the scope of her study (p. 19). We are not told the total number of people interviewed, although by all indications it appears to be fairly small; also, those interviewed appear to have been chosen, if not as haphazardly as Mme. Siwek-Pouydesseau's subjects, in a methodologically questionable manner. Mme. Kessler tells us that the number of subjects interviewed is not important. What is important is that the interviewee be an *informateur privilégié* (p. 23). This criterion for the choice of subjects is not elaborated, except in the statement that "the subjects interviewed are those who, by virtue of their position within a group, are particularly well suited to express the dominant—or, possibly, the deviant—tendencies within the group" (p. 23). What group? What individuals? How many? For lack of further information, we are left a little unconvinced by the author's assertion that "in this perspective, which derives from the open nature of the interview, it is not so much the number of persons interviewed that counts for the understanding of the situation as the richness of their analysis. This perspective leads us to employ the ethnological concept of 'privileged informants' rather than the statistical concept of representativity" (p. 23).

This elaborate justification for what turn out to be serious methodological flaws is a little puzzling in view of the fact that Mme. Kessler then proceeds to question the empirical approach to such studies altogether. She asks whether it is possible to draw general conclusions about the Conseil d'Etat from data obtained through interviews. Her

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answer is: "The validity of such an approach may be contested. In fact, in spite of the efforts made to obtain a representative sample of the entire group, the very nature of the semi-open interview saddles the method with a certain coefficient of uncertainty; the indefiniteness and diversity of the answers preclude extrapolations" (p. 23).

Mme. Kessler did not, evidently, see it as an integral part of her task to pose questions that would enable her to interpret her responses in a meaningful manner. Indeed, the questionnaire appears to have been constructed without any guiding principle (pp. 385-87) and suffers also from the widespread misconception that questions posed to elites must necessarily be left open (p. 20).[63] This is one of those "rules" that find their way into the literature and become accepted as gospel. What is far more important than the openness or shutness of a question with regard to elite surveys is the specificity of the question, the nature of the survey—i.e., whether it is a general rambling one or whether it deals with specific matters—and the knowledge and alertness of the interviewer. Elites are no less susceptible to having their choices delimited than are the masses, nor are they in need of more pampering. What is crucial is that the interviewer cannot be a mere passive agent. Because Mme. Kessler's questionnaire appears to have been tailored with no particular aim in mind, the inevitable result is that scarcely any conclusion in the study is derived from the interviews. It is difficult to tell whether this is entirely due to the ill-constructed questionnaire and the poor methodology employed; it may well be also due to a lack of faith in the whole empirical method.[64]

Like Mme. Siwek-Pouydesseau, Mme. Kessler seems to shy away from the salient questions. Thus, for example, instead of examining the Conseil d'Etat's interactions with the administrative and political spheres, she spends a good deal of energy discussing how other groups or institutions—deputies, the press, the Grands Corps—view the Conseil d'Etat. And she laments the fact that, with regard to groups with which the Conseil has no contact, "the interview could scarcely be used to compensate for the gaps in published sources: how could a sufficiently

[63] For one formulation of this mistaken belief see Richard L. Merritt, "Interviewing French and West German Elites," in Karl Deutsch and others, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York 1967) 9. For a more recent echo of this misconception, see Bernard E. Brown, "Elite Attitudes and Political Legitimacy in France," *The Journal of Politics,* XXXI (May 1969), 420.

[64] It is certainly possible, as the methodological window-dressing indicates, that Mme. Kessler, like Mme. Siwek-Pouydesseau, had aspired to follow a path other than those previously traced out for such studies but may have been hindered by her training. Both *Le Conseil d'Etat* and *Le Personnel de direction des ministères* were originally written as theses in the Faculties of Law and Political Science and were undoubtedly circumscribed by the standards and methods expected of such works.

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significant number of *Inspecteurs des finances* or members of the *Cour des Comptes* be persuaded to consent to devote a part of their time to discussing an institution with which they have not the slightest professional contact?" (p. 9) The author does not stop to ask just what the significance of such an undertaking would be, were it possible. Surely, a civil servant's lack of interest in talking about an institution with which he has not the slightest contact is no more than a sign of good sense.

Because the author was not able to distinguish between the more important and the less important questions, it is not surprising to find some of the most significant aspects of the institution she studied receiving only scant attention. It is well known, for example, that a large proportion of the members of the Conseil d'Etat are *détachés* at any given time. While taking time out from the Conseil, they often occupy posts that are sensitive if only because they emanate from the executive branch. A large number serve in ministerial cabinets, or on the Matignon and Elysée staffs. It may happen, therefore, that a member of the Conseil d'Etat on leave as a collaborator to a minister is largely responsible for drawing up a particular bill whose legality he becomes responsible for ruling on at some later point when he has returned to the Conseil. The possible conflict of interest that this may give rise to is evident: either one examines a government's actions as an impartial judge, or one defends those actions as a partisan. One cannot do both. It is the close relation between executive and judicial powers that prompted a Deputy to address the following questions to the Minister of Justice in the National Assembly in 1961: "(1) What is the present number of members of the Conseil d'Etat who are *détachés*. (2) What are the posts currently held by these members. (3) Whether it is true that some members of the Conseil d'Etat continue to occupy their posts in the Conseil, and particularly in the *section du contentieux* [judicial section], while they are serving in a ministerial cabinet. (4) Whether he [the minister] does not think that in the case of an affirmative answer to these last questions, there is here a violation of principle, even if this situation is in perfect conformity with the letter of the law insofar as the duties of the members of the Conseil d'Etat are concerned."[65]

[65] Quoted in Debbasch, *L'Administration au pouvoir*, 65-66. The *détachement* of the members of the Conseil d'Etat receives a strictly juridical treatment in Mme. Kessler's study (pp. 166-74). Yet the practice of *détachement* constitutes one of the most crucial aspects of the functioning of the French administrative system. At any given time, approximately one-third of the members of the Conseil d'Etat and two-thirds of the members of the Inspection des Finances are *détachés*. Because the Grands Corps are seen as springboards to the most brilliant administrative careers, many civil serv-

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

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Now, Mme. Kessler, one of whose tasks was ostensibly to deal with the role and the decision-making process of the Conseil d'Etat,[68] skirts, like the Minister to whom the above questions were posed, all these crucial issues and draws conclusions whose aim seems to be to reassure us lest we might question the purity of the administrative elite. Thus, although admitting that it is scarcely possible to separate the technical and political spheres when the latter is conceived as "collaboration" with a minister (p. 241), she dismisses the implication of this in so far as the Conseil d'Etat is concerned. "There exists," she writes, "in ministerial cabinets a division of labor and a distinction in preoccupations which prove that the role of the higher civil servants is essentially technical. The posts held by the members of the Conseil d'Etat in a ministerial cabinet are more technical than political" (p. 242). Such conclusions, for which no evidence whatever is presented, typify Mme. Kessler's attempt to de-fuse issues that might otherwise cast a controversial light on the French administration. What tasks do members of the Conseil d'Etat occupy in ministerial cabinets? What of those members who serve in the cabinets of the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic? How does one separate *technique* from *politique* at a level where the technician's task is essentially to prepare decisions for the minister? Are some cabinets more *technique* or more *politique* than others? Mme. Kessler does not go into any of these questions. She merely issues blanket statements that are intended to absolve the Conseil d'Etat *en masse* from any suspicion that it might be involved in the affairs of the nation in a capacity other than that of an administrative or judicial ivory tower. It goes without saying that her research is neither empirical nor objective.

In order to study the functioning of the Conseil d'Etat, Mme. Kessler would have had to approach her subject from two vantage points: first, as a system of organization and, second, as an institution constituting an integral part of the French politico-administrative system. Both these questions call for an empirical approach, one that deals with *mechanisms, relationships*, and *attitudes*. Had Mme. Kessler adopted such a method, she would have made a badly needed contribution to our scant knowledge of the French higher civil service:

ants render little or no service to their corps throughout their career. Yet unless they resign from the civil service, they retain their rank within the corps, which attaches to them much like a title for the remainder of their careers. The role of the Grand Corps in the French state is currently being studied by the author.

[68] See C. J. Hamson, *Executive Discretion and Judicial Control* (London 1954), C. Freedman, *The Conseil d'Etat in Modern France* (New York 1961), and J.-P. Negrin, *Le Conseil d'Etat et la vie publique en France depuis 1958* (Paris 1968).

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

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as it is, the role of the Grands Corps, the role of ministerial cabinets, the political role of the administrative elite, and the functioning of one of France's most important institutions, remain yet to be studied.

III

The writings of French specialists, even when they are not jurists, on the French administration, clearly illustrate that this institution occupies something approaching a sanctified position in the hearts of its students, who appear to share the view that the administration ought not to be treated like other institutions. In their eyes, to analyze the administration as though it were any other institution would be tantamount to dissecting the State. This explains why even those studies that profess to take a novel approach scarcely go beyond examining the administration from the point of view of the jurists, "from the exterior, not from *within,* in its pathology (jurisprudence), in its regulatory aspects, as opposed to its anatomical and functional ones. . . ."[67]

These studies also evidence, as we noted earlier, a marked ideological conservatism that avoids a rigorous analysis of existing institutions for fear that this may lead to a questioning of their *raison d'être*. This is clear not only in the juridical studies but in those studies, like Belorgey's, Siwek-Pouydesseau's, Kessler's, and the *Traité*, that profess to take as their point of departure the "scientific" approach. The "scientific" elements, as is patent in the works of Siwek-Pouydesseau and Kessler, consists in no more than paying lip-service to "sociology," "political science" and "empiricism"—a method scarcely sufficient to mask the ideological bias of these works.

Yet another factor that helps explain the hitherto unfruitful methods of studying the French administration is the teaching of public administration in France, which emphasizes the acquisition of a given body of material and which tends to discourage research. It remains largely in the hands of those brought up in the juridical tradition, who have been largely insulated from more modern tools of analysis. At the Institutes of Political Science and in the Law Faculties, the teaching of public administration falls almost totally within the purview of administrative law. Also, many civil servants teach in these institutions and they themselves have been steeped in administrative law. Moreover, many of these teachers belong to the Conseil d'Etat, and this undoubtedly serves to accentuate the emphasis in law. With such a heavy emphasis on law, and all the order and simplicity that this implies for

[67] A. Bertrand and M. Long, "L'Enseignement supérieur des sciences administratives en France," in *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*, I (1960), 9.

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the functioning of the administration, it is not surprising to find the view expressed that empirical research is not wholly desirable or necessary where the study of public administration is concerned. In other words, where those who serve the state are also given large responsibilities in the teaching of how that state operates, there is bound to be a certain lack of objectivity in the transmission of knowledge, as well as a reluctance to delve too deeply into the mechanism of the state apparatus.

Still another, and perhaps more crucial, reason for the intellectual timidity that has tended to render sterile the study of public administration in France has to do with the particular tradition of French political science, a tradition that has generally tended to look askance at empirical investigations, considering them to be no more than a costly American hocus-pocus that yields little more than we already know. To be sure, American social scientists have all too often been guilty of collecting data for data's sake; but it is doubtful whether this alone would have warranted the total rejection of the methods they employ. Rather, this is, more likely than not, a rationalization for holding on tenaciously to the familiar and treating as suspect that which is new and bound to disturb. As the former Dean of the Paris Law Faculty, a man deeply steeped in the traditional approach, has noted: "When a certain number of men proclaim the need for entering a specifically new field of research, or for adopting a new perspective toward subjects that have already been studied, the first reaction is one of distrust. These men are upsetting the neat picture of the sciences to which everyone has grown accustomed."[68]

This is clearly illustrated by the reception accorded to, and by the subsequent influence of, Michel Crozier's *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*.[69] Almost seven years have now passed since Crozier's study was published, and it is as evident as it is unfortunate that its influence has been remarkably small in French academic circles compared to the wide influence it has had elsewhere. Outside Crozier's own Groupe de Sociologie des Organisations, whose work is discussed below, his work has stimulated little research in France. Precisely because of its extraordinarily ambitious scope and wide generalizations based, ultimately, on limited data, Crozier's study ought to have stimulated a fruitful debate that might have led to certain re-interpretations and modifications of his analysis of French institutions. What is interesting about

[68] Vedel, *Traité*, 5. Empirical political studies in France have never gone much beyond electoral analysis.

[69] (Chicago 1964.)

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The Bureaucratic Phenomenon is not that it answers all questions about French institutions and society, though it does offer an overall theory, but that it poses numerous questions that could be answered only in further detailed studies. We have to bear in mind that Crozier's data are based on surveys with low-level civil servants. Is what is true of low-level civil servants also true of the *grands commis*, let alone of French society? I have found, for example, that Crozier's analysis of the lowest civil servants (the *dirigés*) could not be used to explain the behavior of higher civil servants (the *dirigeants*). The congruence Crozier establishes between two specialized administrative agencies and French society is at once the key to his thesis and the aspect most open to debate. But whereas the study was widely acclaimed outside France, and particularly in the United States, in Crozier's own country it was severely attacked as a "neo-liberal," ideologically inspired work,[70] and it has had little impact there on students of French society and administration. To be sure, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* is usually cited in most studies on the French administration, but one is hardly able to gather from these studies that it constitutes the most stimulating analysis of the French bureaucracy published so far.

IV

If, as we have seen, the academic approach to the study of public administration in France over the past several years has been rather stagnant and has brought forth little fresh information, there have been two other approaches that, if they have contributed little methodologically, have nevertheless helped to pinpoint a number of crucial questions.

The first of these is what might be called the polemical approach, and is perhaps best represented by the works of Jacques Mandrin (a pseudonym for three young socialists who are graduates of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration), and those of Mendès-France.[71] Although these works are highly polemical and ideological (Mandrin looks forward to the day when France will be administered by "*le fonctionnaire socialiste*"),[72] they nevertheless have the merit of treating some key issues, such as recruitment, training, and the class basis of the French

[70] Alain Touraine, "Le Rationalisme libéral de Michel Crozier," *Sociologie du Travail*, VI (April-June 1964), 188-97. See Crozier's rejoinder to this attack, "Le Volontarisme d'Alain Touraine," *Sociologie du Travail*, VI (July-September 1964), 301-305.

[71] See Jacques Mandrin, *L'Enarchie ou les mandrins de la société bourgeoise* (Paris 1967), and Pierre Mendès-France, "La République des jeunes messieurs," *Courrier de la République*, XXXIV (Nov. 1965).

[72] Mandrin, 151.

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administration. They attempt to be neither empirical nor objective. These polemical works ought properly to be distinguished from the rapidly proliferating satirical works on the French administration, which no doubt aspire to do for the French administration of the twentieth century what Balzac, Courteline, and Stendhal did for that of the nineteenth. It cannot, of course, be said that there exists in France today any fiction writer of talent who has chosen the administration as his major theme; and, whatever their merits, neither Georges Elgozy nor Paul Pasteur has enhanced our understanding of administrative life in the way that Balzac did in *Les Employés* or Stendhal in *Lucien Leuwen*.[73]

The attempt to grapple with some of the key problems of a centralized state is what we may call the *critical* approach. Clearly, only the best of the critical studies are distinguishable from the polemical studies, for the line between polemics and criticism is often very thin. The critical studies to which I am referring are not generally written from a particular ideological or political perspective. Their point of departure is that they do not accept the centralized state as a given, as do all the academic studies. In addition to putting forth numerous ideas, they generally make good use of the little solid information that is available. One recent example of this approach is René Mayer's *Féodalité ou Démocratie?*,[74] which contains a number of shrewd observations about the administrative mentality, or style. These observations, dealing in large part with the administration's mode of behavior toward the elected officials and the public, as well as with conflicts within the administration itself, suggests a dialectical relation between the administration and society that requires further detailed study. What Mayer is concerned with, above all, is the effect of centralization on the functioning of the state. He has relied for his information on his own first-hand knowledge as a civil servant, as well as on the little empirical information that exists.[75]

Another such study, equally nonacademic in approach but somewhat more wide-ranging in scope, is the recently published *Pour nationaliser*

[73] Georges Elgozy uses the administration as a vehicle for trying out his literary talents. See his *Le Paradoxe des technocrates* (Paris 1966) and *Lettre ouverte à un jeune technocrate* (Paris 1968). These works are studded with literary allusions, but they do no more than compound the popular image of Courteline's *rond-de-cuir*. Unlike Balzac or Stendhal, Elgozy is more concerned with his own literary references than with using his talents to describe a particular world. In the same vein, though somewhat less irritating, are the two books by Paul Pasteur, *La Dictature des ronds-de-cuir* (Vichy 1965) and *Chinoiseries des mandrins* (Vichy 1968).

[74] (Paris 1968.)

[75] As we shall see below, the empirical information available on the French administration is derived almost solely from studies on *local* administration.

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l'Etat,[76] a collaborative effort by twenty people, most of whom are higher civil servants. Its central theme is the corrosive effect of an excessively centralized state on society. Because many of the authors are higher civil servants, they quite properly insist that at the heart of the French administrative system stands the Ministry of National Economy and Finance, and that in order to understand what centralization means in practice it is necessary to understand the all-pervasive role of this ministry.[77] From their analysis of the Ministry of Finance, the authors proceed to discuss the relation of the state to local government, to private enterprise, to health, to education, to employment, and to urbanism, devoting a chapter to each subject. The book contains proposals for reform as well as criticism and it begins and ends with a plea for "returning the state to the nation"—which, as M. Bloch-Lainé, one of the authors, has explained, means that "the citizens, who constitute the Nation, must be able to say: *L'Etat c'est nous*—as Louis XIV used to say: *L'Etat c'est moi*—we believe that this is not the case at the present time."[78] The premise of *Pour nationaliser l'Etat* is thus diametrically opposed to that which forms the basis of Belorgey's *Le Gouvernement et l'administration de la France*. For the authors of the former work, as for Mayer, the state exists to serve its citizens democratically and efficiently; it does not exist to be revered and served.

Both *Féodalité ou Democratie?* and *Pour nationaliser l'Etat* consist essentially of essays and are not, nor do they pretend to be, studies in depth. They suggest numerous themes that require further study and they recognize very well the paucity of available information on an institution about which so much has come to be written. Indeed, the authors of *Pour nationaliser l'Etat* note that their book "has as its chief aim to stimulate other works in the same spirit, but more complete, more thorough, and more persuasive."[79] Both, it should be remembered, are only examples of works that aim at stripping the state of its halo, an undertaking whose origin may be traced to the publication of the Club Jean Moulin's, *L'Etat et le citoyen*.[80] What is also of interest is

[76] (Paris 1968.)

[77] See Jean Monthen, "Un château-fort médiéval: le ministère de l'Economie et des Finances," *Esprit*, Special Number (January 1970), 140-54.

[78] See the transcript of the important interview of François Bloch-Lainé with Albert du Roy, Europe No. 1, *Europe-Soir*, December 27, 1968, 2.

[79] *Pour Nationaliser l'Etat*, 11.

[80] See also the Club Jean Moulin's, *Les Citoyens au pouvoir* (Paris 1968), and Michel Crozier's recently published *La Société bloquée* (Paris 1970). It is interesting that many of the civil servants who originally formed or joined the Club did so in opposition to the Algerian war and later to de Gaulle's regime. Gradually, however, the dissidents came to terms with the regime, so that today many of the regime's strongest former critics occupy important posts in the government. Concomitantly, the role of the Club

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that many higher civil servants with a reformist bent have participated in this undertaking. A discussion of it, however brief, would be incomplete without emphasizing the profound intellectual influence of François Bloch-Lainé, a civil servant who became Director of the Treasury at the age of thirty-three and who, as head of the Crédit Lyonnais, has been chiefly concerned with reforming the administration and making it more responsive to those it serves. As a teacher and as a higher civil servant he has had a remarkable influence on a whole generation of civil servants.

It is interesting to note that some of the best writings on the French administration have come from the pens of civil servants, and often from politicians. The analysis of the administration and its problems by civil servants was more frequent in the past than it is today.[81] Indeed, under the Third Republic it would have been difficult to come across academic studies offering equally penetrating insights into and an understanding of the French administration. This helps, perhaps, to explain why those whose profession it is to study public administration in France have seldom been called upon to lend a hand in administrative reforms.[82]

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I have argued that, essentially, the study of French public administration has been stymied by three factors. First, the various approaches used hitherto—the juridical, the technical, and the philosophical—have outlived their usefulness. The most traditional scholars now recognize this to be the case.[83] Second, a certain intellectual timidity has confined even those studies that profess to use a novel approach—like the studies of Siwek-Pouydesseau, Kessler, and the *Traité*—more or less to the traditional framework. Third, the ideological bias of many of these works precludes *a priori* the posing of certain imperative questions. We may add another factor: the penchant for theorizing that characterizes

has seen a sharp decline in importance, and it is scarcely able to sustain the interest of the remaining members.

[81] See Henri Chardon, *Le Pouvoir administratif* (Paris 1911) and *L'Administration de la France* (Paris 1908); Georges-Cahen, *Les Fonctionnaires* (Paris 1911); Georges Dermartial, *Le Personnel des ministères* (Paris 1906); Henri Noel, *Les Ministères* (Paris 1911); Alexandre Lefas, *L'Etat et les fonctionnaires* (Paris 1913); André Tardieu, *La Révolution à refaire* (Paris 1937); Léon Blum, *La Réforme gouvernementale* (Paris 1936). This book was first published in 1918 and was re-issued in the year that Blum became head of the Popular Front government.

[82] See Lanza, *Les Projets de réforme administrative en France*. It is interesting to note that of the forty-seven members of the Commission created in October 1968 to study the problems of E.N.A., only three held academic posts.

[83] Vedel, *Traité*, 15.

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much of French scholarship notwithstanding, the field of public administration has given rise to few theories. Consequently, the point of departure for a would-be researcher in this field is never very clear, for he has nothing more than some varied and inchoate propositions from which to launch his study.

The result has been that the administration has not been analyzed sociologically as an organizational system or systems, or sociopolitically as an organization that operates within a dialectical framework as opposed to a void. It has been seen, rather, as *sui generis* and thus not subject to analysis by means applicable to other institutions. I have stressed particularly the failing of the academic studies because they are the ones that are essentially responsible for our understanding, or misunderstanding, of the French bureaucracy and also because it is the scholars who are expected to possess the methods, expertise, and time necessary for detailed studies of the anatomies of societies and institutions. As for the broader questions of centralization versus decentralization, of administrative oligarchy and its social basis, and of the undemocratic and inefficient nature of the "technocratic" state, these have been totally shunned by the scholars and left to the polemicists and critics, most of whose vigorous and often brilliant criticisms remain unanalyzed and unanswered.

All this leads us to the paradox that the central institution in French society, about which so much has been written, remains almost totally unexplored. Although the approaches used thus far to study the French administration are not without importance, they cannot alone provide the basis for the necessary body of knowledge required for an understanding of this institution. They need, above all, to be supplemented by empirical studies. The chief argument against the empirical approach has usually been the "closed" nature of the bureaucracy, which tends to reject outside intruders—an argument that is, in fact, no more than a self-fulfilling prophesy.

The studies of Michel Crozier, *Petits fonctionnaires au travail* and *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*, ought to have been sufficient to demonstrate that the *méfiance* that forms such an important part of Crozier's analysis of groups in French society did not prevent Crozier from carrying out his own detailed studies of those who were most likely to mistrust anyone seeking to penetrate and understand the workings of their institutions. And it has been largely under Crozier's direction that a group of French sociologists—the Groupe de Sociologie des Organisations—has undertaken to study the administration within the framework of organizational theory.

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Thus, where the jurists have been ill-equipped and the political scientists unwilling, the sociologists have begun studying the French administration with a *method* that might be called scientific, in the sense that it is applicable without *a priori* prejudice to the study of organizations (public and private), of their relations to their environment, and of the sociology of work. In other words, the state administration is desanctified and no longer treated as *sui generis*. Most of this recent work on the administration by the sociologists has been undertaken at the local level because of the implicit belief, which might be contested, that the central administration can best be understood by prior analysis of the local administration. Actually, it would be more accurate to say that these studies deal with local *politics* rather than administration, a change of emphasis that itself is a major innovation in France and a happy corrective to the approach employed thus far.

The chief innovation of the sociological approach is that it views organizations as *dynamic* institutions—in other words, as embodying a set of power relations without which, as *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* demonstrated so well, no organization can be properly understood. Hitherto, the study of local institutions being confined to the domain of administrative law has always implied, above all, a denial of power relations within the institutions and between the institutions and their environment. This brings us to the second important innovation of the sociological approach: it sees organizations as being in direct contact with a specific environment. This contact forms a dialectical relation by which the organization is affected and to which it must adapt. One of the criticisms that have been made of Crozier's study is that in ignoring the external relations of the two organizations he studied, he missed the significance of *sanctions* that the environment can impose on the organizations and thereby affect their functioning. But, as is also recognized, this limitation was a self-imposed one on Crozier's part since his was very specifically a clinical approach to the study of organizations.[84] In the United States, studies of organizations have also tended, as James Q. Wilson has recently noted, to be more concerned with the internal mechanism of organizations rather than with the relationship of the organizations to their clientele.[85] In France, however, most of the recent work on the sociology of organizations has aimed at viewing organizations in conjunction with their environment, since

[84] Pierre Grémion, "Introduction à une étude du système politico-administratif local," *Sociologie du Travail*, XII (January-March 1970), 63. Nevertheless, Crozier's study does suffer as a result of this limitation.

[85] James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior* (New York 1970), 2.

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the need for constant adaptation is, to a large extent, externally imposed.[86]

The sociological approach to the study of organizations has been used by Jean-Pierre Worms in his *Une Préfecture comme organisation*,[87] which examines the workings of a prefecture in its internal as well as external aspects. It shows not merely how a prefecture is organized, but how it functions. Besides examining the attitudes of the civil servants of this organization toward their work and the network of relations within the organization, Worms's study also takes into account the malfunctioning of the prefecture that results from the differing views of their tasks of the Prefect and his subordinates.[88] The prefecture also has a clientele or public that constitutes the environment within which it operates, and this aspect of the organization's work is excellently discussed by Worms. In an earlier essay, Worms analyzed the relation of the Prefect to the local "notables" and found it to be characterized by a profound mutual dependence[89] resulting in collusion that worked to the detriment of the central authorities. If we compare the work of Worms and that of Siwek-Pouydesseau on the Prefects,[90] we become immediately aware of two very different approaches: Worms views the institution as a dynamic and integral component of the politico-administrative system, while Siwek-Pouydesseau regards the institution as being a world unto itself *without* a complex network of relationships. It is in the method used by Worms that the mechanisms of the prefectoral institution are best revealed to us precisely because this method rests upon a sociology of organizations that takes into account the written rules prescribing functions, while at the same time analyzing the means by which these regulations are adhered to, or, more often than not, circumvented.

The approach adopted in *Une Préfecture comme organisation* has also been used by Worms and Pierre Grémion in their *Les Institutions régionales et la société locale*.[91] It was the creation in 1964 of an intermediary institution between the state and the *département*—the Region—that led to this study, which is perhaps the best one available on the relation between the administration and its immediate environment

[86] See Robert Pagès, "L'élasticité d'une organisation en crise de direction," *Sociologie du Travail*, VII (October-December 1965).

[87] (Paris 1968.)

[88] *Ibid.*, 155.

[89] See Worms's, "Le Préfet et ses notables," *Sociologie du Travail*, VIII (July-September 1966), 246-75. For the mayor's view of the prefect, see Mark Kesselman, *The Ambiguous Consensus: A Study of Local Government in France* (New York 1967), 95.

[90] See Siwek-Pouydesseau, *Le Corps préfectoral.*

[91] (Paris 1969.)

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as well as on the adaptation of both to the changed institutions created by the 1964 administrative reform.[92] The authors show how, after having opposed the reform, the local elites directly affected by it were able to recreate the same institutional patterns and relations that had existed prior to the reform and thus render the reform nugatory. That the authors chose to conduct their study in two regions—Champagne and Aquitaine—testifies to their awareness of the complexity of the administrative structure in France, which affects and is profoundly affected by regional factors. Moreover, even within regions, profound differences exist between rural and urban communes, the power of one elite being greater in the one than in the other. Friedberg and Thoenig have shown in another study[93] how the urbanization of France brought about a power struggle between two technical corps, the *ingénieurs des Ponts et Chaussées* and the *ingénieurs des Travaux Publics*. When the former decided to shift their major field of activity from the countryside to the cities they encroached upon the domain of the latter, who are technically their subordinates. The *ingénieurs des Travaux Publics* (public works engineers) then sought to take advantage of this situation and to alter the hierarchical relation between them and their superiors. The *ingénieurs des Ponts et Chaussées* (civil engineers), on the other hand, at once sought to preserve their own hierarchical superiority and to take over the construction of new towns. This corps might very easily have sought to shore up its declining prestige by turning to another domain. That they chose to do so in the area of urban development was due partly to chance and partly to the extreme importance attached to the construction of new towns in France. One result of this conflict between the two corps is that urban development becomes subordinated to considerations of internecine rivalry. As the authors of this study note, "In this context, constructing the city becomes a secondary objective. The power relationships between corps within the administration impose their logic on the urban policy envisaged by the civil servants."[94] We can see from this study how geographic and demographic factors exert their influence on administrative behavior and, ultimately, on public policy.

[92] How this reform was conceived and modified as those responsible for its conception were succeeded by others is currently the subject of a survey that promises to give rise to the first major decision-making study of the French administration. For the preliminary results of this study, see Catherine Grémion, "Les Structures du système de décision de la haute administration française," Mimeo., Groupe de Sociologie des Organisations, Paris, November 1969.

[93] Erhard Friedberg and J.-C. Thoenig, "Politique urbaines et stratégies corporatives," *Sociologie du Travail*, Special Number, XI (October-December 1969).

[94] *Ibid.*, 388.

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It will suffice to mention one further study in this genre, the recently published *Les Services extérieurs du Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances dans le système de décision départemental* by François D'Arcy and Pierre Grémion.[95] This study examines the regional services of three *directions* of the Ministry of Finance. It bears on attitudes and mechanisms and shows the lack of a uniform pattern in the relation of the regional services to their public. Even within a single ministry, different *directions* establish different types of relations with their clientele. The pattern of relations depends on numerous factors: the function performed—i.e., whether it is collecting taxes or verifying prices—the social status of the representative of the central administration, which varies according to type of commune, and the flexibility with regard to the application of laws, which depends on the degree of personal contact the representative of the central ministry has with the local authorities. Flexibility is greater in small rural communes than in urban centers, where there is a tendency to apply the law blindly.

These studies of the sociology of administrative organization constitute the first genuinely empirical approach to the study of the French bureaucracy. That the studies have thus far largely centered on local institutions in no way detracts from their contribution.[96] For what is of crucial importance is the introduction, in France, of a wholly new approach to the study of organizations in general, and of the bureaucracy in particular. It is unfortunate, however, that because of the form of publication these studies are not widely disseminated and have, therefore, only a very limited audience. Nevertheless, this approach will, it is to be hoped, stimulate studies of the central administration that adopt a similar framework.[97] Above all, it is this empirical approach and not what has been labeled *science administrative* that represents a new direction, one that is long overdue and that will eventually lead us to a better understanding of the French bureaucracy, of the relation between state and society in France, and of the manner in which the state bureaucracy impinges upon the political system.

[95] (Paris 1969.)

[96] The detailed study of local administration has also more or less preceded the study of the central administration in Italy. See Franco Demarchi, *L'Ideologia del funzionario* (Milan 1969) and P. Ammassari and others, *Il Burocrate di Fronte alla Burocrazia* (Milan 1969).

[97] See the excellent article by Jacques Lautman and Jean-Claude Thoenig, "Conflits internes et unité d'action: le cas d'une administration centrale," *Sociologie du Travail*, VIII (July-September 1966), 296-316.

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